Narrative:

On flight from yng to cak I was the first officer with PF duties. Our cruising altitude was 4000 ft en route. We were vectored down to the ILS runway 19 at cak. The captain, who was also acting as my initial operations instructor, was in a foul mood the entire day and lent no advice or pointers and more importantly he established an antagonistic and unsafe atmosphere from the start of the day. He began by briefing me with 'I want to see the bitch in you today.' I was shocked and offended but I tried to glean something constructive from the comment by thinking about being more aggressive and assertive while flying. The captain also urged me to fly the airplane as fast as the gear and flap limits would permit. I did exactly what he asked for by flying at 180 KTS (gear down/extension and flaps 15 degrees extension speed) to the derby OM on the ILS runway 19 at cak. At that point I called for 'flaps 15 degrees gear down.' the captain said, 'no' so I hesitated a couple of seconds to look at him in disbelief and said 'why not?' 'too close to overspd,' he said. I reacted by bringing the power to flight idle as the autoplt had captured and was following the GS down -- all the while we're starting to pick up airspeed. I estimated 1/2 way down the GS the aircraft had slowed to 178 KTS. I again called for flaps 15 degrees gear down, then confirmed 3 green gear lights and asked for flaps 20 degrees, landing checks. At 500 ft AGL the rain increased from moderate to heavy. I was intent upon not losing my scan but was thinking about locating and finding my windshield wiper 'on' button and pressing it. As we approached the 300 ft mark I momentarily looked up and pressed the button 'on.' 100 ft previous to that (400 ft AGL) the autoplt had disengaged so I was hand flying it. As I looked up to press my windshield button on, the GS began to descend and we moved 1/2 DOT off course. This I know because it is what I saw when I looked back at the EFIS. The captain then excitedly announced, 'I've got it' and took the airplane. He then positioned the airplane back in an attitude to make a landing but he had momentarily added power, then retarded it back to flight idle. He then announced 'ok, you've got it.' I said 'I have the airplane.' I took the controls and crossed the threshold. I remember thinking that being at vref plus 20 KTS was a little fast and I thought that the tailwind of 9 KTS would not affect our glide and touchdown too much. I was in error on this judgement as I took the airplane and I landed well past the touchdown zone (approximately 1000 ft). At the gate, an airline pilot asked who was flying the airplane?' the captain stated, 'the first officer.' pilot, 'did you have everything under control up here?' captain then replied, 'yes, it was under control.' airline pilot, 'I'm still going to call the FAA because if that's how you fly all of the time then it's unsafe!' captain then replied, 'everything was under control.' the flight back to ord was without incident. I don't think the captain, who rarely flies the line and who isn't a regular initial operations instructor, was prepared to trust me. There was a lot of confusion on my part as to why he didn't give me flaps 15 degrees, gear down, because he had asked us to fly fast so we could make schedule. I'll prevent this from happening again by flying slower (then I'm not trying to push the limit of the flaps and gear). I will add power and go around if the landing is out of the touchdown zone. This will also prevent me from breaking far 121.651 ever again. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter flew with the company check airman on the following trip. She states that she was told that she was 'doing a fine job.' the first officer has not flown with management since, but does not view her job 'positively' as a result of the rough beginning. The aircraft flown was a bae ATP, ATP. Maximum takeoff gross weight is 50500 pounds and it is a low wing turboprop operated under part 121 (64 passenger seats).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PART 121 BAE ATP'S FLC CONTINUED WITH A DSCNT RATE THAT WOULD NOT ALLOW LNDG IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE OF THE RWY.

Narrative: ON FLT FROM YNG TO CAK I WAS THE FO WITH PF DUTIES. OUR CRUISING ALT WAS 4000 FT ENRTE. WE WERE VECTORED DOWN TO THE ILS RWY 19 AT CAK. THE CAPT, WHO WAS ALSO ACTING AS MY INITIAL OPS INSTRUCTOR, WAS IN A FOUL MOOD THE ENTIRE DAY AND LENT NO ADVICE OR POINTERS AND MORE IMPORTANTLY HE ESTABLISHED AN ANTAGONISTIC AND UNSAFE ATMOSPHERE FROM THE START OF THE DAY. HE BEGAN BY BRIEFING ME WITH 'I WANT TO SEE THE BITCH IN YOU TODAY.' I WAS SHOCKED AND OFFENDED BUT I TRIED TO GLEAN SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE FROM THE COMMENT BY THINKING ABOUT BEING MORE AGGRESSIVE AND ASSERTIVE WHILE FLYING. THE CAPT ALSO URGED ME TO FLY THE AIRPLANE AS FAST AS THE GEAR AND FLAP LIMITS WOULD PERMIT. I DID EXACTLY WHAT HE ASKED FOR BY FLYING AT 180 KTS (GEAR DOWN/EXTENSION AND FLAPS 15 DEGS EXTENSION SPD) TO THE DERBY OM ON THE ILS RWY 19 AT CAK. AT THAT POINT I CALLED FOR 'FLAPS 15 DEGS GEAR DOWN.' THE CAPT SAID, 'NO' SO I HESITATED A COUPLE OF SECONDS TO LOOK AT HIM IN DISBELIEF AND SAID 'WHY NOT?' 'TOO CLOSE TO OVERSPD,' HE SAID. I REACTED BY BRINGING THE PWR TO FLT IDLE AS THE AUTOPLT HAD CAPTURED AND WAS FOLLOWING THE GS DOWN -- ALL THE WHILE WE'RE STARTING TO PICK UP AIRSPD. I ESTIMATED 1/2 WAY DOWN THE GS THE ACFT HAD SLOWED TO 178 KTS. I AGAIN CALLED FOR FLAPS 15 DEGS GEAR DOWN, THEN CONFIRMED 3 GREEN GEAR LIGHTS AND ASKED FOR FLAPS 20 DEGS, LNDG CHKS. AT 500 FT AGL THE RAIN INCREASED FROM MODERATE TO HVY. I WAS INTENT UPON NOT LOSING MY SCAN BUT WAS THINKING ABOUT LOCATING AND FINDING MY WINDSHIELD WIPER 'ON' BUTTON AND PRESSING IT. AS WE APCHED THE 300 FT MARK I MOMENTARILY LOOKED UP AND PRESSED THE BUTTON 'ON.' 100 FT PREVIOUS TO THAT (400 FT AGL) THE AUTOPLT HAD DISENGAGED SO I WAS HAND FLYING IT. AS I LOOKED UP TO PRESS MY WINDSHIELD BUTTON ON, THE GS BEGAN TO DSND AND WE MOVED 1/2 DOT OFF COURSE. THIS I KNOW BECAUSE IT IS WHAT I SAW WHEN I LOOKED BACK AT THE EFIS. THE CAPT THEN EXCITEDLY ANNOUNCED, 'I'VE GOT IT' AND TOOK THE AIRPLANE. HE THEN POSITIONED THE AIRPLANE BACK IN AN ATTITUDE TO MAKE A LNDG BUT HE HAD MOMENTARILY ADDED PWR, THEN RETARDED IT BACK TO FLT IDLE. HE THEN ANNOUNCED 'OK, YOU'VE GOT IT.' I SAID 'I HAVE THE AIRPLANE.' I TOOK THE CTLS AND CROSSED THE THRESHOLD. I REMEMBER THINKING THAT BEING AT VREF PLUS 20 KTS WAS A LITTLE FAST AND I THOUGHT THAT THE TAILWIND OF 9 KTS WOULD NOT AFFECT OUR GLIDE AND TOUCHDOWN TOO MUCH. I WAS IN ERROR ON THIS JUDGEMENT AS I TOOK THE AIRPLANE AND I LANDED WELL PAST THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE (APPROX 1000 FT). AT THE GATE, AN AIRLINE PLT ASKED WHO WAS FLYING THE AIRPLANE?' THE CAPT STATED, 'THE FO.' PLT, 'DID YOU HAVE EVERYTHING UNDER CTL UP HERE?' CAPT THEN REPLIED, 'YES, IT WAS UNDER CTL.' AIRLINE PLT, 'I'M STILL GOING TO CALL THE FAA BECAUSE IF THAT'S HOW YOU FLY ALL OF THE TIME THEN IT'S UNSAFE!' CAPT THEN REPLIED, 'EVERYTHING WAS UNDER CTL.' THE FLT BACK TO ORD WAS WITHOUT INCIDENT. I DON'T THINK THE CAPT, WHO RARELY FLIES THE LINE AND WHO ISN'T A REGULAR INITIAL OPS INSTRUCTOR, WAS PREPARED TO TRUST ME. THERE WAS A LOT OF CONFUSION ON MY PART AS TO WHY HE DIDN'T GIVE ME FLAPS 15 DEGS, GEAR DOWN, BECAUSE HE HAD ASKED US TO FLY FAST SO WE COULD MAKE SCHEDULE. I'LL PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING AGAIN BY FLYING SLOWER (THEN I'M NOT TRYING TO PUSH THE LIMIT OF THE FLAPS AND GEAR). I WILL ADD PWR AND GO AROUND IF THE LNDG IS OUT OF THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE. THIS WILL ALSO PREVENT ME FROM BREAKING FAR 121.651 EVER AGAIN. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR FLEW WITH THE COMPANY CHK AIRMAN ON THE FOLLOWING TRIP. SHE STATES THAT SHE WAS TOLD THAT SHE WAS 'DOING A FINE JOB.' THE FO HAS NOT FLOWN WITH MGMNT SINCE, BUT DOES NOT VIEW HER JOB 'POSITIVELY' AS A RESULT OF THE ROUGH BEGINNING. THE ACFT FLOWN WAS A BAE ATP, ATP. MAX TKOF GROSS WT IS 50500 LBS AND IT IS A LOW WING TURBOPROP OPERATED UNDER PART 121 (64 PAX SEATS).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.