Narrative:

Upon arrival, the ATIS was broadcast as foxtrot: 2000 scattered 6500 scattered estimate 13000 overcast 2 mi thunderstorm, temperature 76 degrees/dew point 74 wind 240 at 7, altimeter 30.03. Close in, the airborne radar showed a small irregular cell west of the field. I estimated its distance from columbus to be about 6 mi, but this was approximately as there is no VORTAC on the field, and I had to mentally transpose a fix from appleton VOR on my RMI to the radar screen to indicate the position of the field. We descended to 2700 ft by sumi (the fix on the ILS runway 28L) and were slowed to a speed of reference plus 10 and configured to flaps 30 degrees. (I wanted to be as stabilized as possible to give ourselves the best possible chance to detect windshear.) we reset to flaps 40 degrees later in the approach. Past sumie, I started a descent to the runway, which was fully in sight, using the autoplt to establish a descent profile to the touchdown point, as the GS was out OTS and there is no VASI on this runway. We entered light rain at about this point. We received clearance to land, and wind reports of light headwinds of about 8-10 KTS. This was not substantially changed in 3 or 4 subsequent wind calls from tower. The radar showed the storm cell had moved closer to the field but was still well on the other side. A preceding aircraft landed about 3 mi in front of us, and reported entering an area of rain at about 1/2 mi final. I could see this area and still see the runway beyond. I queried the tower about the rain status and by the time I heard 'moderate to heavy,' I was at about 200 ft, still visual on the entire length of the runway and in light to moderate rain. The cell on the other side of the field had now built closer very rapidly. I considered making a map, but decided it was equally safe to continue the landing as to go around through the cell. Touchdown was at about 1500 ft down the runway, flaps 40 degrees, and reference plus 10. Just after touchdown of the nosewheel, as control of the ailerons was transferred to the first officer, the left wing began to lift, and the windscreen was covered with water from severely heavy rain, obscuring any visibility out of the cockpit. The first officer applied full left aileron as we attempted to maintain directional control rolling in the blind, and I felt the aircraft move to the right from what I thought was a gust of wind from the left. We were blind for a full 5 seconds. As I felt the right main gear drop off the pavement, we regained forward visibility and found the aircraft angled left but hydroplaning right, further off the runway. Only when the right main began to trench the grass did I gain enough foothold to stop the lateral drift. Very tender use of nosewheel steering and rudder, while the first officer maintained full left aileron and slight down elevator pressure, saved this airplane from either flipping fully over to the right or pivoting too hard left and collapsing the gear. We were able to regain the runway after bringing the right gear out of the grass at taxiway C3 at about 50 KTS, proceeded down to taxiway C4 and exited the runway. I communicated to the flight attendants the situation was under control, told the tower we had gone off the runway into the grass and suggested they do not let anyone else land right then (the aircraft following me was sent around), and checked the aircraft for damage. The emergency was declared by tower, after hearing only part of our 'in the grass' call and subsequently losing sight of us in the rain. The emergency vehicles were at our side a scant 2 mins later, catching up with us as we went east on taxiway C. I found no control problems, no indication of blown tires, braking normal, and normal engine operation, and with the concurrence of the emergency people, I proceeded to gate as the most safe manner of deplaning the passenger. I believe the conditions encountered were caused by a microburst. We suddenly entered a very heavy rainfall and strong side wind at about 200 ft after touchdown and just as suddenly departed from it at about 3000 ft later. Seconds after we touched down, the tower reported a 35 KT gust, which would have reached them just after it crossed the runway. Also, I had planned a firm touchdown to help prevent hydroplaning. This did not occur and I believe the first effect of the gust may have lessened the descent rate I had established. The gust may have been caused by a packet of heavy rain which was high enough during the late part of the approach to allow me to see underneath it toward the runway, but which met the touchdown point of the runway the same time I did. It is interesting that the tower did not receive any windshear warnings from their automated system at any time. As the perimeter detectors are spaced every 1/2 to 3/4 of a mi around the field, this was a very small microburst indeed. It may be true that this occurrence could have been prevented by diverting the flight at a much earlier point. But as we continued toward the runway, conditions did not seem to warrant it, until after the last report by air carrier aircraft and the reply by tower to my query. At that point, I believed it was more prudent to continue to land than to go around. An interesting side note is provided by an apparent effect of simulator training on the thought processes of both the first officer and myself. One of the required maneuvers during simulator training is an aborted land, in which a go around is initiated at a very low altitude (below decision altitude) to simulate the incursion onto the runway of a truck or another airplane. The usual way for the simulator instructors to induce such a go around is to lower the visibility to zero. When the visibility out of our cockpit windows went to zero in the rain at columbus, I had the feeling I was back in the simulator and momentarily considered initiating a go around. My first officer reports the same inclination. With 3 gear on the ground, engines idle and spoilers deployed, we did not, of course, make such an attempt. But a valuable second was used in considering it. 2 questions come to mind before I close. The amount of water on the windscreen was so heavy, unaffected even by the high speed setting of the wipers, that I wonder if it is possible that a bow wave of water from the nose tire can splash that high against such a wind. Also, there was a brilliant flash of lightning just after touchdown, and I wonder if there may have been a power fluctuation on the field which may have affected the runway lights, contributing to a loss of forward guidance. My gratitude to a cabin crew who remained very calm, listened to my instructions and quickly gave me the answers that I needed concerning status of the cabin. And also to first officer who needed no instruction on how to handle the ailerons, how to communicate to tower and company, or the need remain in the cockpit until all passenger were deplaned at the gate, while I made a hurried initial survey for dangerous conditions outside. Without his able help, I would not have recovered the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY EXCURSION AFTER LNDG. HVY RAIN OBLITERATED VISUAL REFS.

Narrative: UPON ARR, THE ATIS WAS BROADCAST AS FOXTROT: 2000 SCATTERED 6500 SCATTERED ESTIMATE 13000 OVCST 2 MI TSTM, TEMP 76 DEGS/DEW POINT 74 WIND 240 AT 7, ALTIMETER 30.03. CLOSE IN, THE AIRBORNE RADAR SHOWED A SMALL IRREGULAR CELL W OF THE FIELD. I ESTIMATED ITS DISTANCE FROM COLUMBUS TO BE ABOUT 6 MI, BUT THIS WAS APPROX AS THERE IS NO VORTAC ON THE FIELD, AND I HAD TO MENTALLY TRANSPOSE A FIX FROM APPLETON VOR ON MY RMI TO THE RADAR SCREEN TO INDICATE THE POS OF THE FIELD. WE DSNDED TO 2700 FT BY SUMI (THE FIX ON THE ILS RWY 28L) AND WERE SLOWED TO A SPD OF REF PLUS 10 AND CONFIGURED TO FLAPS 30 DEGS. (I WANTED TO BE AS STABILIZED AS POSSIBLE TO GIVE OURSELVES THE BEST POSSIBLE CHANCE TO DETECT WINDSHEAR.) WE RESET TO FLAPS 40 DEGS LATER IN THE APCH. PAST SUMIE, I STARTED A DSCNT TO THE RWY, WHICH WAS FULLY IN SIGHT, USING THE AUTOPLT TO ESTABLISH A DSCNT PROFILE TO THE TOUCHDOWN POINT, AS THE GS WAS OUT OTS AND THERE IS NO VASI ON THIS RWY. WE ENTERED LIGHT RAIN AT ABOUT THIS POINT. WE RECEIVED CLRNC TO LAND, AND WIND RPTS OF LIGHT HEADWINDS OF ABOUT 8-10 KTS. THIS WAS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED IN 3 OR 4 SUBSEQUENT WIND CALLS FROM TWR. THE RADAR SHOWED THE STORM CELL HAD MOVED CLOSER TO THE FIELD BUT WAS STILL WELL ON THE OTHER SIDE. A PRECEDING ACFT LANDED ABOUT 3 MI IN FRONT OF US, AND RPTED ENTERING AN AREA OF RAIN AT ABOUT 1/2 MI FINAL. I COULD SEE THIS AREA AND STILL SEE THE RWY BEYOND. I QUERIED THE TWR ABOUT THE RAIN STATUS AND BY THE TIME I HEARD 'MODERATE TO HVY,' I WAS AT ABOUT 200 FT, STILL VISUAL ON THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF THE RWY AND IN LIGHT TO MODERATE RAIN. THE CELL ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE FIELD HAD NOW BUILT CLOSER VERY RAPIDLY. I CONSIDERED MAKING A MAP, BUT DECIDED IT WAS EQUALLY SAFE TO CONTINUE THE LNDG AS TO GAR THROUGH THE CELL. TOUCHDOWN WAS AT ABOUT 1500 FT DOWN THE RWY, FLAPS 40 DEGS, AND REF PLUS 10. JUST AFTER TOUCHDOWN OF THE NOSEWHEEL, AS CTL OF THE AILERONS WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE FO, THE L WING BEGAN TO LIFT, AND THE WINDSCREEN WAS COVERED WITH WATER FROM SEVERELY HVY RAIN, OBSCURING ANY VISIBILITY OUT OF THE COCKPIT. THE FO APPLIED FULL L AILERON AS WE ATTEMPTED TO MAINTAIN DIRECTIONAL CTL ROLLING IN THE BLIND, AND I FELT THE ACFT MOVE TO THE R FROM WHAT I THOUGHT WAS A GUST OF WIND FROM THE L. WE WERE BLIND FOR A FULL 5 SECONDS. AS I FELT THE R MAIN GEAR DROP OFF THE PAVEMENT, WE REGAINED FORWARD VISIBILITY AND FOUND THE ACFT ANGLED L BUT HYDROPLANING R, FURTHER OFF THE RWY. ONLY WHEN THE R MAIN BEGAN TO TRENCH THE GRASS DID I GAIN ENOUGH FOOTHOLD TO STOP THE LATERAL DRIFT. VERY TENDER USE OF NOSEWHEEL STEERING AND RUDDER, WHILE THE FO MAINTAINED FULL L AILERON AND SLIGHT DOWN ELEVATOR PRESSURE, SAVED THIS AIRPLANE FROM EITHER FLIPPING FULLY OVER TO THE R OR PIVOTING TOO HARD L AND COLLAPSING THE GEAR. WE WERE ABLE TO REGAIN THE RWY AFTER BRINGING THE R GEAR OUT OF THE GRASS AT TXWY C3 AT ABOUT 50 KTS, PROCEEDED DOWN TO TXWY C4 AND EXITED THE RWY. I COMMUNICATED TO THE FLT ATTENDANTS THE SIT WAS UNDER CTL, TOLD THE TWR WE HAD GONE OFF THE RWY INTO THE GRASS AND SUGGESTED THEY DO NOT LET ANYONE ELSE LAND RIGHT THEN (THE ACFT FOLLOWING ME WAS SENT AROUND), AND CHKED THE ACFT FOR DAMAGE. THE EMER WAS DECLARED BY TWR, AFTER HEARING ONLY PART OF OUR 'IN THE GRASS' CALL AND SUBSEQUENTLY LOSING SIGHT OF US IN THE RAIN. THE EMER VEHICLES WERE AT OUR SIDE A SCANT 2 MINS LATER, CATCHING UP WITH US AS WE WENT E ON TXWY C. I FOUND NO CTL PROBS, NO INDICATION OF BLOWN TIRES, BRAKING NORMAL, AND NORMAL ENG OP, AND WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE EMER PEOPLE, I PROCEEDED TO GATE AS THE MOST SAFE MANNER OF DEPLANING THE PAX. I BELIEVE THE CONDITIONS ENCOUNTERED WERE CAUSED BY A MICROBURST. WE SUDDENLY ENTERED A VERY HVY RAINFALL AND STRONG SIDE WIND AT ABOUT 200 FT AFTER TOUCHDOWN AND JUST AS SUDDENLY DEPARTED FROM IT AT ABOUT 3000 FT LATER. SECONDS AFTER WE TOUCHED DOWN, THE TWR RPTED A 35 KT GUST, WHICH WOULD HAVE REACHED THEM JUST AFTER IT CROSSED THE RWY. ALSO, I HAD PLANNED A FIRM TOUCHDOWN TO HELP PREVENT HYDROPLANING. THIS DID NOT OCCUR AND I BELIEVE THE FIRST EFFECT OF THE GUST MAY HAVE LESSENED THE DSCNT RATE I HAD ESTABLISHED. THE GUST MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY A PACKET OF HVY RAIN WHICH WAS HIGH ENOUGH DURING THE LATE PART OF THE APCH TO ALLOW ME TO SEE UNDERNEATH IT TOWARD THE RWY, BUT WHICH MET THE TOUCHDOWN POINT OF THE RWY THE SAME TIME I DID. IT IS INTERESTING THAT THE TWR DID NOT RECEIVE ANY WINDSHEAR WARNINGS FROM THEIR AUTOMATED SYS AT ANY TIME. AS THE PERIMETER DETECTORS ARE SPACED EVERY 1/2 TO 3/4 OF A MI AROUND THE FIELD, THIS WAS A VERY SMALL MICROBURST INDEED. IT MAY BE TRUE THAT THIS OCCURRENCE COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY DIVERTING THE FLT AT A MUCH EARLIER POINT. BUT AS WE CONTINUED TOWARD THE RWY, CONDITIONS DID NOT SEEM TO WARRANT IT, UNTIL AFTER THE LAST RPT BY ACR ACFT AND THE REPLY BY TWR TO MY QUERY. AT THAT POINT, I BELIEVED IT WAS MORE PRUDENT TO CONTINUE TO LAND THAN TO GAR. AN INTERESTING SIDE NOTE IS PROVIDED BY AN APPARENT EFFECT OF SIMULATOR TRAINING ON THE THOUGHT PROCESSES OF BOTH THE FO AND MYSELF. ONE OF THE REQUIRED MANEUVERS DURING SIMULATOR TRAINING IS AN ABORTED LAND, IN WHICH A GAR IS INITIATED AT A VERY LOW ALT (BELOW DECISION ALT) TO SIMULATE THE INCURSION ONTO THE RWY OF A TRUCK OR ANOTHER AIRPLANE. THE USUAL WAY FOR THE SIMULATOR INSTRUCTORS TO INDUCE SUCH A GAR IS TO LOWER THE VISIBILITY TO ZERO. WHEN THE VISIBILITY OUT OF OUR COCKPIT WINDOWS WENT TO ZERO IN THE RAIN AT COLUMBUS, I HAD THE FEELING I WAS BACK IN THE SIMULATOR AND MOMENTARILY CONSIDERED INITIATING A GAR. MY FO RPTS THE SAME INCLINATION. WITH 3 GEAR ON THE GND, ENGS IDLE AND SPOILERS DEPLOYED, WE DID NOT, OF COURSE, MAKE SUCH AN ATTEMPT. BUT A VALUABLE SECOND WAS USED IN CONSIDERING IT. 2 QUESTIONS COME TO MIND BEFORE I CLOSE. THE AMOUNT OF WATER ON THE WINDSCREEN WAS SO HVY, UNAFFECTED EVEN BY THE HIGH SPD SETTING OF THE WIPERS, THAT I WONDER IF IT IS POSSIBLE THAT A BOW WAVE OF WATER FROM THE NOSE TIRE CAN SPLASH THAT HIGH AGAINST SUCH A WIND. ALSO, THERE WAS A BRILLIANT FLASH OF LIGHTNING JUST AFTER TOUCHDOWN, AND I WONDER IF THERE MAY HAVE BEEN A PWR FLUCTUATION ON THE FIELD WHICH MAY HAVE AFFECTED THE RWY LIGHTS, CONTRIBUTING TO A LOSS OF FORWARD GUIDANCE. MY GRATITUDE TO A CABIN CREW WHO REMAINED VERY CALM, LISTENED TO MY INSTRUCTIONS AND QUICKLY GAVE ME THE ANSWERS THAT I NEEDED CONCERNING STATUS OF THE CABIN. AND ALSO TO FO WHO NEEDED NO INSTRUCTION ON HOW TO HANDLE THE AILERONS, HOW TO COMMUNICATE TO TWR AND COMPANY, OR THE NEED REMAIN IN THE COCKPIT UNTIL ALL PAX WERE DEPLANED AT THE GATE, WHILE I MADE A HURRIED INITIAL SURVEY FOR DANGEROUS CONDITIONS OUTSIDE. WITHOUT HIS ABLE HELP, I WOULD NOT HAVE RECOVERED THE ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.