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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 304077 |
Time | |
Date | 199505 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 0001 To 0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : teb |
State Reference | NJ |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 1950 msl bound upper : 1950 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : teb |
Operator | common carrier : air taxi |
Make Model Name | Learjet 35 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
Flight Phase | descent other |
Route In Use | enroute : on vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | MU-2 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | other : unknown |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air taxi |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 7330 flight time type : 2650 |
ASRS Report | 304077 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air taxi |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : nmac other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : took evasive action other |
Consequence | Other |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 0 vertical : 150 |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Narrative:
During descent to the pattern at teb (left downwind runway 01) my flight had a near miss with a departing mu-2. Luckily enough I spotted the traffic approximately 15 seconds before the conflict. This was sufficient time (barely) to point the traffic out to the captain (PF) and for him to take evasive action (climbing). This incident brings to mind several important items: see and avoid is an inherently dangerous concept. Both the mu-2 and my aircraft had all available lighting on due to the near head on nature of this conflict there was no relative movement of the approaching aircraft thus it blended in with the background city lighting. Trying to spot aircraft below you against the city lighting (especially new york) is extremely difficult. Every aircraft has 'blind spots.' in this case I had to spot the aircraft looking through the warped portion of the left side windshield, by the windshield heat duct, behind the center post. In this case that area causes a lot of visual distortion. High cockpit workloads I the terminal environment require a lot of heads down and inside time. Fewer aircraft at night and the fact that they are generally easier to see at night (except against the city lights) can lead to complacency in see and avoid operations, especially in the radar environment. To avoid conflicts like this pilot's must look, listen and live. Look: one pilot (at least) should be scanning for traffic at all times especially during the high cockpits workload times in the terminal environment. Use all available aircraft lighting. Know proper scanning techniques and limitations. Listen: the main reason that I spotted the mu-2 in time to avoid a collision was that I heard tower report him in radar contact 2 NM northwest of teb (our position). This call caused me to refocus my scan on the part of the sky where the mu-2 was. (Note: I scanned this area less than 15 seconds earlier and didn't see the mu-2 against the city lights). Don't rely on the potential threatening traffic to be pointed out by ATC. Tower was extremely busy with the arrival and departure push. As such he didn't point out the mu-2 until after he passed beneath us. Live: don't hesitate to take over the controls if needed to expedite the evasive action needed. Teb is an accident waiting to happen!! There are close calls on a weekly basis there!
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: NMAC -- ATX ON A VISUAL APCH HAS A NMAC. THE OTHER ACFT IS POINTED OUT AS THEY MISS IT.
Narrative: DURING DSCNT TO THE PATTERN AT TEB (L DOWNWIND RWY 01) MY FLT HAD A NEAR MISS WITH A DEPARTING MU-2. LUCKILY ENOUGH I SPOTTED THE TFC APPROX 15 SECONDS BEFORE THE CONFLICT. THIS WAS SUFFICIENT TIME (BARELY) TO POINT THE TFC OUT TO THE CAPT (PF) AND FOR HIM TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION (CLBING). THIS INCIDENT BRINGS TO MIND SEVERAL IMPORTANT ITEMS: SEE AND AVOID IS AN INHERENTLY DANGEROUS CONCEPT. BOTH THE MU-2 AND MY ACFT HAD ALL AVAILABLE LIGHTING ON DUE TO THE NEAR HEAD ON NATURE OF THIS CONFLICT THERE WAS NO RELATIVE MOVEMENT OF THE APCHING ACFT THUS IT BLENDED IN WITH THE BACKGROUND CITY LIGHTING. TRYING TO SPOT ACFT BELOW YOU AGAINST THE CITY LIGHTING (ESPECIALLY NEW YORK) IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. EVERY ACFT HAS 'BLIND SPOTS.' IN THIS CASE I HAD TO SPOT THE ACFT LOOKING THROUGH THE WARPED PORTION OF THE L SIDE WINDSHIELD, BY THE WINDSHIELD HEAT DUCT, BEHIND THE CTR POST. IN THIS CASE THAT AREA CAUSES A LOT OF VISUAL DISTORTION. HIGH COCKPIT WORKLOADS I THE TERMINAL ENVIRONMENT REQUIRE A LOT OF HEADS DOWN AND INSIDE TIME. FEWER ACFT AT NIGHT AND THE FACT THAT THEY ARE GENERALLY EASIER TO SEE AT NIGHT (EXCEPT AGAINST THE CITY LIGHTS) CAN LEAD TO COMPLACENCY IN SEE AND AVOID OPS, ESPECIALLY IN THE RADAR ENVIRONMENT. TO AVOID CONFLICTS LIKE THIS PLT'S MUST LOOK, LISTEN AND LIVE. LOOK: ONE PLT (AT LEAST) SHOULD BE SCANNING FOR TFC AT ALL TIMES ESPECIALLY DURING THE HIGH COCKPITS WORKLOAD TIMES IN THE TERMINAL ENVIRONMENT. USE ALL AVAILABLE ACFT LIGHTING. KNOW PROPER SCANNING TECHNIQUES AND LIMITATIONS. LISTEN: THE MAIN REASON THAT I SPOTTED THE MU-2 IN TIME TO AVOID A COLLISION WAS THAT I HEARD TWR RPT HIM IN RADAR CONTACT 2 NM NW OF TEB (OUR POS). THIS CALL CAUSED ME TO REFOCUS MY SCAN ON THE PART OF THE SKY WHERE THE MU-2 WAS. (NOTE: I SCANNED THIS AREA LESS THAN 15 SECONDS EARLIER AND DIDN'T SEE THE MU-2 AGAINST THE CITY LIGHTS). DON'T RELY ON THE POTENTIAL THREATENING TFC TO BE POINTED OUT BY ATC. TWR WAS EXTREMELY BUSY WITH THE ARR AND DEP PUSH. AS SUCH HE DIDN'T POINT OUT THE MU-2 UNTIL AFTER HE PASSED BENEATH US. LIVE: DON'T HESITATE TO TAKE OVER THE CTLS IF NEEDED TO EXPEDITE THE EVASIVE ACTION NEEDED. TEB IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN!! THERE ARE CLOSE CALLS ON A WEEKLY BASIS THERE!
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.