Narrative:

Reported airport in sight and was 'cleared for a visual to runway 9 at swf' when approximately 20 mi northwest of the airport at 4000 ft MSL. Planned to be at neely, the NDB for the ILS, at 2100 ft MSL (1600 ft AGL) inbound on localizer and GS. Flew a heading of approximately 140 degrees to intercept ILS just outside of neely. When cleared for a visual, started a descent to 3000 ft MSL and planned to slow and descend so as to be at 2100 ft when intercepting the localizer near neely. At approximately 15 NM from the airport with the airport still clearly in sight, descending through 3500 ft MSL, received a GPWS warning 'terrain, terrain, whoop, whoop, pull up.' I promptly initiated a climb back to 4000 ft MSL. Warning ceased and controller also said '...you should maintain 4000 ft prior to returning to altitude.' continued to airport uneventfully with initial descent later than originally planned. Upon arrival we asked the tower controller about terrain in the vicinity of the warning and were told that a 2500 ft ridge was in that location with higher unlighted antennae. The controller also stated that when cleared for a visual we 'could descend at our discretion as long as the airport was in sight' and 'the controller was discussing the situation with the supervisor.' at that point a crew member from another air carrier stated on frequency 'we had a problem with that too.' we had the airport in sight prior to, during, and after the warning and there were no indications of the presence of intervening terrain (distant lights 'disappearing' behind the ridge, etc). Additionally, there were no obvious indications on any of our IFR charts that a descent from 4000 ft to 3000 ft at that point would be a problem. The following considerations might help prevent this situation from recurring: 1) ATC should not clear aircraft for visual approachs at swf (particularly at night or in marginal WX) until clear of the ridge. (Note: it could be that the new york approach controller had no knowledge of the ridge, while the local controllers did). 2) I will plan a 3:1 descent profile for all visual approachs and should not have descended below 4000 ft approaching swf until closer to the airport. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter said he was flying a fokker 100. The night was clear, visibility unlimited, but it was dark. The airport was clearly in sight when he received the clearance for the visual approach. The only chart reference in front of him was the ILS runway 9 (analyst graphic 3). He said this night was the first time for him into the airport. Since then he has approached stewart in the daylight to be amazed at how the ridges poke up. He said this is the typical way new york approach guides airliners into stewart from the north along airways to filps intersection to where you have to cross the ridge line to get to the airport and then clears the airliner for the visual upon determining the airport is in sight. He understands the logic of approach control to take the traffic to victor 408 where the mountains are to get around the new york traffic area. But, he feels approach should not clear airliners for the visual until beyond the ridge lines as matter of procedure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR EXPERIENCES GPWS WARNING DURING VISUAL TO RWY 9 AT STEWART ARPT (SWF).

Narrative: RPTED ARPT IN SIGHT AND WAS 'CLRED FOR A VISUAL TO RWY 9 AT SWF' WHEN APPROX 20 MI NW OF THE ARPT AT 4000 FT MSL. PLANNED TO BE AT NEELY, THE NDB FOR THE ILS, AT 2100 FT MSL (1600 FT AGL) INBOUND ON LOC AND GS. FLEW A HDG OF APPROX 140 DEGS TO INTERCEPT ILS JUST OUTSIDE OF NEELY. WHEN CLRED FOR A VISUAL, STARTED A DSCNT TO 3000 FT MSL AND PLANNED TO SLOW AND DSND SO AS TO BE AT 2100 FT WHEN INTERCEPTING THE LOC NEAR NEELY. AT APPROX 15 NM FROM THE ARPT WITH THE ARPT STILL CLRLY IN SIGHT, DSNDING THROUGH 3500 FT MSL, RECEIVED A GPWS WARNING 'TERRAIN, TERRAIN, WHOOP, WHOOP, PULL UP.' I PROMPTLY INITIATED A CLB BACK TO 4000 FT MSL. WARNING CEASED AND CTLR ALSO SAID '...YOU SHOULD MAINTAIN 4000 FT PRIOR TO RETURNING TO ALT.' CONTINUED TO ARPT UNEVENTFULLY WITH INITIAL DSCNT LATER THAN ORIGINALLY PLANNED. UPON ARR WE ASKED THE TWR CTLR ABOUT TERRAIN IN THE VICINITY OF THE WARNING AND WERE TOLD THAT A 2500 FT RIDGE WAS IN THAT LOCATION WITH HIGHER UNLIGHTED ANTENNAE. THE CTLR ALSO STATED THAT WHEN CLRED FOR A VISUAL WE 'COULD DSND AT OUR DISCRETION AS LONG AS THE ARPT WAS IN SIGHT' AND 'THE CTLR WAS DISCUSSING THE SIT WITH THE SUPVR.' AT THAT POINT A CREW MEMBER FROM ANOTHER ACR STATED ON FREQ 'WE HAD A PROB WITH THAT TOO.' WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT PRIOR TO, DURING, AND AFTER THE WARNING AND THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS OF THE PRESENCE OF INTERVENING TERRAIN (DISTANT LIGHTS 'DISAPPEARING' BEHIND THE RIDGE, ETC). ADDITIONALLY, THERE WERE NO OBVIOUS INDICATIONS ON ANY OF OUR IFR CHARTS THAT A DSCNT FROM 4000 FT TO 3000 FT AT THAT POINT WOULD BE A PROB. THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS MIGHT HELP PREVENT THIS SIT FROM RECURRING: 1) ATC SHOULD NOT CLR ACFT FOR VISUAL APCHS AT SWF (PARTICULARLY AT NIGHT OR IN MARGINAL WX) UNTIL CLR OF THE RIDGE. (NOTE: IT COULD BE THAT THE NEW YORK APCH CTLR HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE RIDGE, WHILE THE LCL CTLRS DID). 2) I WILL PLAN A 3:1 DSCNT PROFILE FOR ALL VISUAL APCHS AND SHOULD NOT HAVE DSNDED BELOW 4000 FT APCHING SWF UNTIL CLOSER TO THE ARPT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR SAID HE WAS FLYING A FOKKER 100. THE NIGHT WAS CLR, VISIBILITY UNLIMITED, BUT IT WAS DARK. THE ARPT WAS CLRLY IN SIGHT WHEN HE RECEIVED THE CLRNC FOR THE VISUAL APCH. THE ONLY CHART REF IN FRONT OF HIM WAS THE ILS RWY 9 (ANALYST GRAPHIC 3). HE SAID THIS NIGHT WAS THE FIRST TIME FOR HIM INTO THE ARPT. SINCE THEN HE HAS APCHED STEWART IN THE DAYLIGHT TO BE AMAZED AT HOW THE RIDGES POKE UP. HE SAID THIS IS THE TYPICAL WAY NEW YORK APCH GUIDES AIRLINERS INTO STEWART FROM THE N ALONG AIRWAYS TO FILPS INTXN TO WHERE YOU HAVE TO CROSS THE RIDGE LINE TO GET TO THE ARPT AND THEN CLRS THE AIRLINER FOR THE VISUAL UPON DETERMINING THE ARPT IS IN SIGHT. HE UNDERSTANDS THE LOGIC OF APCH CTL TO TAKE THE TFC TO VICTOR 408 WHERE THE MOUNTAINS ARE TO GET AROUND THE NEW YORK TFC AREA. BUT, HE FEELS APCH SHOULD NOT CLR AIRLINERS FOR THE VISUAL UNTIL BEYOND THE RIDGE LINES AS MATTER OF PROC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.