Narrative:

On the day of the above mentioned event with an FAA ATC controller on the jumpseat the PF experienced difficulty landing the aircraft. On short final I gave the required call at 500 ft (AGL) that we were slow. 3-4 KTS slow below bug speed. The captain had no wind additive set on his airspeed cursor. Tower reported the wind as 180 degrees 08 KTS 'estimated.' no actual value was given. The captain had too much wind correction for the amount of actual wind existing. The captain was too slow for the landing attitude he tried to use, and the captain flared too high with the left wing down. As the left main slammed onto the runway forcing the right main down the nose gear followed almost simultaneously. I attempted to intervene at this point grabbing the wheel and reminding the captain to 'be easy' on the controls and hold the landing attitude. It was too late. The nosewheel bounced off the runway and slammed down again. Taxi to the gate was quiet and uneventful. Postflt inspection by the captain revealed nothing. However, postflt inspection by the first officer revealed dislodged/loose 'O' ring dust covers on the nose gear. I told maintenance that I could have missed them early that morning on the originating preflight inspection and I wasn't sure how long the 'O' rings were there in that condition. Maintenance advised us to 'write-up' the hard landing in the logbook so they could perform a formal phase I hard landing inspection. The captain complied. As part of that inspection the landing flaps would not extend normally. Only after subsequent tries and using the alternate system would the flaps and slats extend. Maintenance replaced the 'O' rings and signed off the inspection. I recommend that corporate safety and flight operations use punitive/discipline actions for pilots who are dangerous. Pilots at this airline that are habitually non-compliant and procedurally non-standard need to be grounded. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter is a first officer on the B757-200 for a major airline. He said that although the training/checking standards have improved a great deal, more needs to be done. The general standard of performance, according to the reporter, is far below what was considered acceptable by his previous employer. The major problem, he feels is with the older capts. A number of these pilots still attempt to operate the B757-200 with the same techniques used on much smaller and less advanced aircraft. The first officer said that recently the company has decided to downsize so they have put a large number of pilots on reserve. These reserves are not flying very much and they are sometimes paired with these older not very competent capts. So the 2 pilots are then in a less than ready state. In this incident the first officer said that he told the captain about the below bug speed situation, but he ignored him. Then after the first impact he attempted to assist, but again was unable. He said that he was just along for the ride as far as the captain was concerned. After telling the mechanic about the dust cover problem and the 'landing' the maintenance department persuaded the captain to write up the hard landing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LOSS OF ACFT CTL -- ACR MAKES A HARD LNDG REQUIRING AN INSPECTION WHEN THE CAPT MAKES A BELOW BUG SPD APCH AND FLARES HIGH.

Narrative: ON THE DAY OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED EVENT WITH AN FAA ATC CTLR ON THE JUMPSEAT THE PF EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTY LNDG THE ACFT. ON SHORT FINAL I GAVE THE REQUIRED CALL AT 500 FT (AGL) THAT WE WERE SLOW. 3-4 KTS SLOW BELOW BUG SPD. THE CAPT HAD NO WIND ADDITIVE SET ON HIS AIRSPD CURSOR. TWR RPTED THE WIND AS 180 DEGS 08 KTS 'ESTIMATED.' NO ACTUAL VALUE WAS GIVEN. THE CAPT HAD TOO MUCH WIND CORRECTION FOR THE AMOUNT OF ACTUAL WIND EXISTING. THE CAPT WAS TOO SLOW FOR THE LNDG ATTITUDE HE TRIED TO USE, AND THE CAPT FLARED TOO HIGH WITH THE L WING DOWN. AS THE L MAIN SLAMMED ONTO THE RWY FORCING THE R MAIN DOWN THE NOSE GEAR FOLLOWED ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY. I ATTEMPTED TO INTERVENE AT THIS POINT GRABBING THE WHEEL AND REMINDING THE CAPT TO 'BE EASY' ON THE CTLS AND HOLD THE LNDG ATTITUDE. IT WAS TOO LATE. THE NOSEWHEEL BOUNCED OFF THE RWY AND SLAMMED DOWN AGAIN. TAXI TO THE GATE WAS QUIET AND UNEVENTFUL. POSTFLT INSPECTION BY THE CAPT REVEALED NOTHING. HOWEVER, POSTFLT INSPECTION BY THE FO REVEALED DISLODGED/LOOSE 'O' RING DUST COVERS ON THE NOSE GEAR. I TOLD MAINT THAT I COULD HAVE MISSED THEM EARLY THAT MORNING ON THE ORIGINATING PREFLT INSPECTION AND I WASN'T SURE HOW LONG THE 'O' RINGS WERE THERE IN THAT CONDITION. MAINT ADVISED US TO 'WRITE-UP' THE HARD LNDG IN THE LOGBOOK SO THEY COULD PERFORM A FORMAL PHASE I HARD LNDG INSPECTION. THE CAPT COMPLIED. AS PART OF THAT INSPECTION THE LNDG FLAPS WOULD NOT EXTEND NORMALLY. ONLY AFTER SUBSEQUENT TRIES AND USING THE ALTERNATE SYS WOULD THE FLAPS AND SLATS EXTEND. MAINT REPLACED THE 'O' RINGS AND SIGNED OFF THE INSPECTION. I RECOMMEND THAT CORPORATE SAFETY AND FLT OPS USE PUNITIVE/DISCIPLINE ACTIONS FOR PLTS WHO ARE DANGEROUS. PLTS AT THIS AIRLINE THAT ARE HABITUALLY NON-COMPLIANT AND PROCEDURALLY NON-STANDARD NEED TO BE GNDED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR IS A FO ON THE B757-200 FOR A MAJOR AIRLINE. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE TRAINING/CHKING STANDARDS HAVE IMPROVED A GREAT DEAL, MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE. THE GENERAL STANDARD OF PERFORMANCE, ACCORDING TO THE RPTR, IS FAR BELOW WHAT WAS CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE BY HIS PREVIOUS EMPLOYER. THE MAJOR PROB, HE FEELS IS WITH THE OLDER CAPTS. A NUMBER OF THESE PLTS STILL ATTEMPT TO OPERATE THE B757-200 WITH THE SAME TECHNIQUES USED ON MUCH SMALLER AND LESS ADVANCED ACFT. THE FO SAID THAT RECENTLY THE COMPANY HAS DECIDED TO DOWNSIZE SO THEY HAVE PUT A LARGE NUMBER OF PLTS ON RESERVE. THESE RESERVES ARE NOT FLYING VERY MUCH AND THEY ARE SOMETIMES PAIRED WITH THESE OLDER NOT VERY COMPETENT CAPTS. SO THE 2 PLTS ARE THEN IN A LESS THAN READY STATE. IN THIS INCIDENT THE FO SAID THAT HE TOLD THE CAPT ABOUT THE BELOW BUG SPD SIT, BUT HE IGNORED HIM. THEN AFTER THE FIRST IMPACT HE ATTEMPTED TO ASSIST, BUT AGAIN WAS UNABLE. HE SAID THAT HE WAS JUST ALONG FOR THE RIDE AS FAR AS THE CAPT WAS CONCERNED. AFTER TELLING THE MECH ABOUT THE DUST COVER PROB AND THE 'LNDG' THE MAINT DEPT PERSUADED THE CAPT TO WRITE UP THE HARD LNDG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.