Narrative:

At FL390 well before reaching kerno intersection I put crossing altitudes of FL260 at kerno and FL130 at somto into the FMS in accordance with nanci 5 arrival to lga. Soon after, flight was cleared to maintain FL350, which was set in the cruise page. Flight descended to FL350. We later received clearance to FL260. I don't remember hearing that restr but thought it was in the FMS. We were given a frequency change during descent and the new controller gave us somto at FL130. He then asked us to increase rate of descent through FL230. We were passing FL280 at that time. He asked if the previous controller had given us FL260 at kerno. The first officer thought he had and I was not sure. We had crossed kerno above FL260 but after receiving somto at FL130, which technically cancels the previous crossing restr unless it is restated. Factors: the first officer and myself had flown together about 1 hour when this incident occurred. I had briefed it was my procedure to fly the airplane first and use the FMS as a tool, rather than vice versa. The first officer says she noticed FL260 at kerno was not in the FMS, but that she assumed I would descend manually in accordance with my brief regarding the FMS, a reasonable conclusion. I will be more specific on my FMS brief in the future. Misuse of FMS. During descent I was watching the descent profile indicator rather than the fixes we were crossing. The indicator was pegged at the top meaning we were low, but the low was probably in reference to somto at FL130 rather than kerno at FL260. I had noticed during the initial set up of the FMS in atl that the line select buttons on the right side of my screen were abnormally hard to push. I may have pushed kerno thinking I had brought FL260 up from the scratch pad, but failed to verify it visually.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ALTDEV. XING RESTR NOT MET. FLC MISCOM, FMS PROGRAMMING ERROR.

Narrative: AT FL390 WELL BEFORE REACHING KERNO INTXN I PUT XING ALTS OF FL260 AT KERNO AND FL130 AT SOMTO INTO THE FMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH NANCI 5 ARR TO LGA. SOON AFTER, FLT WAS CLRED TO MAINTAIN FL350, WHICH WAS SET IN THE CRUISE PAGE. FLT DSNDED TO FL350. WE LATER RECEIVED CLRNC TO FL260. I DON'T REMEMBER HEARING THAT RESTR BUT THOUGHT IT WAS IN THE FMS. WE WERE GIVEN A FREQ CHANGE DURING DSCNT AND THE NEW CTLR GAVE US SOMTO AT FL130. HE THEN ASKED US TO INCREASE RATE OF DSCNT THROUGH FL230. WE WERE PASSING FL280 AT THAT TIME. HE ASKED IF THE PREVIOUS CTLR HAD GIVEN US FL260 AT KERNO. THE FO THOUGHT HE HAD AND I WAS NOT SURE. WE HAD CROSSED KERNO ABOVE FL260 BUT AFTER RECEIVING SOMTO AT FL130, WHICH TECHNICALLY CANCELS THE PREVIOUS XING RESTR UNLESS IT IS RESTATED. FACTORS: THE FO AND MYSELF HAD FLOWN TOGETHER ABOUT 1 HR WHEN THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED. I HAD BRIEFED IT WAS MY PROC TO FLY THE AIRPLANE FIRST AND USE THE FMS AS A TOOL, RATHER THAN VICE VERSA. THE FO SAYS SHE NOTICED FL260 AT KERNO WAS NOT IN THE FMS, BUT THAT SHE ASSUMED I WOULD DSND MANUALLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY BRIEF REGARDING THE FMS, A REASONABLE CONCLUSION. I WILL BE MORE SPECIFIC ON MY FMS BRIEF IN THE FUTURE. MISUSE OF FMS. DURING DSCNT I WAS WATCHING THE DSCNT PROFILE INDICATOR RATHER THAN THE FIXES WE WERE XING. THE INDICATOR WAS PEGGED AT THE TOP MEANING WE WERE LOW, BUT THE LOW WAS PROBABLY IN REF TO SOMTO AT FL130 RATHER THAN KERNO AT FL260. I HAD NOTICED DURING THE INITIAL SET UP OF THE FMS IN ATL THAT THE LINE SELECT BUTTONS ON THE R SIDE OF MY SCREEN WERE ABNORMALLY HARD TO PUSH. I MAY HAVE PUSHED KERNO THINKING I HAD BROUGHT FL260 UP FROM THE SCRATCH PAD, BUT FAILED TO VERIFY IT VISUALLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.