Narrative:

After departing dfw airport, our flight was approximately 20 DME away from the airport. We received a call from company that informed us that the fueler had not secured the port fuel cap and had not finished refueling the aircraft. The captain confirmed that the fuel cap was not secure. We returned to dfw airport where a mechanic secured the fuel cap and confirmed that there was no damage or fuel spillage. We continued the flight with no further incident. The company's operational procedure manual states that it is the PIC's duty to determine the aircraft has met the preflight requirements. Also, the fueling manual states that a crew member will verify that the fuel cap is secure. It does not state that the fueler will leave any notice that the aircraft has been properly fueled or that they have discontinued fueling but would return to finish the fueling process. The problem that becomes apparent is the lack of communication between the fueler, the ramp personnel, and the flight crew. The fueler did not communicate to ramp personnel or operations that he had started but not finished fueling the aircraft. Ramp personnel saw that the fueler had gone and figured that he was finished. The captain checked the fuel quantity and it was the proper amount. Meanwhile, I brought the passenger to the aircraft on a bus since the aircraft was remotely parked. Ramp personnel did not show or tell the flight crew of any fuel receipt or amount of fuel on board. The captain had started the #2 engine as I finished the manifest. The aircraft checklist only verified that the fuel caps were physically in place but not secured. Also, the checklist confirmed fuel quantity and balance was also proper. To reduce the chances of this type of problem ever occurring again, some type of xchk should be required. The operations manual should require both crew members to verify that the aircraft was properly fueled and the fuel caps are secured. The fueling manual should require the fueler to secure the fuel caps even if he is not finished fueling. Also, it should require the fueler to properly notify ramp and operations personnel if he is required to leave an aircraft not properly fueled. Finally, the PIC should retain a copy of the fuel slip with the amount of fuel added to the tanks. Flcs need to double check each other if under a time restraint. Safety must come first.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN INTERRUPTION IN THE RAMP OP AND REFUELING PROC WAS NOT COMMUNICATED TO THE FLC. ACFT DEPARTED WITHOUT REQUESTED FUEL LOAD AND A SECURED FUEL CAP.

Narrative: AFTER DEPARTING DFW ARPT, OUR FLT WAS APPROX 20 DME AWAY FROM THE ARPT. WE RECEIVED A CALL FROM COMPANY THAT INFORMED US THAT THE FUELER HAD NOT SECURED THE PORT FUEL CAP AND HAD NOT FINISHED REFUELING THE ACFT. THE CAPT CONFIRMED THAT THE FUEL CAP WAS NOT SECURE. WE RETURNED TO DFW ARPT WHERE A MECH SECURED THE FUEL CAP AND CONFIRMED THAT THERE WAS NO DAMAGE OR FUEL SPILLAGE. WE CONTINUED THE FLT WITH NO FURTHER INCIDENT. THE COMPANY'S OPERATIONAL PROC MANUAL STATES THAT IT IS THE PIC'S DUTY TO DETERMINE THE ACFT HAS MET THE PREFLT REQUIREMENTS. ALSO, THE FUELING MANUAL STATES THAT A CREW MEMBER WILL VERIFY THAT THE FUEL CAP IS SECURE. IT DOES NOT STATE THAT THE FUELER WILL LEAVE ANY NOTICE THAT THE ACFT HAS BEEN PROPERLY FUELED OR THAT THEY HAVE DISCONTINUED FUELING BUT WOULD RETURN TO FINISH THE FUELING PROCESS. THE PROB THAT BECOMES APPARENT IS THE LACK OF COM BTWN THE FUELER, THE RAMP PERSONNEL, AND THE FLC. THE FUELER DID NOT COMMUNICATE TO RAMP PERSONNEL OR OPS THAT HE HAD STARTED BUT NOT FINISHED FUELING THE ACFT. RAMP PERSONNEL SAW THAT THE FUELER HAD GONE AND FIGURED THAT HE WAS FINISHED. THE CAPT CHKED THE FUEL QUANTITY AND IT WAS THE PROPER AMOUNT. MEANWHILE, I BROUGHT THE PAX TO THE ACFT ON A BUS SINCE THE ACFT WAS REMOTELY PARKED. RAMP PERSONNEL DID NOT SHOW OR TELL THE FLC OF ANY FUEL RECEIPT OR AMOUNT OF FUEL ON BOARD. THE CAPT HAD STARTED THE #2 ENG AS I FINISHED THE MANIFEST. THE ACFT CHKLIST ONLY VERIFIED THAT THE FUEL CAPS WERE PHYSICALLY IN PLACE BUT NOT SECURED. ALSO, THE CHKLIST CONFIRMED FUEL QUANTITY AND BAL WAS ALSO PROPER. TO REDUCE THE CHANCES OF THIS TYPE OF PROB EVER OCCURRING AGAIN, SOME TYPE OF XCHK SHOULD BE REQUIRED. THE OPS MANUAL SHOULD REQUIRE BOTH CREW MEMBERS TO VERIFY THAT THE ACFT WAS PROPERLY FUELED AND THE FUEL CAPS ARE SECURED. THE FUELING MANUAL SHOULD REQUIRE THE FUELER TO SECURE THE FUEL CAPS EVEN IF HE IS NOT FINISHED FUELING. ALSO, IT SHOULD REQUIRE THE FUELER TO PROPERLY NOTIFY RAMP AND OPS PERSONNEL IF HE IS REQUIRED TO LEAVE AN ACFT NOT PROPERLY FUELED. FINALLY, THE PIC SHOULD RETAIN A COPY OF THE FUEL SLIP WITH THE AMOUNT OF FUEL ADDED TO THE TANKS. FLCS NEED TO DOUBLE CHK EACH OTHER IF UNDER A TIME RESTRAINT. SAFETY MUST COME FIRST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.