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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 301478 |
Time | |
Date | 199504 |
Day | Tue |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : lax |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 500 msl bound upper : 5000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : lax |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | Other Other |
Flight Phase | climbout : intermediate altitude |
Route In Use | departure other departure sid : sid |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
ASRS Report | 301478 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : clearance other anomaly other other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
I was met at lax operations by (air carrier company ground personnel) and briefed that we were to conduct a test of the angel 1 FMS procedure and he brought to my attention a note attached to our flight plan. My first officer was to fly the departure and I initially briefed him to engage LNAV instead of heading select after takeoff. We both had our 10-3-1 plates out. I then read the takeoff note section and that is when I made the mistake of using the runway 24 takeoff procedure instead of the runway 25. I changed the brief to a 250 heading select and to expect direct pevee. The next error I made was to not read the flight plan note carefully enough as regards notifying each controling agency that we were flying the angel 1. The note was clear and the 10-3-1 page was clear. I made a pilot error which as PIC I was totally responsible. Later I re-read the 10-3-1 page so carefully that I even noticed a typo error in the last sentence of visibility instead of via. If only I had read it that carefully before the fact. I think that the angel 1 FMS procedure would be a big benefit to pilots and controllers and I deeply regret that I was responsible for the termination of the test.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CAPT OF A WDB FAILED TO FOLLOW THE RTING AND ATC NOTIFICATIONS DURING A DEP OF A NEW DEP PROC.
Narrative: I WAS MET AT LAX OPS BY (ACR CGP) AND BRIEFED THAT WE WERE TO CONDUCT A TEST OF THE ANGEL 1 FMS PROC AND HE BROUGHT TO MY ATTN A NOTE ATTACHED TO OUR FLT PLAN. MY FO WAS TO FLY THE DEP AND I INITIALLY BRIEFED HIM TO ENGAGE LNAV INSTEAD OF HDG SELECT AFTER TKOF. WE BOTH HAD OUR 10-3-1 PLATES OUT. I THEN READ THE TKOF NOTE SECTION AND THAT IS WHEN I MADE THE MISTAKE OF USING THE RWY 24 TKOF PROC INSTEAD OF THE RWY 25. I CHANGED THE BRIEF TO A 250 HDG SELECT AND TO EXPECT DIRECT PEVEE. THE NEXT ERROR I MADE WAS TO NOT READ THE FLT PLAN NOTE CAREFULLY ENOUGH AS REGARDS NOTIFYING EACH CTLING AGENCY THAT WE WERE FLYING THE ANGEL 1. THE NOTE WAS CLR AND THE 10-3-1 PAGE WAS CLR. I MADE A PLT ERROR WHICH AS PIC I WAS TOTALLY RESPONSIBLE. LATER I RE-READ THE 10-3-1 PAGE SO CAREFULLY THAT I EVEN NOTICED A TYPO ERROR IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF VIS INSTEAD OF VIA. IF ONLY I HAD READ IT THAT CAREFULLY BEFORE THE FACT. I THINK THAT THE ANGEL 1 FMS PROC WOULD BE A BIG BENEFIT TO PLTS AND CTLRS AND I DEEPLY REGRET THAT I WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TERMINATION OF THE TEST.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.