Narrative:

It appeared there was sufficient daylight remaining for the last load of skydivers for the day, as the sun was still visible above the horizon. I was told sunset was between XA30-XA40 local time. There was still time for 1 more jump. While climbing to altitude, I do not recall seeing any automobile headlights, but it got darker much quicker than expected. I verbally advised the nearest skydiver we were heading back to the airport. The jumpers replied give them all the altitude I could. Based on 500 FPM rate of climb it took 4 mins to get back to the airport, approximately (we now were at 10000 ft MSL). As the jumpers started to exit the aircraft, I was advised by azo approach of traffic, 6500 ft MSL wbound, near our position. The PF right seat tried to advise the jumpers who were all now near the tail. He was unsuccessful, they went out. I descended slower than normal. I advised azo that jumpers were on the ground, when ATC asked if the jumpers had lighting. A pilot had alerted ATC that they were not lighted. Upon landing I was assured the jumpers had exited the aircraft without lights. I believe the hazy conditions contributed to the earlier than expected darkness. We took off about XA10-XA15 local time, plenty of time for a normal climb and exit. I had flown 3 previous loads that day, but had spent the entire day at the drop zone, as had the right seat pilot and the tandem jump instructors in the aircraft. We all wanted to get the last flight done. This day was my second day working for this operation, my 5TH flight total. I was beginning to learn the operation and airplane better. A written policy book or written procedure for flight/jump operation would greatly help new pilots learn their responsibilities. We did not mean to hurt anyone or scare them either. A pilot was inbound for marshall. He reported maneuvering to avoid jumpers. He seemed most upset by the fact that no unicom assistance was available to advise him of jump operations. There was also another airplane making touch-and-goes at marshall. That pilot was aware of jumpers, but did not advise the other pilot. A manned unicom operator would be a good idea for advisory assistance, as the jump plane for most of the trip is under control of azo approach. I would rather have had all the jumpers stay on board and land with them rather than have them jump, which is what happened. Difficult communication between pilot and jumpers was probably the largest factor.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FAR. PARACHUTE JUMPING ACTIVITY. NIGHT OP. UNLIGHTED SKYDIVERS ALLOWED TO JUMP AFTER OFFICIAL SUNSET NEAR AN UNDERFLYING ACFT.

Narrative: IT APPEARED THERE WAS SUFFICIENT DAYLIGHT REMAINING FOR THE LAST LOAD OF SKYDIVERS FOR THE DAY, AS THE SUN WAS STILL VISIBLE ABOVE THE HORIZON. I WAS TOLD SUNSET WAS BTWN XA30-XA40 LCL TIME. THERE WAS STILL TIME FOR 1 MORE JUMP. WHILE CLBING TO ALT, I DO NOT RECALL SEEING ANY AUTOMOBILE HEADLIGHTS, BUT IT GOT DARKER MUCH QUICKER THAN EXPECTED. I VERBALLY ADVISED THE NEAREST SKYDIVER WE WERE HEADING BACK TO THE ARPT. THE JUMPERS REPLIED GIVE THEM ALL THE ALT I COULD. BASED ON 500 FPM RATE OF CLB IT TOOK 4 MINS TO GET BACK TO THE ARPT, APPROX (WE NOW WERE AT 10000 FT MSL). AS THE JUMPERS STARTED TO EXIT THE ACFT, I WAS ADVISED BY AZO APCH OF TFC, 6500 FT MSL WBOUND, NEAR OUR POS. THE PF R SEAT TRIED TO ADVISE THE JUMPERS WHO WERE ALL NOW NEAR THE TAIL. HE WAS UNSUCCESSFUL, THEY WENT OUT. I DSNDED SLOWER THAN NORMAL. I ADVISED AZO THAT JUMPERS WERE ON THE GND, WHEN ATC ASKED IF THE JUMPERS HAD LIGHTING. A PLT HAD ALERTED ATC THAT THEY WERE NOT LIGHTED. UPON LNDG I WAS ASSURED THE JUMPERS HAD EXITED THE ACFT WITHOUT LIGHTS. I BELIEVE THE HAZY CONDITIONS CONTRIBUTED TO THE EARLIER THAN EXPECTED DARKNESS. WE TOOK OFF ABOUT XA10-XA15 LCL TIME, PLENTY OF TIME FOR A NORMAL CLB AND EXIT. I HAD FLOWN 3 PREVIOUS LOADS THAT DAY, BUT HAD SPENT THE ENTIRE DAY AT THE DROP ZONE, AS HAD THE R SEAT PLT AND THE TANDEM JUMP INSTRUCTORS IN THE ACFT. WE ALL WANTED TO GET THE LAST FLT DONE. THIS DAY WAS MY SECOND DAY WORKING FOR THIS OP, MY 5TH FLT TOTAL. I WAS BEGINNING TO LEARN THE OP AND AIRPLANE BETTER. A WRITTEN POLICY BOOK OR WRITTEN PROC FOR FLT/JUMP OP WOULD GREATLY HELP NEW PLTS LEARN THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES. WE DID NOT MEAN TO HURT ANYONE OR SCARE THEM EITHER. A PLT WAS INBOUND FOR MARSHALL. HE RPTED MANEUVERING TO AVOID JUMPERS. HE SEEMED MOST UPSET BY THE FACT THAT NO UNICOM ASSISTANCE WAS AVAILABLE TO ADVISE HIM OF JUMP OPS. THERE WAS ALSO ANOTHER AIRPLANE MAKING TOUCH-AND-GOES AT MARSHALL. THAT PLT WAS AWARE OF JUMPERS, BUT DID NOT ADVISE THE OTHER PLT. A MANNED UNICOM OPERATOR WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA FOR ADVISORY ASSISTANCE, AS THE JUMP PLANE FOR MOST OF THE TRIP IS UNDER CTL OF AZO APCH. I WOULD RATHER HAVE HAD ALL THE JUMPERS STAY ON BOARD AND LAND WITH THEM RATHER THAN HAVE THEM JUMP, WHICH IS WHAT HAPPENED. DIFFICULT COM BTWN PLT AND JUMPERS WAS PROBABLY THE LARGEST FACTOR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.