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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 322576 |
Time | |
Date | 199511 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : syr |
State Reference | NY |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : preflight |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | other personnel other |
Qualification | other other : other |
ASRS Report | 322576 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | other personnel other |
Qualification | other other : other |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : less severe non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other other : unspecified |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
On the remain overnight of nov/xx/95, 2 DC9 type nosewheels were installed inadvertently on an MD80 aircraft. We had a very busy night. A heavy workload. In an attempt to assist the mechanics working on the remain overnight aircraft, the lead mechanic, C, delivered 2 nosewheels. The mechanics, a and B installed them on the aircraft. It wasn't noticed until after the aircraft had departed for lga. The stock clerk noticed the part number error. Lga maintenance was contacted immediately and advised to replace the nosewheels with the proper type when the aircraft arrived. The nosewheels were replaced at lga. The supervisor and regional manager were both notified. It was agreed that an error had occurred but was immediately dealt with. All involved were very concerned and took the necessary steps to correct the situation without delay. The entire maintenance department at syracuse was briefed on what had happened and all are well aware to double-check wheel part numbers before installing them on the aircraft. Note: the wheels are marked for aircraft type by the valve stem, but the valve stem is rotated to the top for servicing once they are installed. The aircraft type marking is not readily visible with the valves thus positioned. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the DC9 nosewheel assembly dash 5 and later is approved for the MD80 by the manufacturer and FAA. The air carrier does not authority/authorized the interchange. The tire pressure and the fuse plug temperatures are different. The wheel assembly was a dash 6. So no hazard existed. The reporter said the FAA felt the reporter should suffer a letter in his FAA file for 2 yrs for not assuring the appropriate assembly was installed on the MD80. Since the reporter signed the logbook, he and only he received FAA criticism. The air carrier is putting the required information on the tire in large chalk letters that will disappear after installation.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: RPTR AND FELLOW MECH INSTALL DC9 WHEEL ASSEMBLY ON MD80.
Narrative: ON THE REMAIN OVERNIGHT OF NOV/XX/95, 2 DC9 TYPE NOSEWHEELS WERE INSTALLED INADVERTENTLY ON AN MD80 ACFT. WE HAD A VERY BUSY NIGHT. A HVY WORKLOAD. IN AN ATTEMPT TO ASSIST THE MECHS WORKING ON THE REMAIN OVERNIGHT ACFT, THE LEAD MECH, C, DELIVERED 2 NOSEWHEELS. THE MECHS, A AND B INSTALLED THEM ON THE ACFT. IT WASN'T NOTICED UNTIL AFTER THE ACFT HAD DEPARTED FOR LGA. THE STOCK CLERK NOTICED THE PART NUMBER ERROR. LGA MAINT WAS CONTACTED IMMEDIATELY AND ADVISED TO REPLACE THE NOSEWHEELS WITH THE PROPER TYPE WHEN THE ACFT ARRIVED. THE NOSEWHEELS WERE REPLACED AT LGA. THE SUPVR AND REGIONAL MGR WERE BOTH NOTIFIED. IT WAS AGREED THAT AN ERROR HAD OCCURRED BUT WAS IMMEDIATELY DEALT WITH. ALL INVOLVED WERE VERY CONCERNED AND TOOK THE NECESSARY STEPS TO CORRECT THE SIT WITHOUT DELAY. THE ENTIRE MAINT DEPT AT SYRACUSE WAS BRIEFED ON WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND ALL ARE WELL AWARE TO DOUBLE-CHK WHEEL PART NUMBERS BEFORE INSTALLING THEM ON THE ACFT. NOTE: THE WHEELS ARE MARKED FOR ACFT TYPE BY THE VALVE STEM, BUT THE VALVE STEM IS ROTATED TO THE TOP FOR SVCING ONCE THEY ARE INSTALLED. THE ACFT TYPE MARKING IS NOT READILY VISIBLE WITH THE VALVES THUS POSITIONED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE DC9 NOSEWHEEL ASSEMBLY DASH 5 AND LATER IS APPROVED FOR THE MD80 BY THE MANUFACTURER AND FAA. THE ACR DOES NOT AUTH THE INTERCHANGE. THE TIRE PRESSURE AND THE FUSE PLUG TEMPS ARE DIFFERENT. THE WHEEL ASSEMBLY WAS A DASH 6. SO NO HAZARD EXISTED. THE RPTR SAID THE FAA FELT THE RPTR SHOULD SUFFER A LETTER IN HIS FAA FILE FOR 2 YRS FOR NOT ASSURING THE APPROPRIATE ASSEMBLY WAS INSTALLED ON THE MD80. SINCE THE RPTR SIGNED THE LOGBOOK, HE AND ONLY HE RECEIVED FAA CRITICISM. THE ACR IS PUTTING THE REQUIRED INFO ON THE TIRE IN LARGE CHALK LETTERS THAT WILL DISAPPEAR AFTER INSTALLATION.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.