Narrative:

During preflight, we discovered that the map lights and flight kit lights were inoperative due to a broken circuit breaker. Company maintenance deferred the map lights to be repaired at a later time with our concurrence. The lack of these lights turned out to be a major contributing factor in this incident. Just prior to push back, the ATIS was changed from V to west and the runway plan was changed from runway 19L and runway 19R to runway 1L and runway 1R and runway 30. We were cleared to taxiway east to taxiway Z to taxiway Y9 to taxiway Q to runway 30. As we taxied down taxiway Z, the ATIS was changed to taxiway X. I reviewed the engine pressure ratio-available takeoff gross weight (EPR-ATOG) message and takeoff data with the flight engineer using my flashlight and we completed the checklist down to the line. When I looked around to check our progress and change from ground control frequency to iad tower control frequency, I noticed we were following a turboprop aircraft. I reset my heading bug to 300 degrees for runway 30. It had been on 190 degrees for runway 19L or runway 19R. As soon as I switched to tower frequency, we were cleared to position and hold on runway 30. The captain observed an aircraft on a long final approach as we began taxiing forward and completed our flows. As we crossed the hold line for runway 1L, I noticed the compass heading and the sign for runway 1L and the painted white letters for runway 1L all at the same time. I immediately told the tower that we were on runway 1L and that we were getting off the runway which we did quickly making a right hand U turn. The tower instructed the aircraft on final to go around as we reported clear of the runway. We made a mistake which I did not catch until we were crossing the hold short line for runway 1L. During the debriefing of this mistake, it came to light that the captain had thought we were to taxi to runway 1L all along. The flight engineer also thought we were to taxi to runway 1L all along. As we taxied south on taxiway Z, the flight engineer and I were very busy redoing the takeoff data by hand held flashlight and I reviewed the departure for runway 30. Having to use a hand held flashlight to do all this with the other one hand took more than twice as long as it normally would have. The next time we have something like this we will just have to pull over into the run-up blocks, set the brakes, do the new takeoff data with the brakes set, and then go on our way. In retrospect, when I twisted my heading bug to 300 degrees I should have recognized that our orientation was not correct. The captain during the debrief commented that he was wondering why I was setting my heading bug to 300 degrees instead of 010 degrees. Dark, cloudy, and no lights makes it tough. I did not catch the error until the last second and it was too late. We were across the line and on the wrong runway!! I failed to satisfactorily back up the captain. Supplemental information from acn 321670: we requested taxi clearance and were given 'taxiway Z to taxiway Y9 to runway 1L' (so we thought). This is what the captain had written down as he heard the clearance, and also what I believed I had heard. The captain verbalized this taxi clearance within the cockpit to the crew at that time, and repeated it again aloud to the crew later during the taxi. I concurred. First officer was carefully looking at his charts with his flashlights at this time. For whatever reason, the captain and I both believed we had received 'taxiway Z to taxiway Y9 to runway 1L.' we all had a piece of the picture, but unfortunately because of simple distrs, our crew communication momentarily broke down enough that we did not realize there were discrepancies in the clearance.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A B727 MISUNDERSTOOD DEP CLRNC AND TAXIED INTO POS ON THE WRONG RWY AT IAD. UNAUTH RWY ENTRY. NIGHT OP.

Narrative: DURING PREFLT, WE DISCOVERED THAT THE MAP LIGHTS AND FLT KIT LIGHTS WERE INOP DUE TO A BROKEN CIRCUIT BREAKER. COMPANY MAINT DEFERRED THE MAP LIGHTS TO BE REPAIRED AT A LATER TIME WITH OUR CONCURRENCE. THE LACK OF THESE LIGHTS TURNED OUT TO BE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN THIS INCIDENT. JUST PRIOR TO PUSH BACK, THE ATIS WAS CHANGED FROM V TO W AND THE RWY PLAN WAS CHANGED FROM RWY 19L AND RWY 19R TO RWY 1L AND RWY 1R AND RWY 30. WE WERE CLRED TO TXWY E TO TXWY Z TO TXWY Y9 TO TXWY Q TO RWY 30. AS WE TAXIED DOWN TXWY Z, THE ATIS WAS CHANGED TO TXWY X. I REVIEWED THE ENG PRESSURE RATIO-AVAILABLE TKOF GROSS WT (EPR-ATOG) MESSAGE AND TKOF DATA WITH THE FE USING MY FLASHLIGHT AND WE COMPLETED THE CHKLIST DOWN TO THE LINE. WHEN I LOOKED AROUND TO CHK OUR PROGRESS AND CHANGE FROM GND CTL FREQ TO IAD TWR CTL FREQ, I NOTICED WE WERE FOLLOWING A TURBOPROP ACFT. I RESET MY HDG BUG TO 300 DEGS FOR RWY 30. IT HAD BEEN ON 190 DEGS FOR RWY 19L OR RWY 19R. AS SOON AS I SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ, WE WERE CLRED TO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 30. THE CAPT OBSERVED AN ACFT ON A LONG FINAL APCH AS WE BEGAN TAXIING FORWARD AND COMPLETED OUR FLOWS. AS WE CROSSED THE HOLD LINE FOR RWY 1L, I NOTICED THE COMPASS HDG AND THE SIGN FOR RWY 1L AND THE PAINTED WHITE LETTERS FOR RWY 1L ALL AT THE SAME TIME. I IMMEDIATELY TOLD THE TWR THAT WE WERE ON RWY 1L AND THAT WE WERE GETTING OFF THE RWY WHICH WE DID QUICKLY MAKING A R HAND U TURN. THE TWR INSTRUCTED THE ACFT ON FINAL TO GAR AS WE RPTED CLR OF THE RWY. WE MADE A MISTAKE WHICH I DID NOT CATCH UNTIL WE WERE CROSSING THE HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RWY 1L. DURING THE DEBRIEFING OF THIS MISTAKE, IT CAME TO LIGHT THAT THE CAPT HAD THOUGHT WE WERE TO TAXI TO RWY 1L ALL ALONG. THE FE ALSO THOUGHT WE WERE TO TAXI TO RWY 1L ALL ALONG. AS WE TAXIED S ON TXWY Z, THE FE AND I WERE VERY BUSY REDOING THE TKOF DATA BY HAND HELD FLASHLIGHT AND I REVIEWED THE DEP FOR RWY 30. HAVING TO USE A HAND HELD FLASHLIGHT TO DO ALL THIS WITH THE OTHER ONE HAND TOOK MORE THAN TWICE AS LONG AS IT NORMALLY WOULD HAVE. THE NEXT TIME WE HAVE SOMETHING LIKE THIS WE WILL JUST HAVE TO PULL OVER INTO THE RUN-UP BLOCKS, SET THE BRAKES, DO THE NEW TKOF DATA WITH THE BRAKES SET, AND THEN GO ON OUR WAY. IN RETROSPECT, WHEN I TWISTED MY HDG BUG TO 300 DEGS I SHOULD HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT OUR ORIENTATION WAS NOT CORRECT. THE CAPT DURING THE DEBRIEF COMMENTED THAT HE WAS WONDERING WHY I WAS SETTING MY HDG BUG TO 300 DEGS INSTEAD OF 010 DEGS. DARK, CLOUDY, AND NO LIGHTS MAKES IT TOUGH. I DID NOT CATCH THE ERROR UNTIL THE LAST SECOND AND IT WAS TOO LATE. WE WERE ACROSS THE LINE AND ON THE WRONG RWY!! I FAILED TO SATISFACTORILY BACK UP THE CAPT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 321670: WE REQUESTED TAXI CLRNC AND WERE GIVEN 'TXWY Z TO TXWY Y9 TO RWY 1L' (SO WE THOUGHT). THIS IS WHAT THE CAPT HAD WRITTEN DOWN AS HE HEARD THE CLRNC, AND ALSO WHAT I BELIEVED I HAD HEARD. THE CAPT VERBALIZED THIS TAXI CLRNC WITHIN THE COCKPIT TO THE CREW AT THAT TIME, AND REPEATED IT AGAIN ALOUD TO THE CREW LATER DURING THE TAXI. I CONCURRED. FO WAS CAREFULLY LOOKING AT HIS CHARTS WITH HIS FLASHLIGHTS AT THIS TIME. FOR WHATEVER REASON, THE CAPT AND I BOTH BELIEVED WE HAD RECEIVED 'TXWY Z TO TXWY Y9 TO RWY 1L.' WE ALL HAD A PIECE OF THE PICTURE, BUT UNFORTUNATELY BECAUSE OF SIMPLE DISTRS, OUR CREW COM MOMENTARILY BROKE DOWN ENOUGH THAT WE DID NOT REALIZE THERE WERE DISCREPANCIES IN THE CLRNC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.