Narrative:

Having completed a far 135 charter flight (dropped passenger at FBO) just within a 14 hour duty day, we taxied for takeoff runway 1 at teb, for ferry flight to return home. It was night, XX36 pm, and ending a long day. We stopped at the ILS hold line for runway 1 and tower advised us to hold for release. We had completed our taxi/before takeoff checklist items, briefed the takeoff, and were ready for immediate takeoff. After waiting in this position for 20 mins without an estimate of the delay, I decided to shut down 1 engine to conserve fuel. Our APU was running, 1 engine still running, and all system were pwred. As luck would have it, tower cleared us for takeoff shortly thereafter. The copilot stated, 'we'll need a couple of mins, we have to start an engine.' tower advised there was no traffic, we could taxi into position, runway 1, and takeoff when we were ready. The copilot started the engine as we began taxiing and I began the lineup checklist (final 7 items). The copilot crossed my fingers as I selected ignition-on and called 'igniters-on,' and I assumed he had caught up with me on the checklist and would complete the checklist. We were holding in position -- I made my final fats check (flaps, air brakes, trim, and speeds), checked for warnings on the annunciator panel, slowly advanced the throttles, checked engine instruments, and began the takeoff roll. The copilot was late on '80 KTS' and 'V,' calls -- unusual because our procedures had been nearly flawless through 5 days of flying. After we were airborne, I heard the copilot calling off items from the 'taxi' checklist. We had taken off with several items from the checklist undone. Fortunately, they were lights and avionics rather than safety of flight items. I attribute these errors to fatigue, irritation with a long delay, assumptions about crew coordination items without actual crew coordination, lack of crew communication, etc. This situation has led to some lengthy 'hangar flying' discussions in our department aimed at preventing a reoccurrence. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the captain was flying bae 125-600 when the fatigued flight crew departed before they had completed their checklists. The chief pilot joined in the discussion that this analyst had with the reporter. The incident has been discussed within the company in an effort to determine what caused the breakdown in standards and the failure of good CRM practices. The reporter thought that fatigue and schedule pressure caused him to focus on getting en route to the detriment of everything else. The captain said that he was amazed when he realized that the first officer was reading the taxi/takeoff checklist during the climb out. The crew spent some time catching up and later they talked about their situation and how it could be avoided in the future. The chief pilot was apprised of the incident and the other pilots for the company were briefed on the incident as part of their recurrent training.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AIRLINE OPERATIONAL PROC -- ATX CREW TAKES OFF AND DURING THE CLBOUT THE CAPT NOTICES THAT THE FO IS STILL COMPLETING THE TAXI/TKOF CHKLIST.

Narrative: HAVING COMPLETED A FAR 135 CHARTER FLT (DROPPED PAX AT FBO) JUST WITHIN A 14 HR DUTY DAY, WE TAXIED FOR TKOF RWY 1 AT TEB, FOR FERRY FLT TO RETURN HOME. IT WAS NIGHT, XX36 PM, AND ENDING A LONG DAY. WE STOPPED AT THE ILS HOLD LINE FOR RWY 1 AND TWR ADVISED US TO HOLD FOR RELEASE. WE HAD COMPLETED OUR TAXI/BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST ITEMS, BRIEFED THE TKOF, AND WERE READY FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF. AFTER WAITING IN THIS POS FOR 20 MINS WITHOUT AN ESTIMATE OF THE DELAY, I DECIDED TO SHUT DOWN 1 ENG TO CONSERVE FUEL. OUR APU WAS RUNNING, 1 ENG STILL RUNNING, AND ALL SYS WERE PWRED. AS LUCK WOULD HAVE IT, TWR CLRED US FOR TKOF SHORTLY THEREAFTER. THE COPLT STATED, 'WE'LL NEED A COUPLE OF MINS, WE HAVE TO START AN ENG.' TWR ADVISED THERE WAS NO TFC, WE COULD TAXI INTO POS, RWY 1, AND TKOF WHEN WE WERE READY. THE COPLT STARTED THE ENG AS WE BEGAN TAXIING AND I BEGAN THE LINEUP CHKLIST (FINAL 7 ITEMS). THE COPLT CROSSED MY FINGERS AS I SELECTED IGNITION-ON AND CALLED 'IGNITERS-ON,' AND I ASSUMED HE HAD CAUGHT UP WITH ME ON THE CHKLIST AND WOULD COMPLETE THE CHKLIST. WE WERE HOLDING IN POS -- I MADE MY FINAL FATS CHK (FLAPS, AIR BRAKES, TRIM, AND SPDS), CHKED FOR WARNINGS ON THE ANNUNCIATOR PANEL, SLOWLY ADVANCED THE THROTTLES, CHKED ENG INSTS, AND BEGAN THE TKOF ROLL. THE COPLT WAS LATE ON '80 KTS' AND 'V,' CALLS -- UNUSUAL BECAUSE OUR PROCS HAD BEEN NEARLY FLAWLESS THROUGH 5 DAYS OF FLYING. AFTER WE WERE AIRBORNE, I HEARD THE COPLT CALLING OFF ITEMS FROM THE 'TAXI' CHKLIST. WE HAD TAKEN OFF WITH SEVERAL ITEMS FROM THE CHKLIST UNDONE. FORTUNATELY, THEY WERE LIGHTS AND AVIONICS RATHER THAN SAFETY OF FLT ITEMS. I ATTRIBUTE THESE ERRORS TO FATIGUE, IRRITATION WITH A LONG DELAY, ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT CREW COORD ITEMS WITHOUT ACTUAL CREW COORD, LACK OF CREW COM, ETC. THIS SIT HAS LED TO SOME LENGTHY 'HANGAR FLYING' DISCUSSIONS IN OUR DEPT AIMED AT PREVENTING A REOCCURRENCE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CAPT WAS FLYING BAE 125-600 WHEN THE FATIGUED FLC DEPARTED BEFORE THEY HAD COMPLETED THEIR CHKLISTS. THE CHIEF PLT JOINED IN THE DISCUSSION THAT THIS ANALYST HAD WITH THE RPTR. THE INCIDENT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITHIN THE COMPANY IN AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE WHAT CAUSED THE BREAKDOWN IN STANDARDS AND THE FAILURE OF GOOD CRM PRACTICES. THE RPTR THOUGHT THAT FATIGUE AND SCHEDULE PRESSURE CAUSED HIM TO FOCUS ON GETTING ENRTE TO THE DETRIMENT OF EVERYTHING ELSE. THE CAPT SAID THAT HE WAS AMAZED WHEN HE REALIZED THAT THE FO WAS READING THE TAXI/TKOF CHKLIST DURING THE CLBOUT. THE CREW SPENT SOME TIME CATCHING UP AND LATER THEY TALKED ABOUT THEIR SIT AND HOW IT COULD BE AVOIDED IN THE FUTURE. THE CHIEF PLT WAS APPRISED OF THE INCIDENT AND THE OTHER PLTS FOR THE COMPANY WERE BRIEFED ON THE INCIDENT AS PART OF THEIR RECURRENT TRAINING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.