Narrative:

On may/tue/95, acting as PIC and PNF, I departed deadhorse airport on a SVFR clearance. The WX was 500 ft overcast and 3 mi, whiteout conditions. Shortly after takeoff, FSS asked for a report on ht of the ceiling. I responded but FSS did not answer. As I cleared the class east surface area I called clear, again with no response. At this point I noticed navs flagged, low voltage and no load on generators. Generator fail lights were not on. I instructed my copilot to return to deadhorse airport. I shut off all non essential electrical system but we soon lost all electrical power, showing about 10 volts. We proceeded to deadhorse by pilotage, lowered the gear manually and landed without further incident. After landing with the help of a mechanic it was determined that the starter switches were in the 'on' position (taking the generators off-line and depleting the battery). It appears to me that prior to departure when completing the checklist, I put on all anti-icing equipment and inadvertently put on the starter switches instead of the automatic-ignitors which are in close proximity. Factors which I believe led to this oversight include: pressures from running behind schedule, passenger with no tickets (which pilots have to track down), last min changes in the number of passenger and load, and that I had just been informed that 1 passenger was about to have a baby (she was having contractions) and needed to get to our ultimate destination. I feel that on occasion there are too many responsibilities placed upon the pilots which have nothing to do with the safety of flight, such as poor manifests from village agents, leaving it up to pilots to deal with tickets, etc. It is a lesson to me that I could find myself in this situation in an aircraft in which I am very familiar. I think that I could have avoided this if I made a conscious effort to separate all outside distrs.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT EQUIP PROB, PLT INDUCED.

Narrative: ON MAY/TUE/95, ACTING AS PIC AND PNF, I DEPARTED DEADHORSE ARPT ON A SVFR CLRNC. THE WX WAS 500 FT OVCST AND 3 MI, WHITEOUT CONDITIONS. SHORTLY AFTER TKOF, FSS ASKED FOR A RPT ON HT OF THE CEILING. I RESPONDED BUT FSS DID NOT ANSWER. AS I CLRED THE CLASS E SURFACE AREA I CALLED CLR, AGAIN WITH NO RESPONSE. AT THIS POINT I NOTICED NAVS FLAGGED, LOW VOLTAGE AND NO LOAD ON GENERATORS. GENERATOR FAIL LIGHTS WERE NOT ON. I INSTRUCTED MY COPLT TO RETURN TO DEADHORSE ARPT. I SHUT OFF ALL NON ESSENTIAL ELECTRICAL SYS BUT WE SOON LOST ALL ELECTRICAL PWR, SHOWING ABOUT 10 VOLTS. WE PROCEEDED TO DEADHORSE BY PILOTAGE, LOWERED THE GEAR MANUALLY AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. AFTER LNDG WITH THE HELP OF A MECH IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE STARTER SWITCHES WERE IN THE 'ON' POS (TAKING THE GENERATORS OFF-LINE AND DEPLETING THE BATTERY). IT APPEARS TO ME THAT PRIOR TO DEP WHEN COMPLETING THE CHKLIST, I PUT ON ALL ANTI-ICING EQUIP AND INADVERTENTLY PUT ON THE STARTER SWITCHES INSTEAD OF THE AUTO-IGNITORS WHICH ARE IN CLOSE PROX. FACTORS WHICH I BELIEVE LED TO THIS OVERSIGHT INCLUDE: PRESSURES FROM RUNNING BEHIND SCHEDULE, PAX WITH NO TICKETS (WHICH PLTS HAVE TO TRACK DOWN), LAST MIN CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF PAX AND LOAD, AND THAT I HAD JUST BEEN INFORMED THAT 1 PAX WAS ABOUT TO HAVE A BABY (SHE WAS HAVING CONTRACTIONS) AND NEEDED TO GET TO OUR ULTIMATE DEST. I FEEL THAT ON OCCASION THERE ARE TOO MANY RESPONSIBILITIES PLACED UPON THE PLTS WHICH HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH THE SAFETY OF FLT, SUCH AS POOR MANIFESTS FROM VILLAGE AGENTS, LEAVING IT UP TO PLTS TO DEAL WITH TICKETS, ETC. IT IS A LESSON TO ME THAT I COULD FIND MYSELF IN THIS SIT IN AN ACFT IN WHICH I AM VERY FAMILIAR. I THINK THAT I COULD HAVE AVOIDED THIS IF I MADE A CONSCIOUS EFFORT TO SEPARATE ALL OUTSIDE DISTRS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.