Narrative:

I was working the local control position at anc ATCT. I had a cabin coordinator assisting me in my duties, including obtaining releases on IFR aircraft departing anc from runway 32. Runway 32 departures conflict with aircraft landing runway 05 at elmendorf AFB, thus proper and timely coordination is essential on these departures. At approximately AA41 local I departed a B747 from runway 32 on an IFR release that my cabin coordinator had coordinated with anchorage TRACON. My cabin coordinator then informed me that the next runway 32 departure was released (air carrier X) 'put him as close as possible behind the B747.' I was aware, as was the cabin coordinator, of an inbound flight of fighters (military Z) approximately 15 mi west and landing at edf AFB. I instructed air carrier X to depart without delay and advised him that the flight of fighters would pass behind him after he departed. This departure was at the minimum 5 mi of in-trail radar separation behind the previous widebody transport jet departure. I believed that this sequence of instructions was what the TRACON controllers expected given the fact that we had an IFR release. I believe that the TRACON would vector or reduce the airspeed of military Z to pass behind air carrier X. This belief was in error. Somehow the cabin coordinator and the radar handoff controller misunderstood the intentions of their counterparts and had agreed to an erroneous IFR release which I acted upon. The TRACON controllers thought that air carrier X would depart after military Z had passed through the runway 32 departure corridor and was no longer a factor. As air carrier X was lifting off the runway it was apparent that military Z was neither slowing down or being vectored to pass behind air carrier X, and I expressed this concern to the cabin coordinator, who began to coordinate with the TRACON. The cabin coordinator then told me to instruct air carrier X to fly heading 320 degrees and maintain 2000 ft, which I told air carrier X to do based on the incorrect assumption that the TRACON was issuing instructions to military Z that would insure separation. Unfortunately, the TRACON had long before cleared military Z for a visual approach to edf and had switched them to edf tower. The heading and altitude instruction for air carrier X was initiated by my cabin coordinator, not the TRACON. It did not improve or worsen the situation, but it prevented me from issuing alternative instructions that might have been more effective. Air carrier X ended up flying through the flight of fighters, and by his estimate missed the second fighter by only 400 ft vertically and 0 ft laterally. My estimate would have been only 100 ft vertically. To my knowledge no evasive action was taken by any aircraft. The radar handoff, the cabin coordinator, and myself were all decertified on the respective position. The investigation into the incident is ongoing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RELEASE COORD RESULTED IN NMAC AND OPERROR BTWN DEPARTING B727 AND A FLT OF 4 F-15'S.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING THE LCL CTL POS AT ANC ATCT. I HAD A CABIN COORDINATOR ASSISTING ME IN MY DUTIES, INCLUDING OBTAINING RELEASES ON IFR ACFT DEPARTING ANC FROM RWY 32. RWY 32 DEPS CONFLICT WITH ACFT LNDG RWY 05 AT ELMENDORF AFB, THUS PROPER AND TIMELY COORD IS ESSENTIAL ON THESE DEPS. AT APPROX AA41 LCL I DEPARTED A B747 FROM RWY 32 ON AN IFR RELEASE THAT MY CABIN COORDINATOR HAD COORDINATED WITH ANCHORAGE TRACON. MY CABIN COORDINATOR THEN INFORMED ME THAT THE NEXT RWY 32 DEP WAS RELEASED (ACR X) 'PUT HIM AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE BEHIND THE B747.' I WAS AWARE, AS WAS THE CABIN COORDINATOR, OF AN INBOUND FLT OF FIGHTERS (MIL Z) APPROX 15 MI W AND LNDG AT EDF AFB. I INSTRUCTED ACR X TO DEPART WITHOUT DELAY AND ADVISED HIM THAT THE FLT OF FIGHTERS WOULD PASS BEHIND HIM AFTER HE DEPARTED. THIS DEP WAS AT THE MINIMUM 5 MI OF IN-TRAIL RADAR SEPARATION BEHIND THE PREVIOUS WDB JET DEP. I BELIEVED THAT THIS SEQUENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS WAS WHAT THE TRACON CTLRS EXPECTED GIVEN THE FACT THAT WE HAD AN IFR RELEASE. I BELIEVE THAT THE TRACON WOULD VECTOR OR REDUCE THE AIRSPD OF MIL Z TO PASS BEHIND ACR X. THIS BELIEF WAS IN ERROR. SOMEHOW THE CABIN COORDINATOR AND THE RADAR HDOF CTLR MISUNDERSTOOD THE INTENTIONS OF THEIR COUNTERPARTS AND HAD AGREED TO AN ERRONEOUS IFR RELEASE WHICH I ACTED UPON. THE TRACON CTLRS THOUGHT THAT ACR X WOULD DEPART AFTER MIL Z HAD PASSED THROUGH THE RWY 32 DEP CORRIDOR AND WAS NO LONGER A FACTOR. AS ACR X WAS LIFTING OFF THE RWY IT WAS APPARENT THAT MIL Z WAS NEITHER SLOWING DOWN OR BEING VECTORED TO PASS BEHIND ACR X, AND I EXPRESSED THIS CONCERN TO THE CABIN COORDINATOR, WHO BEGAN TO COORDINATE WITH THE TRACON. THE CABIN COORDINATOR THEN TOLD ME TO INSTRUCT ACR X TO FLY HDG 320 DEGS AND MAINTAIN 2000 FT, WHICH I TOLD ACR X TO DO BASED ON THE INCORRECT ASSUMPTION THAT THE TRACON WAS ISSUING INSTRUCTIONS TO MIL Z THAT WOULD INSURE SEPARATION. UNFORTUNATELY, THE TRACON HAD LONG BEFORE CLRED MIL Z FOR A VISUAL APCH TO EDF AND HAD SWITCHED THEM TO EDF TWR. THE HDG AND ALT INSTRUCTION FOR ACR X WAS INITIATED BY MY CABIN COORDINATOR, NOT THE TRACON. IT DID NOT IMPROVE OR WORSEN THE SIT, BUT IT PREVENTED ME FROM ISSUING ALTERNATIVE INSTRUCTIONS THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN MORE EFFECTIVE. ACR X ENDED UP FLYING THROUGH THE FLT OF FIGHTERS, AND BY HIS ESTIMATE MISSED THE SECOND FIGHTER BY ONLY 400 FT VERTLY AND 0 FT LATERALLY. MY ESTIMATE WOULD HAVE BEEN ONLY 100 FT VERTLY. TO MY KNOWLEDGE NO EVASIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN BY ANY ACFT. THE RADAR HDOF, THE CABIN COORDINATOR, AND MYSELF WERE ALL DECERTIFIED ON THE RESPECTIVE POS. THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE INCIDENT IS ONGOING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.