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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 317550 |
Time | |
Date | 199507 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : msp |
State Reference | MN |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 500 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : msp |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B727 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | descent : approach landing other |
Route In Use | approach : straight in enroute : on vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial pilot : cfi pilot : atp pilot : flight engineer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 11000 flight time type : 800 |
ASRS Report | 317550 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial |
Events | |
Anomaly | inflight encounter : weather other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Weather |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Situations | |
ATC Facility | procedure or policy : unspecified |
Airport | procedure or policy : unspecified |
Narrative:
After reading about an accident in 3 different pubs as well as reading about the many previous windshear accidents in the aviation industry I am convinced that the next windshear accident is not far away. The airline crew needs to know, with great certainty, whether or not shear exists and to what extent it exists before making critical decisions. Make this my vote for an in-cockpit, forward looking, predictive windshear alerting system. After a divert to dlh, refueling, and an extensive ground delay (waiting for the WX to improve), we found ourselves north of msp and being vectored for an approach to runway 22. Our radar was showing a system of cells approaching the airport from the southwest. We saw on radar and visually a set of cells beginning to 'wrap' around to the east of the field. Rain was falling at the airport and we could see lightning south of the field. We were basically racing the cumulo nimbus to the airport. We were #2 for the airport behind a B757. We were about 8 mi out and my deodorant had begun to break down. Then, a flash of cloud to ground lightning struck between us and the runway. Our already heightened awareness was pegged and my deodorant failed. I had never been 'here' before. I wanted to go around and turn to the northwest, but the airplane was flying perfectly and the air was smooth and the visibility was good up to the storms southwest through east and it wasn't raining. I needed information. The copilot was flying. The power setting was normal and the airspeed was stable. I asked the tower if it was raining at the field, they answered affirmative. Wind check revealed 210 degrees at 10 gusting 15 KTS. We continued the approach. Approximately 3 more lightning strikes (cloud to ground) occurred north of the field. On short final, at 500 ft, we encountered moderate rain and slightly reduced visibility and about an 8 KT gain in airspeed as well as some light turbulence. The landing and rollout were successful but less than comforting. I thought surely we would be the last airplane to land. To my surprise, many more lndgs were made after ours, as well as one takeoff on runway 29L. Because my information was incomplete and I did not err conservatively, I feel that this was my worst decision. I've made tough choices in the past and have felt good about the decisions that my crew and I have made. How can I feel good about sneaking in by the hair of my chinny-chin-chin when I didn't know how close or how big the wolf was? On that night in july, nobody knew, for certain, what amount of low level windshear was going to occur on the approach and landing. Give us pilots the tools we need to 'see' low level windshear before we are in it or else low level windshear accidents will continue to plague the airline industry.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: WX MOVED FASTER THAN EXPECTED CREATING POSSIBILITY OF WINDSHEAR ON ARR.
Narrative: AFTER READING ABOUT AN ACCIDENT IN 3 DIFFERENT PUBS AS WELL AS READING ABOUT THE MANY PREVIOUS WINDSHEAR ACCIDENTS IN THE AVIATION INDUSTRY I AM CONVINCED THAT THE NEXT WINDSHEAR ACCIDENT IS NOT FAR AWAY. THE AIRLINE CREW NEEDS TO KNOW, WITH GREAT CERTAINTY, WHETHER OR NOT SHEAR EXISTS AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT EXISTS BEFORE MAKING CRITICAL DECISIONS. MAKE THIS MY VOTE FOR AN IN-COCKPIT, FORWARD LOOKING, PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR ALERTING SYS. AFTER A DIVERT TO DLH, REFUELING, AND AN EXTENSIVE GND DELAY (WAITING FOR THE WX TO IMPROVE), WE FOUND OURSELVES N OF MSP AND BEING VECTORED FOR AN APCH TO RWY 22. OUR RADAR WAS SHOWING A SYS OF CELLS APCHING THE ARPT FROM THE SW. WE SAW ON RADAR AND VISUALLY A SET OF CELLS BEGINNING TO 'WRAP' AROUND TO THE E OF THE FIELD. RAIN WAS FALLING AT THE ARPT AND WE COULD SEE LIGHTNING S OF THE FIELD. WE WERE BASICALLY RACING THE CUMULO NIMBUS TO THE ARPT. WE WERE #2 FOR THE ARPT BEHIND A B757. WE WERE ABOUT 8 MI OUT AND MY DEODORANT HAD BEGUN TO BREAK DOWN. THEN, A FLASH OF CLOUD TO GND LIGHTNING STRUCK BTWN US AND THE RWY. OUR ALREADY HEIGHTENED AWARENESS WAS PEGGED AND MY DEODORANT FAILED. I HAD NEVER BEEN 'HERE' BEFORE. I WANTED TO GAR AND TURN TO THE NW, BUT THE AIRPLANE WAS FLYING PERFECTLY AND THE AIR WAS SMOOTH AND THE VISIBILITY WAS GOOD UP TO THE STORMS SW THROUGH E AND IT WASN'T RAINING. I NEEDED INFO. THE COPLT WAS FLYING. THE PWR SETTING WAS NORMAL AND THE AIRSPD WAS STABLE. I ASKED THE TWR IF IT WAS RAINING AT THE FIELD, THEY ANSWERED AFFIRMATIVE. WIND CHK REVEALED 210 DEGS AT 10 GUSTING 15 KTS. WE CONTINUED THE APCH. APPROX 3 MORE LIGHTNING STRIKES (CLOUD TO GND) OCCURRED N OF THE FIELD. ON SHORT FINAL, AT 500 FT, WE ENCOUNTERED MODERATE RAIN AND SLIGHTLY REDUCED VISIBILITY AND ABOUT AN 8 KT GAIN IN AIRSPD AS WELL AS SOME LIGHT TURB. THE LNDG AND ROLLOUT WERE SUCCESSFUL BUT LESS THAN COMFORTING. I THOUGHT SURELY WE WOULD BE THE LAST AIRPLANE TO LAND. TO MY SURPRISE, MANY MORE LNDGS WERE MADE AFTER OURS, AS WELL AS ONE TKOF ON RWY 29L. BECAUSE MY INFO WAS INCOMPLETE AND I DID NOT ERR CONSERVATIVELY, I FEEL THAT THIS WAS MY WORST DECISION. I'VE MADE TOUGH CHOICES IN THE PAST AND HAVE FELT GOOD ABOUT THE DECISIONS THAT MY CREW AND I HAVE MADE. HOW CAN I FEEL GOOD ABOUT SNEAKING IN BY THE HAIR OF MY CHINNY-CHIN-CHIN WHEN I DIDN'T KNOW HOW CLOSE OR HOW BIG THE WOLF WAS? ON THAT NIGHT IN JULY, NOBODY KNEW, FOR CERTAIN, WHAT AMOUNT OF LOW LEVEL WINDSHEAR WAS GOING TO OCCUR ON THE APCH AND LNDG. GIVE US PLTS THE TOOLS WE NEED TO 'SEE' LOW LEVEL WINDSHEAR BEFORE WE ARE IN IT OR ELSE LOW LEVEL WINDSHEAR ACCIDENTS WILL CONTINUE TO PLAGUE THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.