Narrative:

Shortly after launching a hot air balloon in the dark for a dawn patrol flight, we discovered in-flight failure of the position light and strobe. The switch appeared damaged, possibly during the inflation process, when the basket transitions from horizontal to vertical. After failing to effect repair of the switch, we elected to continue the flight without lights, reasoning that the danger of landing in the darkness near numerous power lines was much greater than that of an in-flight collision with another aircraft due to lack of lights. (Note: this is especially true in a hot air balloon, as opposed to a gas balloon, since the balloon crew can easily see oncoming aircraft and illuminate the balloon with the 'glow burner,' making it as easy to see as a seven-story-high chinese lantern.) corrective actions include remounting the switch to a location less likely to be damaged by crushing between the tanks and the basket wall, or possibly by changing the FARS so that hot air balloons are not required to carry position lights, since the natural illumination provided by the burner makes such lights practically superfluous. Testing the lights before launch is a possibility, too, but on a windy inflation, any unnecessary delay can increase launch danger. Since the lights can only be extended once airborne (they hang below the basket), testing is awkward in some installations. Finally, changing the 337 process might help, since most call for a switch, even though the switch itself violates the kiss (keep it simple, stupid) principle. In many applications, the connection of the lights' wiring to the battery should be sufficient 'switch,' obviating the necessity of another component (a switch) in the circuitry. As this situation indicates, that extra component is simply one more method by which system failure can occur.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A HOT AIR BALLOON PLT FOUND THAT HIS NIGHT LIGHTS WERE INOP.

Narrative: SHORTLY AFTER LAUNCHING A HOT AIR BALLOON IN THE DARK FOR A DAWN PATROL FLT, WE DISCOVERED INFLT FAILURE OF THE POS LIGHT AND STROBE. THE SWITCH APPEARED DAMAGED, POSSIBLY DURING THE INFLATION PROCESS, WHEN THE BASKET TRANSITIONS FROM HORIZ TO VERT. AFTER FAILING TO EFFECT REPAIR OF THE SWITCH, WE ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE FLT WITHOUT LIGHTS, REASONING THAT THE DANGER OF LNDG IN THE DARKNESS NEAR NUMEROUS PWR LINES WAS MUCH GREATER THAN THAT OF AN INFLT COLLISION WITH ANOTHER ACFT DUE TO LACK OF LIGHTS. (NOTE: THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN A HOT AIR BALLOON, AS OPPOSED TO A GAS BALLOON, SINCE THE BALLOON CREW CAN EASILY SEE ONCOMING ACFT AND ILLUMINATE THE BALLOON WITH THE 'GLOW BURNER,' MAKING IT AS EASY TO SEE AS A SEVEN-STORY-HIGH CHINESE LANTERN.) CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INCLUDE REMOUNTING THE SWITCH TO A LOCATION LESS LIKELY TO BE DAMAGED BY CRUSHING BTWN THE TANKS AND THE BASKET WALL, OR POSSIBLY BY CHANGING THE FARS SO THAT HOT AIR BALLOONS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO CARRY POS LIGHTS, SINCE THE NATURAL ILLUMINATION PROVIDED BY THE BURNER MAKES SUCH LIGHTS PRACTICALLY SUPERFLUOUS. TESTING THE LIGHTS BEFORE LAUNCH IS A POSSIBILITY, TOO, BUT ON A WINDY INFLATION, ANY UNNECESSARY DELAY CAN INCREASE LAUNCH DANGER. SINCE THE LIGHTS CAN ONLY BE EXTENDED ONCE AIRBORNE (THEY HANG BELOW THE BASKET), TESTING IS AWKWARD IN SOME INSTALLATIONS. FINALLY, CHANGING THE 337 PROCESS MIGHT HELP, SINCE MOST CALL FOR A SWITCH, EVEN THOUGH THE SWITCH ITSELF VIOLATES THE KISS (KEEP IT SIMPLE, STUPID) PRINCIPLE. IN MANY APPLICATIONS, THE CONNECTION OF THE LIGHTS' WIRING TO THE BATTERY SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT 'SWITCH,' OBVIATING THE NECESSITY OF ANOTHER COMPONENT (A SWITCH) IN THE CIRCUITRY. AS THIS SIT INDICATES, THAT EXTRA COMPONENT IS SIMPLY ONE MORE METHOD BY WHICH SYS FAILURE CAN OCCUR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.