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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 319423 |
Time | |
Date | 199510 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : fll |
State Reference | FL |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Dawn |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | DHC-7 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : preflight |
Flight Plan | None |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 260 flight time total : 5400 flight time type : 2300 |
ASRS Report | 319423 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : far |
Independent Detector | other other : unspecified |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | faa : investigated Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
I performed a normal and thorough preflight inspection as well as my first officer duties as required. Special circumstances on this day were that the FAA was present and, due to the lack of manpower, I was under the captain's supervision to conduct the duties of the ground crew to insure the area was clear during the starting of engines #3 and #4 in order to aid in a timely departure from the hangar area. After returning from the day's scheduled flying, it was brought to the captain's and my attention that the FAA had questioned a few of our procedures. Mainly why the first officer was directed by the captain to ensure the area around engines #3 and #4 was clear prior to starting. The FAA's presence, I feel, was likely due to some rapid expansion procedures of the airline up north which were being questioned by FAA. Due to the FAA questions the way in which we conducted our preflight and the starting of the engines, I feel that, even though this crew ensured safety was not sacrificed, that the company may punish the crew and use us as an example to other crews in order to ease tension between the FAA and upper management. I am aware that there is always room for improvement and willing to accept constructive criticism if I did neglect any safety or preflight procedures. I'm still uncertain of the exact discrepancy since my company is not very forthcoming to the FAA's comments and is keeping the whole incident a big secret. Lesson to be learned: pilots are often under extreme pressure from management to meet scheduling integrity and, if a problem occurs, it is often dismissed as pilot error. I would remind pilots that, under any circumstances, scheduling should never jeopardize safety. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter's maintenance department was undergoing an FAA inspection. Some of the maintenance personnel and the FAA inspector were in the vicinity of the reporter's aircraft when the flight crew was ready to start the engines in order to taxi from the hangar. Because the maintenance personnel were busy with the FAA inspector, the captain directed the first officer to deplane and clear the area behind the engines so he could start them. The FAA inspector, noting this procedure, notified the reporter's chief pilot about the improper engine start telling him that both pilots of a 121 air carrier must be in the cockpit for engine starts. The chief pilot didn't believe the flight crew's story and said it was against SOP and dangerous. He gave them 2 weeks off without pay. The flight crew also met with their FAA primary operating inspector who had no comment nor initiated any punitive action.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: IMPROPER STARTING PROCS -- FAA FOLLOW UP.
Narrative: I PERFORMED A NORMAL AND THOROUGH PREFLT INSPECTION AS WELL AS MY FO DUTIES AS REQUIRED. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES ON THIS DAY WERE THAT THE FAA WAS PRESENT AND, DUE TO THE LACK OF MANPOWER, I WAS UNDER THE CAPT'S SUPERVISION TO CONDUCT THE DUTIES OF THE GND CREW TO INSURE THE AREA WAS CLR DURING THE STARTING OF ENGS #3 AND #4 IN ORDER TO AID IN A TIMELY DEP FROM THE HANGAR AREA. AFTER RETURNING FROM THE DAY'S SCHEDULED FLYING, IT WAS BROUGHT TO THE CAPT'S AND MY ATTN THAT THE FAA HAD QUESTIONED A FEW OF OUR PROCS. MAINLY WHY THE FO WAS DIRECTED BY THE CAPT TO ENSURE THE AREA AROUND ENGS #3 AND #4 WAS CLR PRIOR TO STARTING. THE FAA'S PRESENCE, I FEEL, WAS LIKELY DUE TO SOME RAPID EXPANSION PROCS OF THE AIRLINE UP N WHICH WERE BEING QUESTIONED BY FAA. DUE TO THE FAA QUESTIONS THE WAY IN WHICH WE CONDUCTED OUR PREFLT AND THE STARTING OF THE ENGS, I FEEL THAT, EVEN THOUGH THIS CREW ENSURED SAFETY WAS NOT SACRIFICED, THAT THE COMPANY MAY PUNISH THE CREW AND USE US AS AN EXAMPLE TO OTHER CREWS IN ORDER TO EASE TENSION BTWN THE FAA AND UPPER MGMNT. I AM AWARE THAT THERE IS ALWAYS ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT AND WILLING TO ACCEPT CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM IF I DID NEGLECT ANY SAFETY OR PREFLT PROCS. I'M STILL UNCERTAIN OF THE EXACT DISCREPANCY SINCE MY COMPANY IS NOT VERY FORTHCOMING TO THE FAA'S COMMENTS AND IS KEEPING THE WHOLE INCIDENT A BIG SECRET. LESSON TO BE LEARNED: PLTS ARE OFTEN UNDER EXTREME PRESSURE FROM MGMNT TO MEET SCHEDULING INTEGRITY AND, IF A PROB OCCURS, IT IS OFTEN DISMISSED AS PLT ERROR. I WOULD REMIND PLTS THAT, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, SCHEDULING SHOULD NEVER JEOPARDIZE SAFETY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR'S MAINT DEPT WAS UNDERGOING AN FAA INSPECTION. SOME OF THE MAINT PERSONNEL AND THE FAA INSPECTOR WERE IN THE VICINITY OF THE RPTR'S ACFT WHEN THE FLC WAS READY TO START THE ENGS IN ORDER TO TAXI FROM THE HANGAR. BECAUSE THE MAINT PERSONNEL WERE BUSY WITH THE FAA INSPECTOR, THE CAPT DIRECTED THE FO TO DEPLANE AND CLR THE AREA BEHIND THE ENGS SO HE COULD START THEM. THE FAA INSPECTOR, NOTING THIS PROC, NOTIFIED THE RPTR'S CHIEF PLT ABOUT THE IMPROPER ENG START TELLING HIM THAT BOTH PLTS OF A 121 ACR MUST BE IN THE COCKPIT FOR ENG STARTS. THE CHIEF PLT DIDN'T BELIEVE THE FLC'S STORY AND SAID IT WAS AGAINST SOP AND DANGEROUS. HE GAVE THEM 2 WKS OFF WITHOUT PAY. THE FLC ALSO MET WITH THEIR FAA PRIMARY OPERATING INSPECTOR WHO HAD NO COMMENT NOR INITIATED ANY PUNITIVE ACTION.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.