Narrative:

At about 100 KTS on takeoff roll, a bird glanced over the windshield from right to left making light contact. Continued takeoff to avoid high speed abort. Contacted dispatch and maintenance control to see if situation warranted return for landing. Instruments steady and normal. Advised to continue. Made logbook write-up. No evidence of bird contact found upon inspection. Complicated by fact that operations inspector on jumpseat. We (first officer, inspector and myself) all had input in making decision to continue, but first officer later told me that he did not really feel free to state his views because they may have been contrary to blocks the FAA wanted filled. It's sad that, in addition to being safe, you have to be concerned with filling blocks for some monday morning quarterback who might violate you 3 months after the fact. In this light, the aviation community needs a list of current violation actions to clear up the gray areas of what to do when and or what the FAA really wants. By having a better understanding of what's going on within FAA, flcs would be able to function more efficiently in sits not covered by the book. Supplemental information from acn 303234: I did feel inhibited to recommend to the captain to abort and to return to the field for inspection. The FAA observer, at all times from arrival to the aircraft to landing in btr seemed to be very courteous and professional. I still felt inhibited to make recommendations to the captain.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BIRD STRIKE ON TKOF.

Narrative: AT ABOUT 100 KTS ON TKOF ROLL, A BIRD GLANCED OVER THE WINDSHIELD FROM R TO L MAKING LIGHT CONTACT. CONTINUED TKOF TO AVOID HIGH SPD ABORT. CONTACTED DISPATCH AND MAINT CTL TO SEE IF SIT WARRANTED RETURN FOR LNDG. INSTS STEADY AND NORMAL. ADVISED TO CONTINUE. MADE LOGBOOK WRITE-UP. NO EVIDENCE OF BIRD CONTACT FOUND UPON INSPECTION. COMPLICATED BY FACT THAT OPS INSPECTOR ON JUMPSEAT. WE (FO, INSPECTOR AND MYSELF) ALL HAD INPUT IN MAKING DECISION TO CONTINUE, BUT FO LATER TOLD ME THAT HE DID NOT REALLY FEEL FREE TO STATE HIS VIEWS BECAUSE THEY MAY HAVE BEEN CONTRARY TO BLOCKS THE FAA WANTED FILLED. IT'S SAD THAT, IN ADDITION TO BEING SAFE, YOU HAVE TO BE CONCERNED WITH FILLING BLOCKS FOR SOME MONDAY MORNING QUARTERBACK WHO MIGHT VIOLATE YOU 3 MONTHS AFTER THE FACT. IN THIS LIGHT, THE AVIATION COMMUNITY NEEDS A LIST OF CURRENT VIOLATION ACTIONS TO CLR UP THE GRAY AREAS OF WHAT TO DO WHEN AND OR WHAT THE FAA REALLY WANTS. BY HAVING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT'S GOING ON WITHIN FAA, FLCS WOULD BE ABLE TO FUNCTION MORE EFFICIENTLY IN SITS NOT COVERED BY THE BOOK. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 303234: I DID FEEL INHIBITED TO RECOMMEND TO THE CAPT TO ABORT AND TO RETURN TO THE FIELD FOR INSPECTION. THE FAA OBSERVER, AT ALL TIMES FROM ARR TO THE ACFT TO LNDG IN BTR SEEMED TO BE VERY COURTEOUS AND PROFESSIONAL. I STILL FELT INHIBITED TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CAPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.