Narrative:

The captain was PF. We were cleared for a visual approach 20 mi northwest by approach control. Radio frequency not active, quiet. Cockpit was sterile form cruise to landing. Approach control failed to hand us off to tower. We landed on runway 13 and I discovered on the rollout, we were still on approach control frequency. After pointing out to the captain, I transferred the tower frequency from standby to active mode. The captain asked me if we had landed without clearance. I stated I believe we had. The tower controller then asked if we had received a late handoff and the captain advised 'affirmative.' he said to contact ground control. The captain then called the tower via telephone and when I questioned how it went, the captain advised 'it was taken care of.' a discussion did not follow as the captain would not speak about the occurrence for the remainder of the shift. The cockpit was filled with much tension. I advised the captain I thought it would be wise to complete NASA reports and the captain did not respond, period. I had flown with this captain several weeks prior. The captain is a new upgrade with mostly a flight instructor background. Very little multi-crew experience and essentially no cockpit resource management training. The captain is extremely weak with cockpit resource management and situational awareness. The captain has advised, on a previous shift, that first officer's should not be 'right-seat capts.' their input/assistance is unwelcome, even during high workload sits. She will not even acknowledge your concerns. The contributing factors: 1) lack of adequate cockpit communication between crewmembers, the captain's inability to confirm clrncs, altitudes, headings, etc, the captain's dangerous attitude in regard to not seeking assistance, or input from first officer's. The captain flies the airplane as single pilot operation. The first officer's willingness to communicate openly hindered by above, lack of cockpit resource management training for crewmembers, 2) failure to issue a handoff from approach control to tower, 3) lack of xmissions on frequency very quiet radio. The corrective actions: 1) educate and train all crewmembers thorough with cockpit resource management, 2) make available to crewmembers a means to communication potential problems such as this to chief pilot (ie, a form or hotline).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER LTT LANDS WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative: THE CAPT WAS PF. WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH 20 MI NW BY APCH CTL. RADIO FREQ NOT ACTIVE, QUIET. COCKPIT WAS STERILE FORM CRUISE TO LNDG. APCH CTL FAILED TO HAND US OFF TO TWR. WE LANDED ON RWY 13 AND I DISCOVERED ON THE ROLLOUT, WE WERE STILL ON APCH CTL FREQ. AFTER POINTING OUT TO THE CAPT, I TRANSFERRED THE TWR FREQ FROM STANDBY TO ACTIVE MODE. THE CAPT ASKED ME IF WE HAD LANDED WITHOUT CLRNC. I STATED I BELIEVE WE HAD. THE TWR CTLR THEN ASKED IF WE HAD RECEIVED A LATE HDOF AND THE CAPT ADVISED 'AFFIRMATIVE.' HE SAID TO CONTACT GND CTL. THE CAPT THEN CALLED THE TWR VIA TELEPHONE AND WHEN I QUESTIONED HOW IT WENT, THE CAPT ADVISED 'IT WAS TAKEN CARE OF.' A DISCUSSION DID NOT FOLLOW AS THE CAPT WOULD NOT SPEAK ABOUT THE OCCURRENCE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE SHIFT. THE COCKPIT WAS FILLED WITH MUCH TENSION. I ADVISED THE CAPT I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE WISE TO COMPLETE NASA RPTS AND THE CAPT DID NOT RESPOND, PERIOD. I HAD FLOWN WITH THIS CAPT SEVERAL WEEKS PRIOR. THE CAPT IS A NEW UPGRADE WITH MOSTLY A FLT INSTRUCTOR BACKGROUND. VERY LITTLE MULTI-CREW EXPERIENCE AND ESSENTIALLY NO COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT TRAINING. THE CAPT IS EXTREMELY WEAK WITH COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. THE CAPT HAS ADVISED, ON A PREVIOUS SHIFT, THAT FO'S SHOULD NOT BE 'R-SEAT CAPTS.' THEIR INPUT/ASSISTANCE IS UNWELCOME, EVEN DURING HIGH WORKLOAD SITS. SHE WILL NOT EVEN ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR CONCERNS. THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) LACK OF ADEQUATE COCKPIT COM BTWN CREWMEMBERS, THE CAPT'S INABILITY TO CONFIRM CLRNCS, ALTS, HDGS, ETC, THE CAPT'S DANGEROUS ATTITUDE IN REGARD TO NOT SEEKING ASSISTANCE, OR INPUT FROM FO'S. THE CAPT FLIES THE AIRPLANE AS SINGLE PLT OP. THE FO'S WILLINGNESS TO COMMUNICATE OPENLY HINDERED BY ABOVE, LACK OF COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT TRAINING FOR CREWMEMBERS, 2) FAILURE TO ISSUE A HDOF FROM APCH CTL TO TWR, 3) LACK OF XMISSIONS ON FREQ VERY QUIET RADIO. THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1) EDUCATE AND TRAIN ALL CREWMEMBERS THOROUGH WITH COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT, 2) MAKE AVAILABLE TO CREWMEMBERS A MEANS TO COM POTENTIAL PROBS SUCH AS THIS TO CHIEF PLT (IE, A FORM OR HOTLINE).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.