Narrative:

It was common knowledge around the airport that a change was taking place from an old runway (runway 13/31) to a newer nearly parallel runway (runway 14/32). It was known that the old runway was closed and the new runway was in use. A second crosswind runway was not known to be closed. Indeed, the most common topic around the airport was that from now on, the crosswind runway (runway 5/23) would be the runway of preference for takeoff when conditions permitted. This was to avoid a lengthy 2 mi taxi to the end of the new runway (runway 14/32). On start-up and taxi and during the preflight, the local unicom was monitored and no other traffic was heard or observed. However, 1 aircraft was noted climbing to the northeast. On arrival at the taxiway to the new runway, it was noted that the taxiway was closed, but traffic was instead routed onto runway 5/23. Barricades were noted at this time limiting access to the east. However, no barricades were noted to the west. At this time the wind sock was observed and estimated to be from the west at approximately 10 KTS. It was known that in excess of 3000 ft was left on runway 23 from this intersection. It should be noted here that the wind was checked later and found to be 230/05. It was recalled that the earlier mentioned aircraft could have been in a climbing right turn from runway 23 as well as a climbing right turn from runway 32. The decision was made to launch from runway 23, make a maximum performance climb to 6000 ft, circle the airport and land. A visual check was again made for traffic, none was observed, and the takeoff went without incident. Sometime during the takeoff and climb out, a radio transmission from an incoming aircraft indicated he was approaching sheridan and would enter left traffic for runway 14. At this time the wind sock was again checked, and in so doing, the X's on runway 5/23 were noted. The pattern was entered behind the incoming twin and a landing was made on runway 14 without incident. The entire incident could have been avoided by checking the local NOTAMS before the short maintenance flight. They were indeed noted during a preliminary WX brief an hour later in preparation for the ensuing trip. The incident could further have been avoided by better signing as to the purpose of runway 5/23 by the responsible parties. Also, someone such as the airport management should take responsibility for monitoring the unicom frequency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TKOF ON CLOSED RWY.

Narrative: IT WAS COMMON KNOWLEDGE AROUND THE ARPT THAT A CHANGE WAS TAKING PLACE FROM AN OLD RWY (RWY 13/31) TO A NEWER NEARLY PARALLEL RWY (RWY 14/32). IT WAS KNOWN THAT THE OLD RWY WAS CLOSED AND THE NEW RWY WAS IN USE. A SECOND XWIND RWY WAS NOT KNOWN TO BE CLOSED. INDEED, THE MOST COMMON TOPIC AROUND THE ARPT WAS THAT FROM NOW ON, THE XWIND RWY (RWY 5/23) WOULD BE THE RWY OF PREFERENCE FOR TKOF WHEN CONDITIONS PERMITTED. THIS WAS TO AVOID A LENGTHY 2 MI TAXI TO THE END OF THE NEW RWY (RWY 14/32). ON START-UP AND TAXI AND DURING THE PREFLT, THE LCL UNICOM WAS MONITORED AND NO OTHER TFC WAS HEARD OR OBSERVED. HOWEVER, 1 ACFT WAS NOTED CLBING TO THE NE. ON ARR AT THE TXWY TO THE NEW RWY, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE TXWY WAS CLOSED, BUT TFC WAS INSTEAD ROUTED ONTO RWY 5/23. BARRICADES WERE NOTED AT THIS TIME LIMITING ACCESS TO THE E. HOWEVER, NO BARRICADES WERE NOTED TO THE W. AT THIS TIME THE WIND SOCK WAS OBSERVED AND ESTIMATED TO BE FROM THE W AT APPROX 10 KTS. IT WAS KNOWN THAT IN EXCESS OF 3000 FT WAS LEFT ON RWY 23 FROM THIS INTXN. IT SHOULD BE NOTED HERE THAT THE WIND WAS CHKED LATER AND FOUND TO BE 230/05. IT WAS RECALLED THAT THE EARLIER MENTIONED ACFT COULD HAVE BEEN IN A CLBING R TURN FROM RWY 23 AS WELL AS A CLBING R TURN FROM RWY 32. THE DECISION WAS MADE TO LAUNCH FROM RWY 23, MAKE A MAX PERFORMANCE CLB TO 6000 FT, CIRCLE THE ARPT AND LAND. A VISUAL CHK WAS AGAIN MADE FOR TFC, NONE WAS OBSERVED, AND THE TKOF WENT WITHOUT INCIDENT. SOMETIME DURING THE TKOF AND CLBOUT, A RADIO XMISSION FROM AN INCOMING ACFT INDICATED HE WAS APCHING SHERIDAN AND WOULD ENTER L TFC FOR RWY 14. AT THIS TIME THE WIND SOCK WAS AGAIN CHKED, AND IN SO DOING, THE X'S ON RWY 5/23 WERE NOTED. THE PATTERN WAS ENTERED BEHIND THE INCOMING TWIN AND A LNDG WAS MADE ON RWY 14 WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE ENTIRE INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY CHKING THE LCL NOTAMS BEFORE THE SHORT MAINT FLT. THEY WERE INDEED NOTED DURING A PRELIMINARY WX BRIEF AN HR LATER IN PREPARATION FOR THE ENSUING TRIP. THE INCIDENT COULD FURTHER HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY BETTER SIGNING AS TO THE PURPOSE OF RWY 5/23 BY THE RESPONSIBLE PARTIES. ALSO, SOMEONE SUCH AS THE ARPT MGMNT SHOULD TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MONITORING THE UNICOM FREQ.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.