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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 321373 |
Time | |
Date | 199511 |
Day | Sat |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sfo |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B747-100 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground other : taxi landing other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 206 flight time total : 20000 flight time type : 206 |
ASRS Report | 321373 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : flight engineer pilot : commercial pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 10600 flight time type : 2100 |
ASRS Report | 321366 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : overcame equipment problem flight crew : declared emergency |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
First officer landing sfo runway 28R. Normal approach and landing. Normal reverse by first officer. First officer deselected reverse approaching 80 KTS ground speed. At 60 KTS the captain took control of the aircraft with a planned turnoff at taxiway K. First officer stated 'you have the aircraft, engines in idle reverse.' captain put reverse levers down and slowed the aircraft down to taxi speed for a left turn off the runway onto taxiway K. Just as the aircraft cleared both active runways (28R and 28L) heading for taxiway a, the tower advised that our #1 engine was on fire. At the same moment FSS called with the same message. There was no cockpit indication of a fire. Captain immediately stopped the aircraft and completed the immediate action items of the engine fire checklist. Captain asked first officer to call for emergency equipment and to ask the control tower to assess the fire status. Tower replied that the fire appeared to be out. Captain then made a PA announcement advising the passenger and FSS as to the aircraft status and to remain seated. An alert maintenance person working at gate X saw our situation and came to our assistance, hooked into interphone, said he saw some smoke. Captain then fired fire bottle #2 as the emergency equipment arrived. Shortly thereafter they stated the fire was out for sure. Captain again reassured the passenger all was well and we would be under taxi shortly. Maintenance cleared the area, then gave us a salute and release from guidance. So completed engine fire reference actions. Again the captain reassured the passenger and reminded them of the 'seat belt sign on.' with taxi clearance the aircraft proceeded to gate and was secured in the normal manner. Upon leaving the aircraft, maintenance was briefed by the captain and so. Dispatch was briefed by the captain and a captain's report was submitted to the company. During all of this the only abnormal cockpit indication was a high egt reading on #1 engine. As captain, the thought of conducting a passenger evacuate/evacuation came to mind immediately. Using all resources available to me and the excellent feedback I got from very professional and capable people I realized an evacuate/evacuation was not only not necessary it would have been a very poor choice indeed. 'Clear' does work if those in command know their resources and how to get the best from them. Callback conversation with reporter from acn #321366 revealed the following information: the first officer reporter stated the fire warning did not occur because the fire had no way to get to the fire warning loops. The fire occurred from compressor stalls as the #1 engine came out of reverse. Apparently the fuel control was supplying excess fuel to the stalled engine and the fire was coming from the exhaust. The flight was actually a few mins ahead of schedule when it got to the gate and everyone made their connections. As a result of the coordination of everyone, the tower, the flight attendants, and the ground crew, the experience was a nonevent and no one was hurt.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: THE FLC OF A WDB EXPERIENCED A #1 ENG FIRE ON LNDG ROLLOUT, WITHOUT AN ENG FIRE WARNING.
Narrative: FO LNDG SFO RWY 28R. NORMAL APCH AND LNDG. NORMAL REVERSE BY FO. FO DESELECTED REVERSE APCHING 80 KTS GND SPD. AT 60 KTS THE CAPT TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT WITH A PLANNED TURNOFF AT TXWY K. FO STATED 'YOU HAVE THE ACFT, ENGS IN IDLE REVERSE.' CAPT PUT REVERSE LEVERS DOWN AND SLOWED THE ACFT DOWN TO TAXI SPD FOR A L TURN OFF THE RWY ONTO TXWY K. JUST AS THE ACFT CLRED BOTH ACTIVE RWYS (28R AND 28L) HEADING FOR TXWY A, THE TWR ADVISED THAT OUR #1 ENG WAS ON FIRE. AT THE SAME MOMENT FSS CALLED WITH THE SAME MESSAGE. THERE WAS NO COCKPIT INDICATION OF A FIRE. CAPT IMMEDIATELY STOPPED THE ACFT AND COMPLETED THE IMMEDIATE ACTION ITEMS OF THE ENG FIRE CHKLIST. CAPT ASKED FO TO CALL FOR EMER EQUIP AND TO ASK THE CTL TWR TO ASSESS THE FIRE STATUS. TWR REPLIED THAT THE FIRE APPEARED TO BE OUT. CAPT THEN MADE A PA ANNOUNCEMENT ADVISING THE PAX AND FSS AS TO THE ACFT STATUS AND TO REMAIN SEATED. AN ALERT MAINT PERSON WORKING AT GATE X SAW OUR SIT AND CAME TO OUR ASSISTANCE, HOOKED INTO INTERPHONE, SAID HE SAW SOME SMOKE. CAPT THEN FIRED FIRE BOTTLE #2 AS THE EMER EQUIP ARRIVED. SHORTLY THEREAFTER THEY STATED THE FIRE WAS OUT FOR SURE. CAPT AGAIN REASSURED THE PAX ALL WAS WELL AND WE WOULD BE UNDER TAXI SHORTLY. MAINT CLRED THE AREA, THEN GAVE US A SALUTE AND RELEASE FROM GUIDANCE. SO COMPLETED ENG FIRE REF ACTIONS. AGAIN THE CAPT REASSURED THE PAX AND REMINDED THEM OF THE 'SEAT BELT SIGN ON.' WITH TAXI CLRNC THE ACFT PROCEEDED TO GATE AND WAS SECURED IN THE NORMAL MANNER. UPON LEAVING THE ACFT, MAINT WAS BRIEFED BY THE CAPT AND SO. DISPATCH WAS BRIEFED BY THE CAPT AND A CAPT'S RPT WAS SUBMITTED TO THE COMPANY. DURING ALL OF THIS THE ONLY ABNORMAL COCKPIT INDICATION WAS A HIGH EGT READING ON #1 ENG. AS CAPT, THE THOUGHT OF CONDUCTING A PAX EVAC CAME TO MIND IMMEDIATELY. USING ALL RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO ME AND THE EXCELLENT FEEDBACK I GOT FROM VERY PROFESSIONAL AND CAPABLE PEOPLE I REALIZED AN EVAC WAS NOT ONLY NOT NECESSARY IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A VERY POOR CHOICE INDEED. 'CLR' DOES WORK IF THOSE IN COMMAND KNOW THEIR RESOURCES AND HOW TO GET THE BEST FROM THEM. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR FROM ACN #321366 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE FO RPTR STATED THE FIRE WARNING DID NOT OCCUR BECAUSE THE FIRE HAD NO WAY TO GET TO THE FIRE WARNING LOOPS. THE FIRE OCCURRED FROM COMPRESSOR STALLS AS THE #1 ENG CAME OUT OF REVERSE. APPARENTLY THE FUEL CTL WAS SUPPLYING EXCESS FUEL TO THE STALLED ENG AND THE FIRE WAS COMING FROM THE EXHAUST. THE FLT WAS ACTUALLY A FEW MINS AHEAD OF SCHEDULE WHEN IT GOT TO THE GATE AND EVERYONE MADE THEIR CONNECTIONS. AS A RESULT OF THE COORD OF EVERYONE, THE TWR, THE FLT ATTENDANTS, AND THE GND CREW, THE EXPERIENCE WAS A NONEVENT AND NO ONE WAS HURT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.