Narrative:

On mar/sun/95, at flabob airport, riverside, ca (rir), the WX was hazy with 3 mi visibility. Not having flown the cessna 310 for 4 months, I was performing the 3 required touch-and-goes to reestablish my currency. On my second approach to flabob airport, after reporting 'crosswind' and 'turning downwind' on unicom 122.8, I heard 2 pilots report their position as 'downwind' runway 25 flabob. Flabob's active runway at the time was runway 24, corona airport's (L66) active runway that day was runway 25. I believed that these pilots either incorrectly indicated airport of intended landing or incorrectly indicated runway heading. My attention was diverted as I attempted to visually confirm their actual position. Thus, I neglected to perform my 'gumps.' additional visually-confirmed traffic in the pattern included a luscombe on final and a mooney turning base, both reporting flabob runway 24 in sight. The luscomb, at this point, was making a touchdown. I decided to maintain altitude and execute a go around at the same time that the mooney made the decision to go around, based on the confusion over where, in fact, these 2 pilots actually were. I determined that the previously mentioned aircraft were at corona, not a flabob as they had reported. As I turned base at pattern altitude, I reconsidered my decision to go around, and decided to institute a landing. I entered landing profile establishing proper airspeed and altitude. On short final, I decreased power. A horn sounded, which I incorrectly interpreted as being a stall warning horn. My attention was diverted to analyzing the reason for the horn, I believed that if it was, indeed, the stall horn, it may have been malfunctioning, given that my airspeed was indicating well above stall speed. I heard the propeller 'ting,' and realized that the horn had been indicating gear up, not stall. I cut the throttles, mixture, and propeller, and concentrated on maintaining control despite the inevitable consequence. 3 issues need to be addressed. First, despite having made over 600 lndgs in the cessna C-310 and reestablishing my currency countless times with no negative events, I now believe that I should have been accompanied by an instructor. We must take into consideration the fact that a pilot, despite a perfect flying record, still lacks proficiency after a period of inactivity and is vulnerable to errors. Second, taking into consideration the high number of uncontrolled airports and the volume of aircraft in southern california, the need for more unicom frequencys is apparent. Third, the stall warning horn and the gear warning horn in the early C-310 have such great similarity in their intensity and tone when heard through noise-attenuating headsets, that is inevitable a pilot could easily become confused, and misinterpret one for the other. Although cessna had corrected that situation in their b-model aircraft by adding a flasher to pulse the audible tone of the gear warning, flight instruction still needs to include methods of differentiating between the stall indication and gear-up indication.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GEAR UP LNDG IN A CESSNA 310.

Narrative: ON MAR/SUN/95, AT FLABOB ARPT, RIVERSIDE, CA (RIR), THE WX WAS HAZY WITH 3 MI VISIBILITY. NOT HAVING FLOWN THE CESSNA 310 FOR 4 MONTHS, I WAS PERFORMING THE 3 REQUIRED TOUCH-AND-GOES TO REESTABLISH MY CURRENCY. ON MY SECOND APCH TO FLABOB ARPT, AFTER RPTING 'XWIND' AND 'TURNING DOWNWIND' ON UNICOM 122.8, I HEARD 2 PLTS RPT THEIR POS AS 'DOWNWIND' RWY 25 FLABOB. FLABOB'S ACTIVE RWY AT THE TIME WAS RWY 24, CORONA ARPT'S (L66) ACTIVE RWY THAT DAY WAS RWY 25. I BELIEVED THAT THESE PLTS EITHER INCORRECTLY INDICATED ARPT OF INTENDED LNDG OR INCORRECTLY INDICATED RWY HDG. MY ATTN WAS DIVERTED AS I ATTEMPTED TO VISUALLY CONFIRM THEIR ACTUAL POS. THUS, I NEGLECTED TO PERFORM MY 'GUMPS.' ADDITIONAL VISUALLY-CONFIRMED TFC IN THE PATTERN INCLUDED A LUSCOMBE ON FINAL AND A MOONEY TURNING BASE, BOTH RPTING FLABOB RWY 24 IN SIGHT. THE LUSCOMB, AT THIS POINT, WAS MAKING A TOUCHDOWN. I DECIDED TO MAINTAIN ALT AND EXECUTE A GAR AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE MOONEY MADE THE DECISION TO GAR, BASED ON THE CONFUSION OVER WHERE, IN FACT, THESE 2 PLTS ACTUALLY WERE. I DETERMINED THAT THE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED ACFT WERE AT CORONA, NOT A FLABOB AS THEY HAD RPTED. AS I TURNED BASE AT PATTERN ALT, I RECONSIDERED MY DECISION TO GAR, AND DECIDED TO INSTITUTE A LNDG. I ENTERED LNDG PROFILE ESTABLISHING PROPER AIRSPD AND ALT. ON SHORT FINAL, I DECREASED PWR. A HORN SOUNDED, WHICH I INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED AS BEING A STALL WARNING HORN. MY ATTN WAS DIVERTED TO ANALYZING THE REASON FOR THE HORN, I BELIEVED THAT IF IT WAS, INDEED, THE STALL HORN, IT MAY HAVE BEEN MALFUNCTIONING, GIVEN THAT MY AIRSPD WAS INDICATING WELL ABOVE STALL SPD. I HEARD THE PROP 'TING,' AND REALIZED THAT THE HORN HAD BEEN INDICATING GEAR UP, NOT STALL. I CUT THE THROTTLES, MIXTURE, AND PROP, AND CONCENTRATED ON MAINTAINING CTL DESPITE THE INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE. 3 ISSUES NEED TO BE ADDRESSED. FIRST, DESPITE HAVING MADE OVER 600 LNDGS IN THE CESSNA C-310 AND REESTABLISHING MY CURRENCY COUNTLESS TIMES WITH NO NEGATIVE EVENTS, I NOW BELIEVE THAT I SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY AN INSTRUCTOR. WE MUST TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE FACT THAT A PLT, DESPITE A PERFECT FLYING RECORD, STILL LACKS PROFICIENCY AFTER A PERIOD OF INACTIVITY AND IS VULNERABLE TO ERRORS. SECOND, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE HIGH NUMBER OF UNCTLED ARPTS AND THE VOLUME OF ACFT IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, THE NEED FOR MORE UNICOM FREQS IS APPARENT. THIRD, THE STALL WARNING HORN AND THE GEAR WARNING HORN IN THE EARLY C-310 HAVE SUCH GREAT SIMILARITY IN THEIR INTENSITY AND TONE WHEN HEARD THROUGH NOISE-ATTENUATING HEADSETS, THAT IS INEVITABLE A PLT COULD EASILY BECOME CONFUSED, AND MISINTERPRET ONE FOR THE OTHER. ALTHOUGH CESSNA HAD CORRECTED THAT SIT IN THEIR B-MODEL ACFT BY ADDING A FLASHER TO PULSE THE AUDIBLE TONE OF THE GEAR WARNING, FLT INSTRUCTION STILL NEEDS TO INCLUDE METHODS OF DIFFERENTIATING BTWN THE STALL INDICATION AND GEAR-UP INDICATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.