Narrative:

This was on a training flight with a student and it was going to last 2 hours. But I arrived late from a previous flight with another student. The next student was in a hurry for a tennis lesson at XA00. I knew we would only have enough time for a 1 1/2 hour flight. The lesson would only take an hour or a little more. I spoke to pilot who flew the airplane before us. He said they had flown to mui and back. The flight was 2.3 hours. My student preflted the aircraft and said everything was ok. I asked him how much oil and fuel was on board. He said 5 quarts of oil and little low on fuel. I checked the airplane's flight log to figure out how much fuel was onboard. The flight log stated the airplane had flown 2.3 hours and had been fueled before the flight to mui. I turned the master switch on to check the gauges. The gauges read between 3/4 and 1/2 tank on both fuel cells. I then visually checked the fuel cells on top of the wings. I could see fuel and I physically touched it with my fingers. I had been taught, I teach, and I have used a rule of thumb, that is, if you touch the fuel you roughly have 1/2 tank or a little less. We were practicing maneuvers for about 35-40 mins when the engine began running rough. I immediately took control of the aircraft and started going through procedures to make the engine run smoothly. I had experienced problems with the carburetor and magnetos before and it felt like the same problem. The procedures seemed to take care of the roughness and I returned the airplane to the student. In the process of going through the procedures, I had turned towards the airport. At the time of the problems, we were at 2500 ft and about 5-7 mi from the airport. The student started flying away from the airport to set up for an entry into the traffic pattern. When the roughness recurred, I again took control of the aircraft and started flying directly toward the field. We were losing power and altitude as we headed toward the field. I was trying to maintain power and altitude but we were descending. The airport was in sight and I thought I could make the runway or taxiway. As we were getting closer, I realized I was not going to make the runway. I decided to pick the taxiway to land. We were still heading toward the airport and descending. I realized I was not going to make taxiway. I decided I could not make the field and turned towards a big road by the airport. The decision I made was the hardest decision I have ever made. I wanted to make the airport so badly. But it was either put the airplane into houses, try to hold altitude and make the field which could have resulted in a stall, or pick the safest place I could put the airplane down. Over the road were many power lines, highway signs, and stoplights. There were so many times I wanted to put the airplane down. But I couldn't because of the obstructions. I finally put the airplane down on the road safely. There were no injuries to us, anybody on the ground, and the airplane was not damaged. I learned the rule of thumb I use is not a good way to check the fuel. I know it is not reliable and I will never teach it or use it again. I learned a very pwrful lesson. This lesson I learned I can carry to students and any pilot. No one should go through what I did. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter had a hearing with the local FSDO. He was awarded a '609' training ride stressing preflight procedures and flight instruction technique. The reporter was advised regarding a dipstick to check the fuel level in his tanks. Isz is an uncontrolled airport. The reporter was talking to no one on the ground during this incident. He has increased his altitude approaching the traffic pattern and in the practice area.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FUEL EXHAUSTION LEADS TO AN EMER FORCED OFF ARPT LNDG.

Narrative: THIS WAS ON A TRAINING FLT WITH A STUDENT AND IT WAS GOING TO LAST 2 HRS. BUT I ARRIVED LATE FROM A PREVIOUS FLT WITH ANOTHER STUDENT. THE NEXT STUDENT WAS IN A HURRY FOR A TENNIS LESSON AT XA00. I KNEW WE WOULD ONLY HAVE ENOUGH TIME FOR A 1 1/2 HR FLT. THE LESSON WOULD ONLY TAKE AN HR OR A LITTLE MORE. I SPOKE TO PLT WHO FLEW THE AIRPLANE BEFORE US. HE SAID THEY HAD FLOWN TO MUI AND BACK. THE FLT WAS 2.3 HRS. MY STUDENT PREFLTED THE ACFT AND SAID EVERYTHING WAS OK. I ASKED HIM HOW MUCH OIL AND FUEL WAS ON BOARD. HE SAID 5 QUARTS OF OIL AND LITTLE LOW ON FUEL. I CHKED THE AIRPLANE'S FLT LOG TO FIGURE OUT HOW MUCH FUEL WAS ONBOARD. THE FLT LOG STATED THE AIRPLANE HAD FLOWN 2.3 HRS AND HAD BEEN FUELED BEFORE THE FLT TO MUI. I TURNED THE MASTER SWITCH ON TO CHK THE GAUGES. THE GAUGES READ BTWN 3/4 AND 1/2 TANK ON BOTH FUEL CELLS. I THEN VISUALLY CHKED THE FUEL CELLS ON TOP OF THE WINGS. I COULD SEE FUEL AND I PHYSICALLY TOUCHED IT WITH MY FINGERS. I HAD BEEN TAUGHT, I TEACH, AND I HAVE USED A RULE OF THUMB, THAT IS, IF YOU TOUCH THE FUEL YOU ROUGHLY HAVE 1/2 TANK OR A LITTLE LESS. WE WERE PRACTICING MANEUVERS FOR ABOUT 35-40 MINS WHEN THE ENG BEGAN RUNNING ROUGH. I IMMEDIATELY TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND STARTED GOING THROUGH PROCS TO MAKE THE ENG RUN SMOOTHLY. I HAD EXPERIENCED PROBS WITH THE CARB AND MAGNETOS BEFORE AND IT FELT LIKE THE SAME PROB. THE PROCS SEEMED TO TAKE CARE OF THE ROUGHNESS AND I RETURNED THE AIRPLANE TO THE STUDENT. IN THE PROCESS OF GOING THROUGH THE PROCS, I HAD TURNED TOWARDS THE ARPT. AT THE TIME OF THE PROBS, WE WERE AT 2500 FT AND ABOUT 5-7 MI FROM THE ARPT. THE STUDENT STARTED FLYING AWAY FROM THE ARPT TO SET UP FOR AN ENTRY INTO THE TFC PATTERN. WHEN THE ROUGHNESS RECURRED, I AGAIN TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND STARTED FLYING DIRECTLY TOWARD THE FIELD. WE WERE LOSING PWR AND ALT AS WE HEADED TOWARD THE FIELD. I WAS TRYING TO MAINTAIN PWR AND ALT BUT WE WERE DSNDING. THE ARPT WAS IN SIGHT AND I THOUGHT I COULD MAKE THE RWY OR TXWY. AS WE WERE GETTING CLOSER, I REALIZED I WAS NOT GOING TO MAKE THE RWY. I DECIDED TO PICK THE TXWY TO LAND. WE WERE STILL HDG TOWARD THE ARPT AND DSNDING. I REALIZED I WAS NOT GOING TO MAKE TXWY. I DECIDED I COULD NOT MAKE THE FIELD AND TURNED TOWARDS A BIG ROAD BY THE ARPT. THE DECISION I MADE WAS THE HARDEST DECISION I HAVE EVER MADE. I WANTED TO MAKE THE ARPT SO BADLY. BUT IT WAS EITHER PUT THE AIRPLANE INTO HOUSES, TRY TO HOLD ALT AND MAKE THE FIELD WHICH COULD HAVE RESULTED IN A STALL, OR PICK THE SAFEST PLACE I COULD PUT THE AIRPLANE DOWN. OVER THE ROAD WERE MANY PWR LINES, HWY SIGNS, AND STOPLIGHTS. THERE WERE SO MANY TIMES I WANTED TO PUT THE AIRPLANE DOWN. BUT I COULDN'T BECAUSE OF THE OBSTRUCTIONS. I FINALLY PUT THE AIRPLANE DOWN ON THE ROAD SAFELY. THERE WERE NO INJURIES TO US, ANYBODY ON THE GND, AND THE AIRPLANE WAS NOT DAMAGED. I LEARNED THE RULE OF THUMB I USE IS NOT A GOOD WAY TO CHK THE FUEL. I KNOW IT IS NOT RELIABLE AND I WILL NEVER TEACH IT OR USE IT AGAIN. I LEARNED A VERY PWRFUL LESSON. THIS LESSON I LEARNED I CAN CARRY TO STUDENTS AND ANY PLT. NO ONE SHOULD GO THROUGH WHAT I DID. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR HAD A HEARING WITH THE LCL FSDO. HE WAS AWARDED A '609' TRAINING RIDE STRESSING PREFLT PROCS AND FLT INSTRUCTION TECHNIQUE. THE RPTR WAS ADVISED REGARDING A DIPSTICK TO CHK THE FUEL LEVEL IN HIS TANKS. ISZ IS AN UNCTLED ARPT. THE RPTR WAS TALKING TO NO ONE ON THE GND DURING THIS INCIDENT. HE HAS INCREASED HIS ALT APCHING THE TFC PATTERN AND IN THE PRACTICE AREA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.