Narrative:

I was flying with a high minimums captain from mkg to dtw. The captain performed all takeoffs and lndgs. I would fly every other en route leg from the completion of the after takeoff checklist to the completion of the descent checklist. The ATIS was indicating landing runway 21L and hold short of runway 27L. The captain told the controller on initial contact that we could not hold short. After some discussion between the captain and myself, we determined that we could hold short of runway 27L. Control of the aircraft was transferred and we were handed off to the next sector. I was working the radios. I checked in. By this time we were established on the ILS for runway 21L. The controller queried us about the hold short and I told him that after further investigation, we could hold short of runway 27L. We were told to contact tower marker inbound which we did. At 900 ft AGL the captain noticed both hydraulic lights illuminated on the annunciator panel. I checked the hydraulic pressure gauge and found it indicating low and dropping. The captain called for the QRH (quick reference handbook) hydraulics/nosewheel steering. I went through this checklist. We then noticed smoke in the cockpit. The captain had me check the cabin, it did not seem to have any smoke in it at the time. We then performed the smoke removal checklist from the QRH. This did not remove the smoke and by this time the cabin was starting to fill with smoke. Tower cleared us to land and hold short of runway 27L. The captain said we would not be able to hold short of runway 27L and I told tower we had smoke in the cockpit. We talked about landing with 1/2 flaps, the gear was down and flaps set to half, the captain called for flaps full. I selected full flaps and watched as the hydraulic pressure went to zero and the flaps stopped at 3/4. The captain was concerned about the gear, since hydraulic pressure helps hold the gear down. We did have 3 green indication. I ran through the emergency gear extension from the QRH. We landed without incident, and turned off on taxiway F. Crash, fire and rescue was there and the captain called for an emergency evacuation due the smoke in the aircraft. We evacuated the passenger without incident, and I stayed with them all the way to terminal. The tower supervisor called our dispatch and asked to talk to the captain. He wanted to know what the confusion was about concerning the land and hold short. The captain explained about the hydraulics failure and the fact that he did not want to be limited in the available runway. During all the checklists and trying to analyze the situation we never declared an emergency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT EQUIP PROB HYDRAULIC PRESSURE LOST ON FINAL APCH.

Narrative: I WAS FLYING WITH A HIGH MINIMUMS CAPT FROM MKG TO DTW. THE CAPT PERFORMED ALL TKOFS AND LNDGS. I WOULD FLY EVERY OTHER ENRTE LEG FROM THE COMPLETION OF THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST TO THE COMPLETION OF THE DSCNT CHKLIST. THE ATIS WAS INDICATING LNDG RWY 21L AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27L. THE CAPT TOLD THE CTLR ON INITIAL CONTACT THAT WE COULD NOT HOLD SHORT. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION BTWN THE CAPT AND MYSELF, WE DETERMINED THAT WE COULD HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27L. CTL OF THE ACFT WAS TRANSFERRED AND WE WERE HANDED OFF TO THE NEXT SECTOR. I WAS WORKING THE RADIOS. I CHKED IN. BY THIS TIME WE WERE ESTABLISHED ON THE ILS FOR RWY 21L. THE CTLR QUERIED US ABOUT THE HOLD SHORT AND I TOLD HIM THAT AFTER FURTHER INVESTIGATION, WE COULD HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27L. WE WERE TOLD TO CONTACT TWR MARKER INBOUND WHICH WE DID. AT 900 FT AGL THE CAPT NOTICED BOTH HYDRAULIC LIGHTS ILLUMINATED ON THE ANNUNCIATOR PANEL. I CHKED THE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE GAUGE AND FOUND IT INDICATING LOW AND DROPPING. THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE QRH (QUICK REF HANDBOOK) HYDRAULICS/NOSEWHEEL STEERING. I WENT THROUGH THIS CHKLIST. WE THEN NOTICED SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT. THE CAPT HAD ME CHK THE CABIN, IT DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE ANY SMOKE IN IT AT THE TIME. WE THEN PERFORMED THE SMOKE REMOVAL CHKLIST FROM THE QRH. THIS DID NOT REMOVE THE SMOKE AND BY THIS TIME THE CABIN WAS STARTING TO FILL WITH SMOKE. TWR CLRED US TO LAND AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27L. THE CAPT SAID WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27L AND I TOLD TWR WE HAD SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT. WE TALKED ABOUT LNDG WITH 1/2 FLAPS, THE GEAR WAS DOWN AND FLAPS SET TO HALF, THE CAPT CALLED FOR FLAPS FULL. I SELECTED FULL FLAPS AND WATCHED AS THE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE WENT TO ZERO AND THE FLAPS STOPPED AT 3/4. THE CAPT WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE GEAR, SINCE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE HELPS HOLD THE GEAR DOWN. WE DID HAVE 3 GREEN INDICATION. I RAN THROUGH THE EMER GEAR EXTENSION FROM THE QRH. WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT, AND TURNED OFF ON TXWY F. CRASH, FIRE AND RESCUE WAS THERE AND THE CAPT CALLED FOR AN EMER EVACUATION DUE THE SMOKE IN THE ACFT. WE EVACUATED THE PAX WITHOUT INCIDENT, AND I STAYED WITH THEM ALL THE WAY TO TERMINAL. THE TWR SUPVR CALLED OUR DISPATCH AND ASKED TO TALK TO THE CAPT. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHAT THE CONFUSION WAS ABOUT CONCERNING THE LAND AND HOLD SHORT. THE CAPT EXPLAINED ABOUT THE HYDRAULICS FAILURE AND THE FACT THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO BE LIMITED IN THE AVAILABLE RWY. DURING ALL THE CHKLISTS AND TRYING TO ANALYZE THE SIT WE NEVER DECLARED AN EMER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.