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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 306829 |
Time | |
Date | 199506 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sjc |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 12000 msl bound upper : 16000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Dusk |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zoa tracon : oak |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B727-200 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | climbout : intermediate altitude |
Route In Use | departure sid : sid |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : cfi pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 120 flight time total : 7200 flight time type : 2000 |
ASRS Report | 306829 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : flight engineer pilot : commercial pilot : cfi pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 100 flight time total : 11400 flight time type : 1800 |
ASRS Report | 306843 |
Events | |
Anomaly | altitude deviation : crossing restriction not met altitude deviation : overshoot non adherence : clearance non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance other |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Chart Or Publication |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation other |
Situations | |
ATC Facility | procedure or policy : unspecified |
Narrative:
Crew was operating the second leg on the third day of a 4 day trip. Trip pairing over 4 days consisted of 5 legs, 1 which was a deadhead. All duty periods except first deadhead started at night or early morning, operating scheduled cargo operations under far part 121. Aircraft was a boeing 727-200RE, an advanced version of 727 with upgraded higher thrust engines and CAT III avionics. This leg was operating sjc-ord. Crew had just completed a short re-position flight from oak-sjc after a 15 hour layover in oak. So was already out at aircraft when captain and first officer arrived at ramp 1/2 hour prior to departure. Ground time at sjc was about 1 hour, and cargo loading operations were proceeding normally. Captain and first officer completed preflight duties, reviewed flight plan, received ATIS, got en route clearance, and finally reviewed 'loupe 9' SID. Clearance read, 'cleared to ord via loupe 9 departure, linden transition, then af, maintain 5000, squawk, frequency, maintain 250 KTS.' captain took time to review all turn restrs and crossing restrs on loupe 9 SID of which there were several. Both captain and first officer had loupe 9 SID plates in front of them. After closing cargo and front entry doors, before start checklist was completed, and ground crew pushed aircraft back and engine start was completed. After start checklist was completed and clearance received to taxi to runway 30L. Crew was not rushed as aircraft was configured and before takeoff checklist completed. Captain took time on this leg, as he had on each previous leg, to thoroughly review all pertinent information prior to takeoff, and he made it a point not to rush. Clearance to takeoff received and initial turn completed within DME restrs specified in SID. Change to departure control frequency commenced, and bay departure advised 'delete 5000 ft crossing restr, climb and maintain 12000 ft. We inquired about 250 KT restr and departure advised to maintain 250 KTS as it was a center restr. SID calls for a turn back to cross sjc at 12000 ft, then track outbound on sjc 330 degree radial. Crew set up navigation (VOR) for outbound radial then a frequency change to ZOA commenced. Center cleared us to cross sjc at 12000 ft climb and maintain FL230, delete 250 KT restr, resume loupe 9. Both captain and first officer thought clearance was to cross sjc at or above 12000 ft. Aircraft was climbing rapidly when ZOA queried about our altitude. I believe we had just about crossed the sjc VOR climbing through 16000 ft when center advised us that we were supposed to be at 12000 ft. I asked center if he wanted us back at 12000 ft as captain recognized crossing restr and began a pushover. Center advised us it was too late now, climb and maintain FL230, and admonished us that crossing restr was crucial for overhead traffic heading into bay area. Apparently no traffic conflict existed. We discussed this incident on way to chicago, and reaffirmed that we both thought clearance was sjc VOR at or above 12000 ft, climb and maintain FL230. We had been in the habit of dialing any lower crossing restrs into altitude alerter until restrs were met, then dialing higher altitude into alerter. The fact that I had dialed FL230 into alerter despite the loupe 9 SID restr distracted us from requirement to cross sjc VOR at 12000 ft. Also the 'cross sjc VOR at 12000 ft note on the SID graphic depiction is almost at bottom of chart, where, hanging on my yoke clip, it was difficult to see. Crew discussed how to avoid missing SID restrs, and agreed we can more thoroughly review SID and all applicable notes, and verify with ATC. Callback conversation with reporter acn #306843 revealed the following: when asked by the analyst what could be done to make this departure more reliable the reporter suggested the loupe 9 departure would be more workable if the flight crew were either allowed to fly the departure as published or given each progressive heading and altitude as required during the step climb. Another suggestion would be to have the airspace design such that a single frequency and controller rather than the multiple frequencys and controllers. Each controller is changing the altitudes, and/or headings, and or airspeed restr. Perhaps the controller wants all restrs to remain in effect subsequent to vectors unless specifically deleted. The procedures in the minds of some pilots are after vectors all restrare deleted unless specifically repeated. To eliminate confusion if the altitudes are really crucial step climb the pilot each altitude and clear the pilot to climb only when it is safe to do so. To cross sjc at 12000 ft verbal assignment combined with the published assignment 8 mi later along the track or 1 min more along the track to be more than 2000 ft higher was upper most in my mind and made me forget that I needed to be at 12000 ft until crossing the VOR. Perhaps the cross the VOR at 12000 ft and climb to FL230 and resume the loupe 9 departure and resume normal speed meant I did not have to make the above 14000 ft 8 mi north of the VOR and the restr no longer existed. At any rate after having been assigned 12000 ft and the altitude alerter being set at 12000 ft we were told to climb and maintain FL230 and resume the loupe 9 departure and resume normal speed meant the 12000 ft restr no longer existed. To us this meant an altitude change which meant moving the altitude alerter to FL230 when we should have waited until crossing the VOR.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: THE FLC DEVIATED FROM THE SID ALT RESTR.
Narrative: CREW WAS OPERATING THE SECOND LEG ON THE THIRD DAY OF A 4 DAY TRIP. TRIP PAIRING OVER 4 DAYS CONSISTED OF 5 LEGS, 1 WHICH WAS A DEADHEAD. ALL DUTY PERIODS EXCEPT FIRST DEADHEAD STARTED AT NIGHT OR EARLY MORNING, OPERATING SCHEDULED CARGO OPS UNDER FAR PART 121. ACFT WAS A BOEING 727-200RE, AN ADVANCED VERSION OF 727 WITH UPGRADED HIGHER THRUST ENGS AND CAT III AVIONICS. THIS LEG WAS OPERATING SJC-ORD. CREW HAD JUST COMPLETED A SHORT RE-POS FLT FROM OAK-SJC AFTER A 15 HR LAYOVER IN OAK. SO WAS ALREADY OUT AT ACFT WHEN CAPT AND FO ARRIVED AT RAMP 1/2 HR PRIOR TO DEP. GND TIME AT SJC WAS ABOUT 1 HR, AND CARGO LOADING OPS WERE PROCEEDING NORMALLY. CAPT AND FO COMPLETED PREFLT DUTIES, REVIEWED FLT PLAN, RECEIVED ATIS, GOT ENRTE CLRNC, AND FINALLY REVIEWED 'LOUPE 9' SID. CLRNC READ, 'CLRED TO ORD VIA LOUPE 9 DEP, LINDEN TRANSITION, THEN AF, MAINTAIN 5000, SQUAWK, FREQ, MAINTAIN 250 KTS.' CAPT TOOK TIME TO REVIEW ALL TURN RESTRS AND XING RESTRS ON LOUPE 9 SID OF WHICH THERE WERE SEVERAL. BOTH CAPT AND FO HAD LOUPE 9 SID PLATES IN FRONT OF THEM. AFTER CLOSING CARGO AND FRONT ENTRY DOORS, BEFORE START CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED, AND GND CREW PUSHED ACFT BACK AND ENG START WAS COMPLETED. AFTER START CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED AND CLRNC RECEIVED TO TAXI TO RWY 30L. CREW WAS NOT RUSHED AS ACFT WAS CONFIGURED AND BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST COMPLETED. CAPT TOOK TIME ON THIS LEG, AS HE HAD ON EACH PREVIOUS LEG, TO THOROUGHLY REVIEW ALL PERTINENT INFO PRIOR TO TKOF, AND HE MADE IT A POINT NOT TO RUSH. CLRNC TO TKOF RECEIVED AND INITIAL TURN COMPLETED WITHIN DME RESTRS SPECIFIED IN SID. CHANGE TO DEP CTL FREQ COMMENCED, AND BAY DEP ADVISED 'DELETE 5000 FT XING RESTR, CLB AND MAINTAIN 12000 FT. WE INQUIRED ABOUT 250 KT RESTR AND DEP ADVISED TO MAINTAIN 250 KTS AS IT WAS A CTR RESTR. SID CALLS FOR A TURN BACK TO CROSS SJC AT 12000 FT, THEN TRACK OUTBOUND ON SJC 330 DEG RADIAL. CREW SET UP NAV (VOR) FOR OUTBOUND RADIAL THEN A FREQ CHANGE TO ZOA COMMENCED. CTR CLRED US TO CROSS SJC AT 12000 FT CLB AND MAINTAIN FL230, DELETE 250 KT RESTR, RESUME LOUPE 9. BOTH CAPT AND FO THOUGHT CLRNC WAS TO CROSS SJC AT OR ABOVE 12000 FT. ACFT WAS CLBING RAPIDLY WHEN ZOA QUERIED ABOUT OUR ALT. I BELIEVE WE HAD JUST ABOUT CROSSED THE SJC VOR CLBING THROUGH 16000 FT WHEN CTR ADVISED US THAT WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE AT 12000 FT. I ASKED CTR IF HE WANTED US BACK AT 12000 FT AS CAPT RECOGNIZED XING RESTR AND BEGAN A PUSHOVER. CTR ADVISED US IT WAS TOO LATE NOW, CLB AND MAINTAIN FL230, AND ADMONISHED US THAT XING RESTR WAS CRUCIAL FOR OVERHEAD TFC HDG INTO BAY AREA. APPARENTLY NO TFC CONFLICT EXISTED. WE DISCUSSED THIS INCIDENT ON WAY TO CHICAGO, AND REAFFIRMED THAT WE BOTH THOUGHT CLRNC WAS SJC VOR AT OR ABOVE 12000 FT, CLB AND MAINTAIN FL230. WE HAD BEEN IN THE HABIT OF DIALING ANY LOWER XING RESTRS INTO ALT ALERTER UNTIL RESTRS WERE MET, THEN DIALING HIGHER ALT INTO ALERTER. THE FACT THAT I HAD DIALED FL230 INTO ALERTER DESPITE THE LOUPE 9 SID RESTR DISTRACTED US FROM REQUIREMENT TO CROSS SJC VOR AT 12000 FT. ALSO THE 'CROSS SJC VOR AT 12000 FT NOTE ON THE SID GRAPHIC DEPICTION IS ALMOST AT BOTTOM OF CHART, WHERE, HANGING ON MY YOKE CLIP, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE. CREW DISCUSSED HOW TO AVOID MISSING SID RESTRS, AND AGREED WE CAN MORE THOROUGHLY REVIEW SID AND ALL APPLICABLE NOTES, AND VERIFY WITH ATC. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN #306843 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: WHEN ASKED BY THE ANALYST WHAT COULD BE DONE TO MAKE THIS DEP MORE RELIABLE THE RPTR SUGGESTED THE LOUPE 9 DEP WOULD BE MORE WORKABLE IF THE FLC WERE EITHER ALLOWED TO FLY THE DEP AS PUBLISHED OR GIVEN EACH PROGRESSIVE HDG AND ALT AS REQUIRED DURING THE STEP CLB. ANOTHER SUGGESTION WOULD BE TO HAVE THE AIRSPACE DESIGN SUCH THAT A SINGLE FREQ AND CTLR RATHER THAN THE MULTIPLE FREQS AND CTLRS. EACH CTLR IS CHANGING THE ALTS, AND/OR HDGS, AND OR AIRSPD RESTR. PERHAPS THE CTLR WANTS ALL RESTRS TO REMAIN IN EFFECT SUBSEQUENT TO VECTORS UNLESS SPECIFICALLY DELETED. THE PROCS IN THE MINDS OF SOME PLTS ARE AFTER VECTORS ALL RESTRARE DELETED UNLESS SPECIFICALLY REPEATED. TO ELIMINATE CONFUSION IF THE ALTS ARE REALLY CRUCIAL STEP CLB THE PLT EACH ALT AND CLR THE PLT TO CLB ONLY WHEN IT IS SAFE TO DO SO. TO CROSS SJC AT 12000 FT VERBAL ASSIGNMENT COMBINED WITH THE PUBLISHED ASSIGNMENT 8 MI LATER ALONG THE TRACK OR 1 MIN MORE ALONG THE TRACK TO BE MORE THAN 2000 FT HIGHER WAS UPPER MOST IN MY MIND AND MADE ME FORGET THAT I NEEDED TO BE AT 12000 FT UNTIL XING THE VOR. PERHAPS THE CROSS THE VOR AT 12000 FT AND CLB TO FL230 AND RESUME THE LOUPE 9 DEP AND RESUME NORMAL SPD MEANT I DID NOT HAVE TO MAKE THE ABOVE 14000 FT 8 MI N OF THE VOR AND THE RESTR NO LONGER EXISTED. AT ANY RATE AFTER HAVING BEEN ASSIGNED 12000 FT AND THE ALT ALERTER BEING SET AT 12000 FT WE WERE TOLD TO CLB AND MAINTAIN FL230 AND RESUME THE LOUPE 9 DEP AND RESUME NORMAL SPD MEANT THE 12000 FT RESTR NO LONGER EXISTED. TO US THIS MEANT AN ALT CHANGE WHICH MEANT MOVING THE ALT ALERTER TO FL230 WHEN WE SHOULD HAVE WAITED UNTIL XING THE VOR.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.