Narrative:

After landing runway 21R at dtw, we cleared the runway and called for taxi clearance to the gate. The controller advised us that we were still on the approach control frequency. We then contacted the tower and were told to monitor ground control and taxi to the gate. We had apparently landed without contacting the tower. There was no loss of separation and no compromise of safety, only the miscom. The primary contributing factor was conflicting wbound traffic at our altitude in the vicinity of the OM. The approach controller was busy giving us avoidance vectors while the first officer and I were scanning visually for the traffic. The conflicting wbound traffic cleared the final approach course, at which time the controller confirmed with us that we had the field in visual contact. He then cleared us for the visual approach. We were exactly over the OM at this time completing the final descent checklist. This is normally the time the approach controller directs us to contact the tower, but in this case he failed to do so. This radio call by the approach controllers is the normal trigger that alerts us to call the tower. I believe that the approach controller, the first officer, and myself all had our attention diverted at the most inopportune moment by the conflicting traffic. Our company has adequate procedures in place to prevent this type of occurrence, but in this case the diversion of attention took place at a time of high workload for both pilots and controller, resulting in the subsequent miscom.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR FLC FAILED TO CONTACT THE TWR AND LANDED WITHOUT A CLRNC. A VISUAL APCH CLRNC WAS ACCEPTED, AND DURING DISTR OF CONFLICTING TFC, THE FREQ CHANGE WAS FORGOTTEN.

Narrative: AFTER LNDG RWY 21R AT DTW, WE CLRED THE RWY AND CALLED FOR TAXI CLRNC TO THE GATE. THE CTLR ADVISED US THAT WE WERE STILL ON THE APCH CTL FREQ. WE THEN CONTACTED THE TWR AND WERE TOLD TO MONITOR GND CTL AND TAXI TO THE GATE. WE HAD APPARENTLY LANDED WITHOUT CONTACTING THE TWR. THERE WAS NO LOSS OF SEPARATION AND NO COMPROMISE OF SAFETY, ONLY THE MISCOM. THE PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS CONFLICTING WBOUND TFC AT OUR ALT IN THE VICINITY OF THE OM. THE APCH CTLR WAS BUSY GIVING US AVOIDANCE VECTORS WHILE THE FO AND I WERE SCANNING VISUALLY FOR THE TFC. THE CONFLICTING WBOUND TFC CLRED THE FINAL APCH COURSE, AT WHICH TIME THE CTLR CONFIRMED WITH US THAT WE HAD THE FIELD IN VISUAL CONTACT. HE THEN CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL APCH. WE WERE EXACTLY OVER THE OM AT THIS TIME COMPLETING THE FINAL DSCNT CHKLIST. THIS IS NORMALLY THE TIME THE APCH CTLR DIRECTS US TO CONTACT THE TWR, BUT IN THIS CASE HE FAILED TO DO SO. THIS RADIO CALL BY THE APCH CTLRS IS THE NORMAL TRIGGER THAT ALERTS US TO CALL THE TWR. I BELIEVE THAT THE APCH CTLR, THE FO, AND MYSELF ALL HAD OUR ATTN DIVERTED AT THE MOST INOPPORTUNE MOMENT BY THE CONFLICTING TFC. OUR COMPANY HAS ADEQUATE PROCS IN PLACE TO PREVENT THIS TYPE OF OCCURRENCE, BUT IN THIS CASE THE DIVERSION OF ATTN TOOK PLACE AT A TIME OF HIGH WORKLOAD FOR BOTH PLTS AND CTLR, RESULTING IN THE SUBSEQUENT MISCOM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.