Narrative:

Flight was normal from preflight to approach at phl. Our scheduled flight was from iad-phl. At gear extension on final at phl, our main gear came down but our nose gear indicated unsafe. We accomplished the emergency checklist while holding over modena VOR. Using the alternate method of gear extension, the nose gear still would not come down. We wanted to return to dulles for the following reasons: we had to burn off 1200 pounds of gas, we wanted to talk face- to-face with our own maintenance personnel and manufacturer representatives. We wanted to return to a familiar airport with familiar controllers and familiar environment, we felt it easier to accomplish checklists, think, make decisions, prepare passenger, talk with company, ATC and crew coordinate while going in a straight line as opposed to having to concentrate on adhering to a holding pattern. We were unable to talk with anyone on commerical radio. We tried 2 frequencys and no one answered even though we could hear conversations with other airlines. Through phl air carrier operations, we got word that our dispatch wanted us to return to dulles. I discussed briefly with my first officer what the FAA would think about our returning to iad as opposed to landing at phl (the nearest suitable airfield). And in fact, the FAA did question if we had the reserve power with the gear down and if we lost an engine. We proved through our second segment climb chart that we could fly up to 9500 ft with gear down, single engine. It is a shame that we have to work in an environment where we have to question our actions based on what the FAA will think versus concentrating 100 percent on our emergency and passenger safety. While returning to iad, we were able to reach our maintenance through VHF radio. The recommended apply positive and negative G's, yawing and rolling the aircraft. We did so after informing the passenger, to no avail. We did a low pass at iad and tower confirmed the nose gear was not down. We continued to burn down fuel. In the meantime we reviewed the emergency and normal checklists, talked with maintenance and operations personnel and prepared the passenger for an emergency crash landing and emergency evacuate/evacuation on the runway. The first officer landed the aircraft with a little less than 400 pounds of fuel on runway 30 at dulles. My first officer then proceeded to the cabin to open the right overwing emergency exit and assist our 5 passenger off the back of the right wing. I continued to shut the aircraft down and made a final check of the cabin for passenger before exiting. All 5 passenger and 2 crew members exited safely and no injuries were reported at that time. Supplemental information from acn 322913: the company didn't have the gear down single engine drift down chart even though the company has authorized gear down ferry flts. We felt comfortable returning to dulles (iad) due to the fact we were only using 40 percent torque at 160 KIAS. In retrospect we should have brought the gear up at phl and proceeded back to iad before trying to pump the gear down. Once the gear is put in emergency it cannot be brought back up.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LNDG WITH THE NOSE GEAR STUCK IN THE UP POS.

Narrative: FLT WAS NORMAL FROM PREFLT TO APCH AT PHL. OUR SCHEDULED FLT WAS FROM IAD-PHL. AT GEAR EXTENSION ON FINAL AT PHL, OUR MAIN GEAR CAME DOWN BUT OUR NOSE GEAR INDICATED UNSAFE. WE ACCOMPLISHED THE EMER CHKLIST WHILE HOLDING OVER MODENA VOR. USING THE ALTERNATE METHOD OF GEAR EXTENSION, THE NOSE GEAR STILL WOULD NOT COME DOWN. WE WANTED TO RETURN TO DULLES FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: WE HAD TO BURN OFF 1200 LBS OF GAS, WE WANTED TO TALK FACE- TO-FACE WITH OUR OWN MAINT PERSONNEL AND MANUFACTURER REPRESENTATIVES. WE WANTED TO RETURN TO A FAMILIAR ARPT WITH FAMILIAR CTLRS AND FAMILIAR ENVIRONMENT, WE FELT IT EASIER TO ACCOMPLISH CHKLISTS, THINK, MAKE DECISIONS, PREPARE PAX, TALK WITH COMPANY, ATC AND CREW COORDINATE WHILE GOING IN A STRAIGHT LINE AS OPPOSED TO HAVING TO CONCENTRATE ON ADHERING TO A HOLDING PATTERN. WE WERE UNABLE TO TALK WITH ANYONE ON COMMERICAL RADIO. WE TRIED 2 FREQS AND NO ONE ANSWERED EVEN THOUGH WE COULD HEAR CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHER AIRLINES. THROUGH PHL ACR OPS, WE GOT WORD THAT OUR DISPATCH WANTED US TO RETURN TO DULLES. I DISCUSSED BRIEFLY WITH MY FO WHAT THE FAA WOULD THINK ABOUT OUR RETURNING TO IAD AS OPPOSED TO LNDG AT PHL (THE NEAREST SUITABLE AIRFIELD). AND IN FACT, THE FAA DID QUESTION IF WE HAD THE RESERVE PWR WITH THE GEAR DOWN AND IF WE LOST AN ENG. WE PROVED THROUGH OUR SECOND SEGMENT CLB CHART THAT WE COULD FLY UP TO 9500 FT WITH GEAR DOWN, SINGLE ENG. IT IS A SHAME THAT WE HAVE TO WORK IN AN ENVIRONMENT WHERE WE HAVE TO QUESTION OUR ACTIONS BASED ON WHAT THE FAA WILL THINK VERSUS CONCENTRATING 100 PERCENT ON OUR EMER AND PAX SAFETY. WHILE RETURNING TO IAD, WE WERE ABLE TO REACH OUR MAINT THROUGH VHF RADIO. THE RECOMMENDED APPLY POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE G'S, YAWING AND ROLLING THE ACFT. WE DID SO AFTER INFORMING THE PAX, TO NO AVAIL. WE DID A LOW PASS AT IAD AND TWR CONFIRMED THE NOSE GEAR WAS NOT DOWN. WE CONTINUED TO BURN DOWN FUEL. IN THE MEANTIME WE REVIEWED THE EMER AND NORMAL CHKLISTS, TALKED WITH MAINT AND OPS PERSONNEL AND PREPARED THE PAX FOR AN EMER CRASH LNDG AND EMER EVAC ON THE RWY. THE FO LANDED THE ACFT WITH A LITTLE LESS THAN 400 LBS OF FUEL ON RWY 30 AT DULLES. MY FO THEN PROCEEDED TO THE CABIN TO OPEN THE R OVERWING EMER EXIT AND ASSIST OUR 5 PAX OFF THE BACK OF THE R WING. I CONTINUED TO SHUT THE ACFT DOWN AND MADE A FINAL CHK OF THE CABIN FOR PAX BEFORE EXITING. ALL 5 PAX AND 2 CREW MEMBERS EXITED SAFELY AND NO INJURIES WERE RPTED AT THAT TIME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 322913: THE COMPANY DIDN'T HAVE THE GEAR DOWN SINGLE ENG DRIFT DOWN CHART EVEN THOUGH THE COMPANY HAS AUTHORIZED GEAR DOWN FERRY FLTS. WE FELT COMFORTABLE RETURNING TO DULLES (IAD) DUE TO THE FACT WE WERE ONLY USING 40 PERCENT TORQUE AT 160 KIAS. IN RETROSPECT WE SHOULD HAVE BROUGHT THE GEAR UP AT PHL AND PROCEEDED BACK TO IAD BEFORE TRYING TO PUMP THE GEAR DOWN. ONCE THE GEAR IS PUT IN EMER IT CANNOT BE BROUGHT BACK UP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.