Narrative:

Approximately 130 mi out, we tuned the VOR for tus but could not get DME. Asked center if DME was operative and they said 'negative.' (NOTAMS did not indicate that DME was OTS.) requested our DME range in order to plan our descent, and were given it, with pilot's discretion descent to an altitude that would provide terrain clearance over the mountains north of tus. When we switched to approach control, we were given a pilot's discretion descent that would not clear the terrain. I asked for our distance, and approach stated that they couldn't provide it because their radar was down. Because I was familiar with (and could see) the terrain. We did a 'slam-dunk' when I knew that we were in the clear. When we turned final, we noticed that the PAPI for runway 11L was barely discernible (poor chromaticity). In addition, the ILS to runway 11L has no DME, and the NDB is offset. The next morning, we were given a SID that required DME, and I asked, 'how do we fly it?' the controller said, 'good question. I guess I'll give you vectors.' our initial vector was toward the rocks (which I could see). A lost communication in IMC could have been disastrous. Additionally, the ILS will be shut down for 2 weeks tomorrow. At tus, we have all the ingredients for a fatal accident. 1) inoperative navaids, 2) inoperative ATC equipment, 3) high terrain, 4) inadequate ATC service, 5) inadequate visual guidance to field. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated his main concern is the PAPI for runway 11L. Red and white light are not discernible from 5 mi.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATC EQUIP PROB NAV DME OTS POOR CHROMATICITY ON THE PAPI.

Narrative: APPROX 130 MI OUT, WE TUNED THE VOR FOR TUS BUT COULD NOT GET DME. ASKED CTR IF DME WAS OPERATIVE AND THEY SAID 'NEGATIVE.' (NOTAMS DID NOT INDICATE THAT DME WAS OTS.) REQUESTED OUR DME RANGE IN ORDER TO PLAN OUR DSCNT, AND WERE GIVEN IT, WITH PLT'S DISCRETION DSCNT TO AN ALT THAT WOULD PROVIDE TERRAIN CLRNC OVER THE MOUNTAINS N OF TUS. WHEN WE SWITCHED TO APCH CTL, WE WERE GIVEN A PLT'S DISCRETION DSCNT THAT WOULD NOT CLR THE TERRAIN. I ASKED FOR OUR DISTANCE, AND APCH STATED THAT THEY COULDN'T PROVIDE IT BECAUSE THEIR RADAR WAS DOWN. BECAUSE I WAS FAMILIAR WITH (AND COULD SEE) THE TERRAIN. WE DID A 'SLAM-DUNK' WHEN I KNEW THAT WE WERE IN THE CLR. WHEN WE TURNED FINAL, WE NOTICED THAT THE PAPI FOR RWY 11L WAS BARELY DISCERNIBLE (POOR CHROMATICITY). IN ADDITION, THE ILS TO RWY 11L HAS NO DME, AND THE NDB IS OFFSET. THE NEXT MORNING, WE WERE GIVEN A SID THAT REQUIRED DME, AND I ASKED, 'HOW DO WE FLY IT?' THE CTLR SAID, 'GOOD QUESTION. I GUESS I'LL GIVE YOU VECTORS.' OUR INITIAL VECTOR WAS TOWARD THE ROCKS (WHICH I COULD SEE). A LOST COM IN IMC COULD HAVE BEEN DISASTROUS. ADDITIONALLY, THE ILS WILL BE SHUT DOWN FOR 2 WKS TOMORROW. AT TUS, WE HAVE ALL THE INGREDIENTS FOR A FATAL ACCIDENT. 1) INOP NAVAIDS, 2) INOP ATC EQUIP, 3) HIGH TERRAIN, 4) INADEQUATE ATC SVC, 5) INADEQUATE VISUAL GUIDANCE TO FIELD. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED HIS MAIN CONCERN IS THE PAPI FOR RWY 11L. RED AND WHITE LIGHT ARE NOT DISCERNIBLE FROM 5 MI.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.