Narrative:

During descent into cmi heard loud bang followed by aircraft yawing, followed by 2 more loud bangs and grinding noise. Immediately suspected engine trouble. Looked at engine gauges and saw both torque gauges oscillating back and forth. Immediately after that, thick, whitish blue smoke entered cockpit. Could not breathe, could not see very well, as eyes started to tear profusely. Both myself and first officer donned oxygen masks and tried to establish crew communication. I tried to establish crew communication by using overhead speaker. First officer tried to establish crew communication using headsets. Smoke became so bad, and crew communication was compromised, that I reached over and turned off the flows (bleeds). Smoke stopped immediately and cabin started climbing and smoke evacuate/evacuationed from aircraft. Immediately after that I saw the #2 engine fire light illuminate. At this time, we had still not sufficiently established crew communication so I took my oxygen mask off and determined that the air was breathable, and told my first officer to do the same. He did. We then performed memory items and engine fire checklist. We declared an emergency with cmi approach, told them of our problem, and told them to roll the fire trucks and that we would be evacing the aircraft on the runway. They (cmi approach) requested fuel and souls on board and cleared us to land on runway 32L. After stopping aircraft on runway, shut down operating engine and commenced emergency passenger evacuate/evacuation. Evacuate/evacuation was done with no passenger panicking or getting injured. After everyone was off I grabbed fire extinguisher while the first officer handled the passenger. Passenger congregated sufficient distance from aircraft, first officer handled them while I spoke with fire chief and asked them if they confirmed that fire was out. It was. Transportation then arrived for passenger to terminal. One problem was not sufficiently establishing crew communication properly. I went to overhead speaker, first officer went to headsets. All the training and professionalism on both the first officer's and my part helped in the successful and safe termination of the flight. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: BA32 captain reports actual cause of engine fail uncertain. Mechanics stated that substantial damage occurred in reduction gearbox section. Engine parts slung against the fuselage aft of the kevlar ice shield (normal path of propeller ice) puncturing the fuselage. The resulting decompression explains the rapid smoke removal and immediate cabin rate of climb. Particularly alarming to the flight crew, was the aircraft's yawing back and forth and engine torque gauge oscillation. The flight crew could not determine which engine had failed. Only after the #2 engine fire light illuminated, was the flight crew able to get past the unknown, and follow SOP's. Since the date of this incident, the reporter has not witnessed any follow-up activity except company's 'smoke' training standardization and ASRS callback.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMER DECLARED AFTER BA32'S ENG FAILED. LNDG UNEVENTFUL. CFR RESPONSE.

Narrative: DURING DSCNT INTO CMI HEARD LOUD BANG FOLLOWED BY ACFT YAWING, FOLLOWED BY 2 MORE LOUD BANGS AND GRINDING NOISE. IMMEDIATELY SUSPECTED ENG TROUBLE. LOOKED AT ENG GAUGES AND SAW BOTH TORQUE GAUGES OSCILLATING BACK AND FORTH. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THAT, THICK, WHITISH BLUE SMOKE ENTERED COCKPIT. COULD NOT BREATHE, COULD NOT SEE VERY WELL, AS EYES STARTED TO TEAR PROFUSELY. BOTH MYSELF AND FO DONNED OXYGEN MASKS AND TRIED TO ESTABLISH CREW COM. I TRIED TO ESTABLISH CREW COM BY USING OVERHEAD SPEAKER. FO TRIED TO ESTABLISH CREW COM USING HEADSETS. SMOKE BECAME SO BAD, AND CREW COM WAS COMPROMISED, THAT I REACHED OVER AND TURNED OFF THE FLOWS (BLEEDS). SMOKE STOPPED IMMEDIATELY AND CABIN STARTED CLBING AND SMOKE EVACED FROM ACFT. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THAT I SAW THE #2 ENG FIRE LIGHT ILLUMINATE. AT THIS TIME, WE HAD STILL NOT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED CREW COM SO I TOOK MY OXYGEN MASK OFF AND DETERMINED THAT THE AIR WAS BREATHABLE, AND TOLD MY FO TO DO THE SAME. HE DID. WE THEN PERFORMED MEMORY ITEMS AND ENG FIRE CHKLIST. WE DECLARED AN EMER WITH CMI APCH, TOLD THEM OF OUR PROB, AND TOLD THEM TO ROLL THE FIRE TRUCKS AND THAT WE WOULD BE EVACING THE ACFT ON THE RWY. THEY (CMI APCH) REQUESTED FUEL AND SOULS ON BOARD AND CLRED US TO LAND ON RWY 32L. AFTER STOPPING ACFT ON RWY, SHUT DOWN OPERATING ENG AND COMMENCED EMER PAX EVAC. EVAC WAS DONE WITH NO PAX PANICKING OR GETTING INJURED. AFTER EVERYONE WAS OFF I GRABBED FIRE EXTINGUISHER WHILE THE FO HANDLED THE PAX. PAX CONGREGATED SUFFICIENT DISTANCE FROM ACFT, FO HANDLED THEM WHILE I SPOKE WITH FIRE CHIEF AND ASKED THEM IF THEY CONFIRMED THAT FIRE WAS OUT. IT WAS. TRANSPORTATION THEN ARRIVED FOR PAX TO TERMINAL. ONE PROB WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHING CREW COM PROPERLY. I WENT TO OVERHEAD SPEAKER, FO WENT TO HEADSETS. ALL THE TRAINING AND PROFESSIONALISM ON BOTH THE FO'S AND MY PART HELPED IN THE SUCCESSFUL AND SAFE TERMINATION OF THE FLT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: BA32 CAPT RPTS ACTUAL CAUSE OF ENG FAIL UNCERTAIN. MECHS STATED THAT SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE OCCURRED IN REDUCTION GEARBOX SECTION. ENG PARTS SLUNG AGAINST THE FUSELAGE AFT OF THE KEVLAR ICE SHIELD (NORMAL PATH OF PROP ICE) PUNCTURING THE FUSELAGE. THE RESULTING DECOMPRESSION EXPLAINS THE RAPID SMOKE REMOVAL AND IMMEDIATE CABIN RATE OF CLB. PARTICULARLY ALARMING TO THE FLC, WAS THE ACFT'S YAWING BACK AND FORTH AND ENG TORQUE GAUGE OSCILLATION. THE FLC COULD NOT DETERMINE WHICH ENG HAD FAILED. ONLY AFTER THE #2 ENG FIRE LIGHT ILLUMINATED, WAS THE FLC ABLE TO GET PAST THE UNKNOWN, AND FOLLOW SOP'S. SINCE THE DATE OF THIS INCIDENT, THE RPTR HAS NOT WITNESSED ANY FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITY EXCEPT COMPANY'S 'SMOKE' TRAINING STANDARDIZATION AND ASRS CALLBACK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.