Landing gear collapses on rollout after landing.

Attributes
ACN	306788
Time
Date	199506
Day	Fri
Local Time Of Day	1801 To 2400
Place
Locale Reference	airport : sdp
State Reference	AK
Altitude	agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Operator	other
Make Model Name	Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 91
Flight Phase	ground other : taxi landing other
Flight Plan	VFR
Person 1
Affiliation	government other
Function	flight crew : single pilot
Qualification	pilot : atp pilot : cfi
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 100 flight time total : 2400 flight time type : 400
ASRS Report	306788
Person 2
Affiliation	Other
Function	observation : passenger
Qualification	other other : other
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : critical other anomaly other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	none taken : unable
Consequence	other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Ambiguous
Air Traffic Incident	other

Narrative:

While taxiing after landing, aircraft started veering right and despite immediate application of left brake and rudder, aircraft did not respond. And only after application of full power did aircraft stop yawing to right when left landing gear collapsed. The left brake apparently malfunctioned since the initial yawing to the right was not severe and should have been correctable with left brake and rudder. The aircraft had yawed approximately 45 degrees when the left gear collapsed. Fortunately the gear collapsed in front of the wing strut, so there was no damage to wing struts, only wing tip damage. Contributing factors: aircraft is equipped with tundra tires which makes handling on hard-surfaced runways more difficult. Also, there is a possibility that the rear-seat passenger could have inadvertently activated and/or held right brake which could have initiated veering to the right and may have countered left rudder and brake corrective action. Wind was not a factor. Upon entering downwind, pilot noted that windsocks on both ends of runway indicated a light wind straight down runway. After pilot and passenger exited aircraft both windsocks still indicated a light wind straight down runway. Corrective actions include: installation of guards to prevent rear passenger from being able to activate brakes, either intentionally or inadvertently. Allow aircraft with oversize tires to operate on gravel shoulders of runways, txwys, or even adjacent roads or grassy infields 'at their own risk,' the same way helicopters are allowed to takeoff and land at 'their own risk' at various locations at airports (other than runways). This would allow the pilots of specially equipped aircraft (or aircraft with limited crosswind capabilities) to choose the most suitable landing area for their aircraft.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LNDG GEAR COLLAPSES ON ROLLOUT AFTER LNDG.

Narrative: WHILE TAXIING AFTER LNDG, ACFT STARTED VEERING R AND DESPITE IMMEDIATE APPLICATION OF L BRAKE AND RUDDER, ACFT DID NOT RESPOND. AND ONLY AFTER APPLICATION OF FULL PWR DID ACFT STOP YAWING TO R WHEN L LNDG GEAR COLLAPSED. THE L BRAKE APPARENTLY MALFUNCTIONED SINCE THE INITIAL YAWING TO THE R WAS NOT SEVERE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN CORRECTABLE WITH L BRAKE AND RUDDER. THE ACFT HAD YAWED APPROX 45 DEGS WHEN THE L GEAR COLLAPSED. FORTUNATELY THE GEAR COLLAPSED IN FRONT OF THE WING STRUT, SO THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO WING STRUTS, ONLY WING TIP DAMAGE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: ACFT IS EQUIPPED WITH TUNDRA TIRES WHICH MAKES HANDLING ON HARD-SURFACED RWYS MORE DIFFICULT. ALSO, THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE REAR-SEAT PAX COULD HAVE INADVERTENTLY ACTIVATED AND/OR HELD R BRAKE WHICH COULD HAVE INITIATED VEERING TO THE R AND MAY HAVE COUNTERED L RUDDER AND BRAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION. WIND WAS NOT A FACTOR. UPON ENTERING DOWNWIND, PLT NOTED THAT WINDSOCKS ON BOTH ENDS OF RWY INDICATED A LIGHT WIND STRAIGHT DOWN RWY. AFTER PLT AND PAX EXITED ACFT BOTH WINDSOCKS STILL INDICATED A LIGHT WIND STRAIGHT DOWN RWY. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDE: INSTALLATION OF GUARDS TO PREVENT REAR PAX FROM BEING ABLE TO ACTIVATE BRAKES, EITHER INTENTIONALLY OR INADVERTENTLY. ALLOW ACFT WITH OVERSIZE TIRES TO OPERATE ON GRAVEL SHOULDERS OF RWYS, TXWYS, OR EVEN ADJACENT ROADS OR GRASSY INFIELDS 'AT THEIR OWN RISK,' THE SAME WAY HELIS ARE ALLOWED TO TKOF AND LAND AT 'THEIR OWN RISK' AT VARIOUS LOCATIONS AT ARPTS (OTHER THAN RWYS). THIS WOULD ALLOW THE PLTS OF SPECIALLY EQUIPPED ACFT (OR ACFT WITH LIMITED XWIND CAPABILITIES) TO CHOOSE THE MOST SUITABLE LNDG AREA FOR THEIR ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.