Inappropriate abort.

Attributes
ACN	311332
Time
Date	199507
Day	Tue
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : sna
State Reference	CA
Altitude	agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	artcc : bqn
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 135
Flight Phase	climbout : takeoff
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : instrument pilot : commercial pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 123 flight time total : 2800 flight time type : 141
ASRS Report	311332
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Events
Anomaly	non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	none taken : insufficient time
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

Crew consisted of a new upgrade captain -- company defined as 'inexperienced' (less than 100 hours in type) and a new first officer. Company procedure calls for aircraft control transfer to PF at 70 KTS, then PNF makes speed calls (this case, the captain). Captain transferred control of aircraft to the first officer then called V1, rotate, at which time aircraft pitch was increased. Simultaneously with this event (just after V1 call) captain called and initiated abort by reducing power completely. Aircraft was momentarily airborne and first officer landed, captain applied reverse and brakes. Aircraft stopped on runway without incident and returned to gate. The captain said reason for abort was a 'drag or yaw to the left' that he interpreted as an impending power-plant failure. All power gauges and caption panel was normal. First officer didn't notice anything that warranted an abort, however, upon rotation and maintaining directional control rudder handling or inadvertent touching of brakes could have produced slight yaw. The problem lies in the fact that the abort was made after V1 call and aircraft was transitioning to flight. A decision to continue takeoff after V1 should not have to be considered (even if the perception is adequate runway remains). However, in those precious moments it appeared instinct overruled training.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INAPPROPRIATE ABORT.

Narrative: CREW CONSISTED OF A NEW UPGRADE CAPT -- COMPANY DEFINED AS 'INEXPERIENCED' (LESS THAN 100 HRS IN TYPE) AND A NEW FO. COMPANY PROC CALLS FOR ACFT CTL TRANSFER TO PF AT 70 KTS, THEN PNF MAKES SPD CALLS (THIS CASE, THE CAPT). CAPT TRANSFERRED CTL OF ACFT TO THE FO THEN CALLED V1, ROTATE, AT WHICH TIME ACFT PITCH WAS INCREASED. SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THIS EVENT (JUST AFTER V1 CALL) CAPT CALLED AND INITIATED ABORT BY REDUCING PWR COMPLETELY. ACFT WAS MOMENTARILY AIRBORNE AND FO LANDED, CAPT APPLIED REVERSE AND BRAKES. ACFT STOPPED ON RWY WITHOUT INCIDENT AND RETURNED TO GATE. THE CAPT SAID REASON FOR ABORT WAS A 'DRAG OR YAW TO THE L' THAT HE INTERPRETED AS AN IMPENDING PWR-PLANT FAILURE. ALL PWR GAUGES AND CAPTION PANEL WAS NORMAL. FO DIDN'T NOTICE ANYTHING THAT WARRANTED AN ABORT, HOWEVER, UPON ROTATION AND MAINTAINING DIRECTIONAL CTL RUDDER HANDLING OR INADVERTENT TOUCHING OF BRAKES COULD HAVE PRODUCED SLIGHT YAW. THE PROB LIES IN THE FACT THAT THE ABORT WAS MADE AFTER V1 CALL AND ACFT WAS TRANSITIONING TO FLT. A DECISION TO CONTINUE TKOF AFTER V1 SHOULD NOT HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED (EVEN IF THE PERCEPTION IS ADEQUATE RWY REMAINS). HOWEVER, IN THOSE PRECIOUS MOMENTS IT APPEARED INSTINCT OVERRULED TRAINING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.