Narrative:

While descending to cross basye at 9000 ft a strong smell of fumes (no smoke) permeated the cockpit. We called the flight attendant to discuss something burning in oven or passenger smoking in lav or other source, all proved to be negative. As odor worsened masks were donned as a precaution and I transferred flying responsibilities to the captain, while I checked the rain repellant bottles as a source. Repellant turned out negative. Rather than transfer responsibilities again, the captain continued as PF, I assumed PNF duties. At this point we had been cleared direct lga, the airport was in sight. We were cleared the visual to runway 22. As the odor was growing stronger, the cockpit fume evacuate/evacuation checklist was initiated as the source was still unknown. There was still no smoke in the cockpit just strong fumes. As a further precautionary measure, we notified the tower to roll the fire trucks for us. A normal landing was accomplished on runway 22. With no delay in the time it would take to stop, turned off on high speed taxiway toward the fire trucks, came to a full stop. Passenger were deplaned by means of truck stairs. Note: upon landing, fumes seemed to lessen considerably. There were no injuries to passenger or damage to aircraft. The fire department, upon boarding and investigating, with infrared heat scope, determined that a coffee pot on the galley warmer pad had burning coffee sludge which was the source and further investigation showed that the switch to the warmer pad was off but the pad was still hot. Note: the phrase 'burning coffee sludge' does not indicate fire. Just continual heating. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the alarm created by the fumes was directly related to the circulation setup in the DC9-30 aircraft. A fault in the galley hot pad kept the coffee stewing and the environmental forward flow directed the smell to the cockpit. Reporter states that complex extol arrival kept tasks to a minimum. Emergency was declared as a precautionary action and communications were kept open with the flight attendants via interphone and physical presence. Flight attendant had turned off the coffee pot switch. Reporter's main concern regarding evacing was language barrier (all spanish speaking passenger), but spanish speaking flight attendant communicated effectively and kept situation under control. Efficiency in handling emergency was enabled by ground control frequency communication with fire, police, and FAA. Company's policy is to treat unknown with precautionary methods. Reporter feels outcome was successful, and case is closed. There was no further follow-up.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC9-30 FLC DECLARED AN EMER WHEN SOURCE OF COCKPIT FUMES COULD NOT BE DETERMINED.

Narrative: WHILE DSNDING TO CROSS BASYE AT 9000 FT A STRONG SMELL OF FUMES (NO SMOKE) PERMEATED THE COCKPIT. WE CALLED THE FLT ATTENDANT TO DISCUSS SOMETHING BURNING IN OVEN OR PAX SMOKING IN LAV OR OTHER SOURCE, ALL PROVED TO BE NEGATIVE. AS ODOR WORSENED MASKS WERE DONNED AS A PRECAUTION AND I TRANSFERRED FLYING RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE CAPT, WHILE I CHKED THE RAIN REPELLANT BOTTLES AS A SOURCE. REPELLANT TURNED OUT NEGATIVE. RATHER THAN TRANSFER RESPONSIBILITIES AGAIN, THE CAPT CONTINUED AS PF, I ASSUMED PNF DUTIES. AT THIS POINT WE HAD BEEN CLRED DIRECT LGA, THE ARPT WAS IN SIGHT. WE WERE CLRED THE VISUAL TO RWY 22. AS THE ODOR WAS GROWING STRONGER, THE COCKPIT FUME EVAC CHKLIST WAS INITIATED AS THE SOURCE WAS STILL UNKNOWN. THERE WAS STILL NO SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT JUST STRONG FUMES. AS A FURTHER PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE, WE NOTIFIED THE TWR TO ROLL THE FIRE TRUCKS FOR US. A NORMAL LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED ON RWY 22. WITH NO DELAY IN THE TIME IT WOULD TAKE TO STOP, TURNED OFF ON HIGH SPD TXWY TOWARD THE FIRE TRUCKS, CAME TO A FULL STOP. PAX WERE DEPLANED BY MEANS OF TRUCK STAIRS. NOTE: UPON LNDG, FUMES SEEMED TO LESSEN CONSIDERABLY. THERE WERE NO INJURIES TO PAX OR DAMAGE TO ACFT. THE FIRE DEPT, UPON BOARDING AND INVESTIGATING, WITH INFRARED HEAT SCOPE, DETERMINED THAT A COFFEE POT ON THE GALLEY WARMER PAD HAD BURNING COFFEE SLUDGE WHICH WAS THE SOURCE AND FURTHER INVESTIGATION SHOWED THAT THE SWITCH TO THE WARMER PAD WAS OFF BUT THE PAD WAS STILL HOT. NOTE: THE PHRASE 'BURNING COFFEE SLUDGE' DOES NOT INDICATE FIRE. JUST CONTINUAL HEATING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE ALARM CREATED BY THE FUMES WAS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE CIRCULATION SETUP IN THE DC9-30 ACFT. A FAULT IN THE GALLEY HOT PAD KEPT THE COFFEE STEWING AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORWARD FLOW DIRECTED THE SMELL TO THE COCKPIT. RPTR STATES THAT COMPLEX EXTOL ARR KEPT TASKS TO A MINIMUM. EMER WAS DECLARED AS A PRECAUTIONARY ACTION AND COMS WERE KEPT OPEN WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS VIA INTERPHONE AND PHYSICAL PRESENCE. FLT ATTENDANT HAD TURNED OFF THE COFFEE POT SWITCH. RPTR'S MAIN CONCERN REGARDING EVACING WAS LANGUAGE BARRIER (ALL SPANISH SPEAKING PAX), BUT SPANISH SPEAKING FLT ATTENDANT COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY AND KEPT SIT UNDER CTL. EFFICIENCY IN HANDLING EMER WAS ENABLED BY GND CTL FREQ COM WITH FIRE, POLICE, AND FAA. COMPANY'S POLICY IS TO TREAT UNKNOWN WITH PRECAUTIONARY METHODS. RPTR FEELS OUTCOME WAS SUCCESSFUL, AND CASE IS CLOSED. THERE WAS NO FURTHER FOLLOW-UP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.