Narrative:

Lost all communication descending from FL210 to 15000 ft on a heading expecting (only) to join the grace 1 arrival to pit. Noted no 'talk' on the frequency. We checked to hear and send on all 3 communication radios with no success. We checked/reset circuit breakers, mikes, headsets, buttons, selectors, and simultaneously squawked 7700/7600. We joined the arrival but stayed clear of class B airspace. Fuel being an eventual concern, we started a descent through 10000 ft from direct over to airport in VMC conditions. We shifted all attention to flying and separation (visual and TCASII) through 9000 ft we heard the tower. Through 8000 ft they heard us. We copied and replied to clearance for a visual approach to runway 32 at pit. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: while on a heading vector for arrival to pit when all radios went dead, the flight crew tried everything to get them back even to changing headsets. Squawking 7600 for lost communication, and with no 'expect' clearance received prior to the communication failure, the flight crew flew direct to the destination fix in accordance with far 91.185. Reporter captain spoke of several factors relating to the incident. Their crew cockpit resource management was excellent with a clear division of duties and continuous input and advocacy from the first officer. (After the flight crew the captain notified their company training department to recommend a similar scenario for their pilots in recurrent training because of the emergency situation and resulting cockpit resource management.) they also relied heavily on the TCASII for operational considerations such as other traffic, where it was and at what altitudes. Reporter was in an emergency and was thinking ahead to prepare for losing both engines and glide distances from altitude, etc. Even though the captain was expecting the worse scenario, he elected not to inform the flight attendants or the passenger. In fact, did not tell the flight attendants until everyone had deplaned and, at that time, a company public relations representative had come on board and was relieved that nothing had been said. Reporter says he didn't inform them because, 'brain is diverted to the press, public and media scrutiny' and, he didn't want to frighten the passenger because recently his company was sued as a result of a captain informing the passenger of a problem that caused fright and panic. Reporter says that his passenger and flight attendants didn't need the worry. Postflt inspection revealed no known problem, but it was still under investigation. The only commonalty with the 4 radios is the push button selector panel which may have had a poor contact. Then, when descending the pressure change could have reconnected the contact and the radios again were normal. The flight crew had even tried transmitting on voice over the ACARS radio, which is separate from the other radios. Maintenance could not explain why it didn't work and are still checking on it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LOST COM. EMER PROCS.

Narrative: LOST ALL COM DSNDING FROM FL210 TO 15000 FT ON A HDG EXPECTING (ONLY) TO JOIN THE GRACE 1 ARR TO PIT. NOTED NO 'TALK' ON THE FREQ. WE CHKED TO HEAR AND SEND ON ALL 3 COM RADIOS WITH NO SUCCESS. WE CHKED/RESET CIRCUIT BREAKERS, MIKES, HEADSETS, BUTTONS, SELECTORS, AND SIMULTANEOUSLY SQUAWKED 7700/7600. WE JOINED THE ARR BUT STAYED CLR OF CLASS B AIRSPACE. FUEL BEING AN EVENTUAL CONCERN, WE STARTED A DSCNT THROUGH 10000 FT FROM DIRECT OVER TO ARPT IN VMC CONDITIONS. WE SHIFTED ALL ATTN TO FLYING AND SEPARATION (VISUAL AND TCASII) THROUGH 9000 FT WE HEARD THE TWR. THROUGH 8000 FT THEY HEARD US. WE COPIED AND REPLIED TO CLRNC FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 32 AT PIT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: WHILE ON A HDG VECTOR FOR ARR TO PIT WHEN ALL RADIOS WENT DEAD, THE FLC TRIED EVERYTHING TO GET THEM BACK EVEN TO CHANGING HEADSETS. SQUAWKING 7600 FOR LOST COM, AND WITH NO 'EXPECT' CLRNC RECEIVED PRIOR TO THE COM FAILURE, THE FLC FLEW DIRECT TO THE DEST FIX IN ACCORDANCE WITH FAR 91.185. RPTR CAPT SPOKE OF SEVERAL FACTORS RELATING TO THE INCIDENT. THEIR CREW COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT WAS EXCELLENT WITH A CLR DIVISION OF DUTIES AND CONTINUOUS INPUT AND ADVOCACY FROM THE FO. (AFTER THE FLC THE CAPT NOTIFIED THEIR COMPANY TRAINING DEPT TO RECOMMEND A SIMILAR SCENARIO FOR THEIR PLTS IN RECURRENT TRAINING BECAUSE OF THE EMER SIT AND RESULTING COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT.) THEY ALSO RELIED HEAVILY ON THE TCASII FOR OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS SUCH AS OTHER TFC, WHERE IT WAS AND AT WHAT ALTS. RPTR WAS IN AN EMER AND WAS THINKING AHEAD TO PREPARE FOR LOSING BOTH ENGS AND GLIDE DISTANCES FROM ALT, ETC. EVEN THOUGH THE CAPT WAS EXPECTING THE WORSE SCENARIO, HE ELECTED NOT TO INFORM THE FLT ATTENDANTS OR THE PAX. IN FACT, DID NOT TELL THE FLT ATTENDANTS UNTIL EVERYONE HAD DEPLANED AND, AT THAT TIME, A COMPANY PUBLIC RELATIONS REPRESENTATIVE HAD COME ON BOARD AND WAS RELIEVED THAT NOTHING HAD BEEN SAID. RPTR SAYS HE DIDN'T INFORM THEM BECAUSE, 'BRAIN IS DIVERTED TO THE PRESS, PUBLIC AND MEDIA SCRUTINY' AND, HE DIDN'T WANT TO FRIGHTEN THE PAX BECAUSE RECENTLY HIS COMPANY WAS SUED AS A RESULT OF A CAPT INFORMING THE PAX OF A PROB THAT CAUSED FRIGHT AND PANIC. RPTR SAYS THAT HIS PAX AND FLT ATTENDANTS DIDN'T NEED THE WORRY. POSTFLT INSPECTION REVEALED NO KNOWN PROB, BUT IT WAS STILL UNDER INVESTIGATION. THE ONLY COMMONALTY WITH THE 4 RADIOS IS THE PUSH BUTTON SELECTOR PANEL WHICH MAY HAVE HAD A POOR CONTACT. THEN, WHEN DSNDING THE PRESSURE CHANGE COULD HAVE RECONNECTED THE CONTACT AND THE RADIOS AGAIN WERE NORMAL. THE FLC HAD EVEN TRIED XMITTING ON VOICE OVER THE ACARS RADIO, WHICH IS SEPARATE FROM THE OTHER RADIOS. MAINT COULD NOT EXPLAIN WHY IT DIDN'T WORK AND ARE STILL CHKING ON IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.