Narrative:

On aug/xx/95 flight returned to the gate at san jose, ca (sjc), after aborting takeoff with a warning horn sounding. I arranged for mechanic mr X to work on the aircraft. I explained to mr X that the following flight controls if mis-positioned or indicating incorrectly (leading edge flap position 1 or 4), or the parking brake valve not opening would cause the takeoff warning horn to sound when the throttles were advanced: flaps out to takeoff range, stabilizer out of green band and speed brake handle out of position. I asked mr X to verify the correct position of the affected flight controls and leading edge flap position indication, and if all was normal, to move each of these controls and reset them to their takeoff position. I told mr X if those actions were no help, to observe the operation of the parking brake valve while a crewmember operated the control lever. I provided mr X with a verbal location of the valve and a description of the valve and disconnect number on its connection. I also faxed a page from the airlines B737-322/522 aircraft reference guide, pages 32-77 to show the valve location. Mr X reported back to my partner mr Y that the flight control position were correct and that moving them did not change the situation, but the parking brake valve did not operate with the control lever. I informed mr Y that the parking brake valve was deferrable per MEL and we could do that if the takeoff warning horn did not sound after the valve was deactivated per the procedure in MEL. Mr Y sent a copy of the MEL to sjc operations via their unimatic computer printer. At some time during the deactivation and deferral procedure that copy was lost. Mr Y sent a copy to the company printer. Mr Y then completed the deferral with mr X. After this was completed, the captain called me and was concerned about the weight restr that had to be applied which would require the removal of some passenger. I explained to him that the parking brake valve deactivation would make the anti-skid system inoperative and our only other option was to send parts and people to sjc to fix the problem. The captain agreed to take the aircraft. My next contact with flight was a phone call from san francisco maintenance. Mr Z advised me that he had the flight on the radio and they were unable to raise the flaps and a visual indication confirmed the flap position. Relaying information through mr Z, I attempted to resolve the situation but to no avail. After these attempts I contacted dispatcher mr ab. We agreed that diversion to sfo would probably be the best course of action, but our method of communication was unsatisfactory. Mr ab contacted the flight via radio link and arranged a 3-WAY arinc patch with me. After the patch was established, the captain decided to divert to sfo. The captain confirmed his flap position and we decided to try the alternate flap extension procedure in the flight handbook. The captain advised me that flap extension was good with no roll to 10 degrees of flap. He decided to stop the extension at 10 degrees because he had a landing warning horn and did not want to complete the extension to 15 degrees until he was ready to lower his landing gear, the captain advised me that he was leaving the frequency to complete his landing arrangements with ATC. After the aircraft landed at sfo, I was informed that the airlines mechanics had found the flap bypass valve connector disconnected and hanging loose. Supplemental information from acn 312953: approximately 2 hours later, I received a call from mechanic at sfo that he had found the connector at the flap bypass valve in the wheelwell was disconnected and hanging down. Also, he found the connector for the parking brake valve was still connected to the valve not in compliance with the deferral. Apparently, the mechanic at sjc removed the wrong connector even though we provided all proper documents and procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT MAINT DISCREPANCY CREATES AN ACR B737-300 DIVERSION TO ALTERNATE AFTER TKOF FROM SJC.

Narrative: ON AUG/XX/95 FLT RETURNED TO THE GATE AT SAN JOSE, CA (SJC), AFTER ABORTING TKOF WITH A WARNING HORN SOUNDING. I ARRANGED FOR MECH MR X TO WORK ON THE ACFT. I EXPLAINED TO MR X THAT THE FOLLOWING FLT CTLS IF MIS-POSITIONED OR INDICATING INCORRECTLY (LEADING EDGE FLAP POS 1 OR 4), OR THE PARKING BRAKE VALVE NOT OPENING WOULD CAUSE THE TKOF WARNING HORN TO SOUND WHEN THE THROTTLES WERE ADVANCED: FLAPS OUT TO TKOF RANGE, STABILIZER OUT OF GREEN BAND AND SPD BRAKE HANDLE OUT OF POS. I ASKED MR X TO VERIFY THE CORRECT POS OF THE AFFECTED FLT CTLS AND LEADING EDGE FLAP POS INDICATION, AND IF ALL WAS NORMAL, TO MOVE EACH OF THESE CTLS AND RESET THEM TO THEIR TKOF POS. I TOLD MR X IF THOSE ACTIONS WERE NO HELP, TO OBSERVE THE OP OF THE PARKING BRAKE VALVE WHILE A CREWMEMBER OPERATED THE CTL LEVER. I PROVIDED MR X WITH A VERBAL LOCATION OF THE VALVE AND A DESCRIPTION OF THE VALVE AND DISCONNECT NUMBER ON ITS CONNECTION. I ALSO FAXED A PAGE FROM THE AIRLINES B737-322/522 ACFT REF GUIDE, PAGES 32-77 TO SHOW THE VALVE LOCATION. MR X RPTED BACK TO MY PARTNER MR Y THAT THE FLT CTL POS WERE CORRECT AND THAT MOVING THEM DID NOT CHANGE THE SIT, BUT THE PARKING BRAKE VALVE DID NOT OPERATE WITH THE CTL LEVER. I INFORMED MR Y THAT THE PARKING BRAKE VALVE WAS DEFERRABLE PER MEL AND WE COULD DO THAT IF THE TKOF WARNING HORN DID NOT SOUND AFTER THE VALVE WAS DEACTIVATED PER THE PROC IN MEL. MR Y SENT A COPY OF THE MEL TO SJC OPS VIA THEIR UNIMATIC COMPUTER PRINTER. AT SOME TIME DURING THE DEACTIVATION AND DEFERRAL PROC THAT COPY WAS LOST. MR Y SENT A COPY TO THE COMPANY PRINTER. MR Y THEN COMPLETED THE DEFERRAL WITH MR X. AFTER THIS WAS COMPLETED, THE CAPT CALLED ME AND WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE WT RESTR THAT HAD TO BE APPLIED WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE REMOVAL OF SOME PAX. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT THE PARKING BRAKE VALVE DEACTIVATION WOULD MAKE THE ANTI-SKID SYS INOP AND OUR ONLY OTHER OPTION WAS TO SEND PARTS AND PEOPLE TO SJC TO FIX THE PROB. THE CAPT AGREED TO TAKE THE ACFT. MY NEXT CONTACT WITH FLT WAS A PHONE CALL FROM SAN FRANCISCO MAINT. MR Z ADVISED ME THAT HE HAD THE FLT ON THE RADIO AND THEY WERE UNABLE TO RAISE THE FLAPS AND A VISUAL INDICATION CONFIRMED THE FLAP POS. RELAYING INFO THROUGH MR Z, I ATTEMPTED TO RESOLVE THE SIT BUT TO NO AVAIL. AFTER THESE ATTEMPTS I CONTACTED DISPATCHER MR AB. WE AGREED THAT DIVERSION TO SFO WOULD PROBABLY BE THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION, BUT OUR METHOD OF COM WAS UNSATISFACTORY. MR AB CONTACTED THE FLT VIA RADIO LINK AND ARRANGED A 3-WAY ARINC PATCH WITH ME. AFTER THE PATCH WAS ESTABLISHED, THE CAPT DECIDED TO DIVERT TO SFO. THE CAPT CONFIRMED HIS FLAP POS AND WE DECIDED TO TRY THE ALTERNATE FLAP EXTENSION PROC IN THE FLT HANDBOOK. THE CAPT ADVISED ME THAT FLAP EXTENSION WAS GOOD WITH NO ROLL TO 10 DEGS OF FLAP. HE DECIDED TO STOP THE EXTENSION AT 10 DEGS BECAUSE HE HAD A LNDG WARNING HORN AND DID NOT WANT TO COMPLETE THE EXTENSION TO 15 DEGS UNTIL HE WAS READY TO LOWER HIS LNDG GEAR, THE CAPT ADVISED ME THAT HE WAS LEAVING THE FREQ TO COMPLETE HIS LNDG ARRANGEMENTS WITH ATC. AFTER THE ACFT LANDED AT SFO, I WAS INFORMED THAT THE AIRLINES MECHS HAD FOUND THE FLAP BYPASS VALVE CONNECTOR DISCONNECTED AND HANGING LOOSE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 312953: APPROX 2 HRS LATER, I RECEIVED A CALL FROM MECH AT SFO THAT HE HAD FOUND THE CONNECTOR AT THE FLAP BYPASS VALVE IN THE WHEELWELL WAS DISCONNECTED AND HANGING DOWN. ALSO, HE FOUND THE CONNECTOR FOR THE PARKING BRAKE VALVE WAS STILL CONNECTED TO THE VALVE NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE DEFERRAL. APPARENTLY, THE MECH AT SJC REMOVED THE WRONG CONNECTOR EVEN THOUGH WE PROVIDED ALL PROPER DOCUMENTS AND PROCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.