Narrative:

While approaching ind for landing, ATC held us at a higher than usual altitude. Approach control set us up on a 4 mi base leg to an 11 mi final. Approach told us to descend to 3100 ft, and cleared us for the ILS to runway 5R. Finally, they told us to contact tower at the OM. I was the PF. Because of our higher than usual altitude, I was concentrating on the descent in order to obtain a stabilized approach. The captain was handling the radio. After the landing, we cleared the runway, I went to change radio frequencys and noticed we were still on approach control frequency. Approach control cleared us for the approach and told us to contact the tower at the marker. During the several mins which elapsed between the clearance and the passing of the marker, we were busy with checklists. Apparently the passing of the marker went unnoticed. Also, during the landing checklist, the captain responded to the challenge 'landing clearance' as 'cleared to land.' supplemental information from acn 322220: the controller cleared us to 'maintain 3100 ft until established on the localizer, cleared for the ILS runway 5R, contact tower at brinn (OM).' because the first officer was flying the aircraft, I acknowledged the clearance and dialed in the tower frequency (dual head radio) in anticipation of switching at brinn. Brinn came and went but the switch to tower didn't happen. Several things contributed to this lapse of attention but in the final analysis, this was primarily a failure on my part to keep track. However, for what it's worth: conditions were cavu (we had had the field in sight for some time) and there was almost no other traffic around. Even though we had been cleared for an ILS we were flying a visual approach on the ILS. Because we were visual the first officer was flying a little faster than we ordinarily would have been and I was distracted by this. Working primarily at night it is common to get the landing clearance from approach control and often at the same time as the approach clearance. The combination of this and physically dialing in the tower frequency may have contributed to me subconsciously believing that we had been cleared to land (by approach control). The so is new (3 months on the line) and still finding his way around his responsibilities, especially as they pertain to backing up the 'front end.' in retrospect, I believe that all 3 of us were lulled into a too relaxed attitude by the overall flight conditions which caused us to lose track of our requirement to contact the tower at the OM. Complacency reared its ugly head again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A LGT FREIGHTER ACFT INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT THE TWR AT THE OM. DISTR BY OTHER DUTIES LED TO LNDG WITHOUT CONTACTING THE TWR.

Narrative: WHILE APCHING IND FOR LNDG, ATC HELD US AT A HIGHER THAN USUAL ALT. APCH CTL SET US UP ON A 4 MI BASE LEG TO AN 11 MI FINAL. APCH TOLD US TO DSND TO 3100 FT, AND CLRED US FOR THE ILS TO RWY 5R. FINALLY, THEY TOLD US TO CONTACT TWR AT THE OM. I WAS THE PF. BECAUSE OF OUR HIGHER THAN USUAL ALT, I WAS CONCENTRATING ON THE DSCNT IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A STABILIZED APCH. THE CAPT WAS HANDLING THE RADIO. AFTER THE LNDG, WE CLRED THE RWY, I WENT TO CHANGE RADIO FREQS AND NOTICED WE WERE STILL ON APCH CTL FREQ. APCH CTL CLRED US FOR THE APCH AND TOLD US TO CONTACT THE TWR AT THE MARKER. DURING THE SEVERAL MINS WHICH ELAPSED BTWN THE CLRNC AND THE PASSING OF THE MARKER, WE WERE BUSY WITH CHKLISTS. APPARENTLY THE PASSING OF THE MARKER WENT UNNOTICED. ALSO, DURING THE LNDG CHKLIST, THE CAPT RESPONDED TO THE CHALLENGE 'LNDG CLRNC' AS 'CLRED TO LAND.' SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 322220: THE CTLR CLRED US TO 'MAINTAIN 3100 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED ON THE LOC, CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 5R, CONTACT TWR AT BRINN (OM).' BECAUSE THE FO WAS FLYING THE ACFT, I ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC AND DIALED IN THE TWR FREQ (DUAL HEAD RADIO) IN ANTICIPATION OF SWITCHING AT BRINN. BRINN CAME AND WENT BUT THE SWITCH TO TWR DIDN'T HAPPEN. SEVERAL THINGS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS LAPSE OF ATTN BUT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THIS WAS PRIMARILY A FAILURE ON MY PART TO KEEP TRACK. HOWEVER, FOR WHAT IT'S WORTH: CONDITIONS WERE CAVU (WE HAD HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT FOR SOME TIME) AND THERE WAS ALMOST NO OTHER TFC AROUND. EVEN THOUGH WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR AN ILS WE WERE FLYING A VISUAL APCH ON THE ILS. BECAUSE WE WERE VISUAL THE FO WAS FLYING A LITTLE FASTER THAN WE ORDINARILY WOULD HAVE BEEN AND I WAS DISTRACTED BY THIS. WORKING PRIMARILY AT NIGHT IT IS COMMON TO GET THE LNDG CLRNC FROM APCH CTL AND OFTEN AT THE SAME TIME AS THE APCH CLRNC. THE COMBINATION OF THIS AND PHYSICALLY DIALING IN THE TWR FREQ MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO ME SUBCONSCIOUSLY BELIEVING THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO LAND (BY APCH CTL). THE SO IS NEW (3 MONTHS ON THE LINE) AND STILL FINDING HIS WAY AROUND HIS RESPONSIBILITIES, ESPECIALLY AS THEY PERTAIN TO BACKING UP THE 'FRONT END.' IN RETROSPECT, I BELIEVE THAT ALL 3 OF US WERE LULLED INTO A TOO RELAXED ATTITUDE BY THE OVERALL FLT CONDITIONS WHICH CAUSED US TO LOSE TRACK OF OUR REQUIREMENT TO CONTACT THE TWR AT THE OM. COMPLACENCY REARED ITS UGLY HEAD AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.