Narrative:

On aug/xx/95, I was conducting a far part 135 competency/proficiency check in a BE90-E90 king air, good VFR at the time. While approximately 18 mi east of the little rock VOR the PF (taking the check) called little rock approach and requested holding over the little rock VOR, southeast on the 152 degree radial, which would set up the airplane for the VOR approach to north little rock, via the 332 degree radial. We were at 3000 ft MSL, and the controller told us to climb to 3500 ft. We did just that. The PF made a direct entry and turned southeast, as required. Then, when he had turned northwest on the holding radial, the controller stated that the traffic was departing runway 18, and would be turning east. I told the controller I had the traffic in sight when he was about 1/4 mi off the end of runway 18. I heard the controller tell the traffic, a baron, to not climb above 3000 ft, that there was a king air holding over the VOR at 3500 ft. The pilot acknowledged the instruction. I had the baron in sight as long as we were on a northwest heading, where I could look out the left side of the king air cockpit, but when we reached the VOR we had to begin a turn again to the southeast for the outbound leg of the holding pattern. This put the traffic behind us, and of course the controller, in my mind, would expect to see us (the king air) turn in that direction, since that is the holding pattern we had requested and the pattern that was approved for us to use. At some time during our northwest leg in the pattern, when the baron pilot told the controller that he had us in sight, the controller deleted the baron's 3000 ft restr, and told him to maintain visual separation. The baron pilot acknowledged, and continued his climb. When we rolled out of the turn to the southeast I could see the baron climbing through our altitude, traveling from right to left, as if we were not there. I reached across the cockpit and hit the autoplt disconnect button on the pilot's yoke and rolled the king air into a 90 degree bank, allowed the nose to fall, lost about 300 ft of altitude, then rolled it back to level flight. (The PF was wearing a hood for the check ride.) when I beganthis maneuver it was obvious that we were going to collide, as the baron's path and ours were going to meet at exactly our 12 O'clock position. The baron was about 300 ft in front of us, with no vertical separation. Why did the controller delete the baron's 3000 ft altitude restr, then allow him to turn 'on course' (east) when he knew we were in a holding pattern to the baron's east? Why did the baron pilot climb in front of us when he had to know that we could not see him with our back to him during our turn in the holding pattern? Why did the lit approach supervisor, when I called him on the phone say, 'it was your fault for turning toward him?' I have to ask myself, 'what should one do when you and the other aircraft are VFR, and you think the controller expects you to be in a holding pattern?' do you tell him he is making a mistake by deleting the other traffic's altitude restr, or do you leave the holding pattern and make the controller wonder what you are doing? (The airplane in the holding pattern is more 'obligated' to maintain its altitude and general position than is an aircraft not so burdened.) there is jet traffic constantly coming in, not to mention all the GA traffic, so the controller is going to raise ---- if you do something unexpected, so you try to comply with his instructions. But in this case, by trying to comply and fit into the system, 'it was your fault.' this is what I think should be done: the controller should not delete an altitude restr on an aircraft until the threat that created that restr is no longer in force. In this case there was a threat until the baron had passed east of the holding pattern. Just because the rule says that if both aircraft have each other in sight the controller is no longer responsible for traffic separation, he should not be allowed to release himself of separation responsibility when he knows the threat will continue to exist. Pilots lose sight of each other all the time, especially when the higher pilot loses the lower aircraft to 'ground clutter.' in this case I could not look through the back of the airplane during the turn to southeast. The 5, 6,and 7 O'clock position are blind, or nearly so.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A FAA CHK PLT RPTED A NMAC WHILE CONDUCTING A FAR PART 135 COMPETENCY CHK IN AN BE90 KING AIR. INCIDENT OCCURRED IN HOLDING PATTERN VFR WHILE IN CLASS C AIRSPACE. RPTR'S ACFT AND OTHER ACFT WERE IN SEE AND BE SEEN ENVIRONMENT UNDER RADAR CTL.

Narrative: ON AUG/XX/95, I WAS CONDUCTING A FAR PART 135 COMPETENCY/PROFICIENCY CHK IN A BE90-E90 KING AIR, GOOD VFR AT THE TIME. WHILE APPROX 18 MI E OF THE LITTLE ROCK VOR THE PF (TAKING THE CHK) CALLED LITTLE ROCK APCH AND REQUESTED HOLDING OVER THE LITTLE ROCK VOR, SE ON THE 152 DEG RADIAL, WHICH WOULD SET UP THE AIRPLANE FOR THE VOR APCH TO NORTH LITTLE ROCK, VIA THE 332 DEG RADIAL. WE WERE AT 3000 FT MSL, AND THE CTLR TOLD US TO CLB TO 3500 FT. WE DID JUST THAT. THE PF MADE A DIRECT ENTRY AND TURNED SE, AS REQUIRED. THEN, WHEN HE HAD TURNED NW ON THE HOLDING RADIAL, THE CTLR STATED THAT THE TFC WAS DEPARTING RWY 18, AND WOULD BE TURNING E. I TOLD THE CTLR I HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT WHEN HE WAS ABOUT 1/4 MI OFF THE END OF RWY 18. I HEARD THE CTLR TELL THE TFC, A BARON, TO NOT CLB ABOVE 3000 FT, THAT THERE WAS A KING AIR HOLDING OVER THE VOR AT 3500 FT. THE PLT ACKNOWLEDGED THE INSTRUCTION. I HAD THE BARON IN SIGHT AS LONG AS WE WERE ON A NW HDG, WHERE I COULD LOOK OUT THE L SIDE OF THE KING AIR COCKPIT, BUT WHEN WE REACHED THE VOR WE HAD TO BEGIN A TURN AGAIN TO THE SE FOR THE OUTBOUND LEG OF THE HOLDING PATTERN. THIS PUT THE TFC BEHIND US, AND OF COURSE THE CTLR, IN MY MIND, WOULD EXPECT TO SEE US (THE KING AIR) TURN IN THAT DIRECTION, SINCE THAT IS THE HOLDING PATTERN WE HAD REQUESTED AND THE PATTERN THAT WAS APPROVED FOR US TO USE. AT SOME TIME DURING OUR NW LEG IN THE PATTERN, WHEN THE BARON PLT TOLD THE CTLR THAT HE HAD US IN SIGHT, THE CTLR DELETED THE BARON'S 3000 FT RESTR, AND TOLD HIM TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION. THE BARON PLT ACKNOWLEDGED, AND CONTINUED HIS CLB. WHEN WE ROLLED OUT OF THE TURN TO THE SE I COULD SEE THE BARON CLBING THROUGH OUR ALT, TRAVELING FROM R TO L, AS IF WE WERE NOT THERE. I REACHED ACROSS THE COCKPIT AND HIT THE AUTOPLT DISCONNECT BUTTON ON THE PLT'S YOKE AND ROLLED THE KING AIR INTO A 90 DEG BANK, ALLOWED THE NOSE TO FALL, LOST ABOUT 300 FT OF ALT, THEN ROLLED IT BACK TO LEVEL FLT. (THE PF WAS WEARING A HOOD FOR THE CHK RIDE.) WHEN I BEGANTHIS MANEUVER IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT WE WERE GOING TO COLLIDE, AS THE BARON'S PATH AND OURS WERE GOING TO MEET AT EXACTLY OUR 12 O'CLOCK POS. THE BARON WAS ABOUT 300 FT IN FRONT OF US, WITH NO VERT SEPARATION. WHY DID THE CTLR DELETE THE BARON'S 3000 FT ALT RESTR, THEN ALLOW HIM TO TURN 'ON COURSE' (E) WHEN HE KNEW WE WERE IN A HOLDING PATTERN TO THE BARON'S E? WHY DID THE BARON PLT CLB IN FRONT OF US WHEN HE HAD TO KNOW THAT WE COULD NOT SEE HIM WITH OUR BACK TO HIM DURING OUR TURN IN THE HOLDING PATTERN? WHY DID THE LIT APCH SUPVR, WHEN I CALLED HIM ON THE PHONE SAY, 'IT WAS YOUR FAULT FOR TURNING TOWARD HIM?' I HAVE TO ASK MYSELF, 'WHAT SHOULD ONE DO WHEN YOU AND THE OTHER ACFT ARE VFR, AND YOU THINK THE CTLR EXPECTS YOU TO BE IN A HOLDING PATTERN?' DO YOU TELL HIM HE IS MAKING A MISTAKE BY DELETING THE OTHER TFC'S ALT RESTR, OR DO YOU LEAVE THE HOLDING PATTERN AND MAKE THE CTLR WONDER WHAT YOU ARE DOING? (THE AIRPLANE IN THE HOLDING PATTERN IS MORE 'OBLIGATED' TO MAINTAIN ITS ALT AND GENERAL POS THAN IS AN ACFT NOT SO BURDENED.) THERE IS JET TFC CONSTANTLY COMING IN, NOT TO MENTION ALL THE GA TFC, SO THE CTLR IS GOING TO RAISE ---- IF YOU DO SOMETHING UNEXPECTED, SO YOU TRY TO COMPLY WITH HIS INSTRUCTIONS. BUT IN THIS CASE, BY TRYING TO COMPLY AND FIT INTO THE SYS, 'IT WAS YOUR FAULT.' THIS IS WHAT I THINK SHOULD BE DONE: THE CTLR SHOULD NOT DELETE AN ALT RESTR ON AN ACFT UNTIL THE THREAT THAT CREATED THAT RESTR IS NO LONGER IN FORCE. IN THIS CASE THERE WAS A THREAT UNTIL THE BARON HAD PASSED E OF THE HOLDING PATTERN. JUST BECAUSE THE RULE SAYS THAT IF BOTH ACFT HAVE EACH OTHER IN SIGHT THE CTLR IS NO LONGER RESPONSIBLE FOR TFC SEPARATION, HE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO RELEASE HIMSELF OF SEPARATION RESPONSIBILITY WHEN HE KNOWS THE THREAT WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST. PLTS LOSE SIGHT OF EACH OTHER ALL THE TIME, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE HIGHER PLT LOSES THE LOWER ACFT TO 'GND CLUTTER.' IN THIS CASE I COULD NOT LOOK THROUGH THE BACK OF THE AIRPLANE DURING THE TURN TO SE. THE 5, 6,AND 7 O'CLOCK POS ARE BLIND, OR NEARLY SO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.