Narrative:

Approximately 20 mins after departing bhm, check airman, in jumpseat, noticed loss of #2 hydraulic fluid. We were in cruise phase with little or no hydraulic demand. We, including jump seat rider, reviewed and followed appropriate procedures. Cabin crew and passenger were advised. As we were completing the abnormal checklist, atl ATC issued us holding instructions for clt, our destination. I advised ATC I did not wish to hold because of the hydraulic problem -- they complied and vectored us towards clt. No emergency was declared. The landing gear was lowered via the #1 hydraulic system. 15 mi from touchdown, all normal indications were present. The passenger and cabin crew were then told we would have a normal landing, as was clt approach and tower. I did not request any ground equipment, yet they followed us upon touchdown. Approach and landing was uneventful. After taxing to the gate, airport police were told 'we had lost all of our hydraulic system.' callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the DC9-30 hydraulic system incorporates protection to prevent component damage. A hydraulic fuse will blow out if the system experiences a sudden rush (volume) of fluid. Reporter states that flight crew and check airman reasonably determined the criticality of the problem, however, ATC and airport crash fire rescue equipment response was conservative -- reporter recognizes that perceptions are variable and believes it is correct to act on the safe side, on ATC's part.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC9-30 FLC EXPERIENCED A #2 HYD SYS FAILURE. CABIN CREWMEMBERS AND PAX WERE ADVISED.

Narrative: APPROX 20 MINS AFTER DEPARTING BHM, CHK AIRMAN, IN JUMPSEAT, NOTICED LOSS OF #2 HYD FLUID. WE WERE IN CRUISE PHASE WITH LITTLE OR NO HYD DEMAND. WE, INCLUDING JUMP SEAT RIDER, REVIEWED AND FOLLOWED APPROPRIATE PROCS. CABIN CREW AND PAX WERE ADVISED. AS WE WERE COMPLETING THE ABNORMAL CHKLIST, ATL ATC ISSUED US HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLT, OUR DEST. I ADVISED ATC I DID NOT WISH TO HOLD BECAUSE OF THE HYD PROB -- THEY COMPLIED AND VECTORED US TOWARDS CLT. NO EMER WAS DECLARED. THE LNDG GEAR WAS LOWERED VIA THE #1 HYD SYS. 15 MI FROM TOUCHDOWN, ALL NORMAL INDICATIONS WERE PRESENT. THE PAX AND CABIN CREW WERE THEN TOLD WE WOULD HAVE A NORMAL LNDG, AS WAS CLT APCH AND TWR. I DID NOT REQUEST ANY GND EQUIP, YET THEY FOLLOWED US UPON TOUCHDOWN. APCH AND LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. AFTER TAXING TO THE GATE, ARPT POLICE WERE TOLD 'WE HAD LOST ALL OF OUR HYD SYS.' CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE DC9-30 HYD SYS INCORPORATES PROTECTION TO PREVENT COMPONENT DAMAGE. A HYD FUSE WILL BLOW OUT IF THE SYS EXPERIENCES A SUDDEN RUSH (VOLUME) OF FLUID. RPTR STATES THAT FLC AND CHK AIRMAN REASONABLY DETERMINED THE CRITICALITY OF THE PROB, HOWEVER, ATC AND ARPT CFR RESPONSE WAS CONSERVATIVE -- RPTR RECOGNIZES THAT PERCEPTIONS ARE VARIABLE AND BELIEVES IT IS CORRECT TO ACT ON THE SAFE SIDE, ON ATC'S PART.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.