Narrative:

Landed on runway 28R and exited on the high speed, crossed runway 28L and was cleared to the gate. Captain proceeded to lead in line and stopped (no lighting system displayed). First officer contacted the ramp and was told either guideman or lighting system (lights may be inoperative), then lights were turned 'on' and then 'off' and back 'on' again. I cannot be certain of the lighting sequence scenario at that time but I am positive that the alignment guidance portion of the system was 'on' during the entire approach to the gate, proceeded to the gate at a slow speed. When we neared the gate, I looked to the right to check wingtip clearance with a B747. I then heard a sound that was thought to be going over a chock or a seam in the ramp. The captain stopped the aircraft and as he did so I turned to the lighting system and saw the red lights and also at the same instant, a mechanic with wands giving us the stop signal. At that time the brakes were already set, shut down engines #2 and #3. Waited for the mechanic for 2-3 mins and when he came on the interphone, we were cleared to shut down #1 and #4, did so and accomplished the checklist. The human factors involved were: a 5 day identify, sfo-hkg-sfo where we got onto hkg local time and then had a XP05 departure. I had been up from about XA00 local had a workout, tried to get a nap, but wasn't successful, and had managed to get a cold. I was PNF and during the first segment (before break) I was as tired as I can remember. The main thing referencing human factors I think was that it happened at our most vulnerable time at the end, with fatigue for all four of us. When the ramp was called, there was a question as to whether or not the lights or a guideman would be available, then the lights were turned 'on' then 'off' then 'on' again and left on with the guidance alignment portion lighted (for sure on) during the entire approach to the gate. The big question was were there ever the green and yellow lights working, as we proceeded to the gate. As per the attached, I cannot be certain of the lighting sequence during approach to the gate. All I know for sure was that after the captain applied the brakes, I saw the red light. We (the 4 crew) all agreed during the debrief that the incident would not have occurred if the lights would have been left 'off,' and that the guidance portion should not have been 'on' if the system was determined to be inoperative.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR B747-400 STRIKES THE JETWAY WHILE LINING UP ON A FAULTY LIGHT GUIDANCE SYS AT THE GATE DURING TAXI-IN.

Narrative: LANDED ON RWY 28R AND EXITED ON THE HIGH SPD, CROSSED RWY 28L AND WAS CLRED TO THE GATE. CAPT PROCEEDED TO LEAD IN LINE AND STOPPED (NO LIGHTING SYS DISPLAYED). FO CONTACTED THE RAMP AND WAS TOLD EITHER GUIDEMAN OR LIGHTING SYS (LIGHTS MAY BE INOP), THEN LIGHTS WERE TURNED 'ON' AND THEN 'OFF' AND BACK 'ON' AGAIN. I CANNOT BE CERTAIN OF THE LIGHTING SEQUENCE SCENARIO AT THAT TIME BUT I AM POSITIVE THAT THE ALIGNMENT GUIDANCE PORTION OF THE SYS WAS 'ON' DURING THE ENTIRE APCH TO THE GATE, PROCEEDED TO THE GATE AT A SLOW SPD. WHEN WE NEARED THE GATE, I LOOKED TO THE R TO CHK WINGTIP CLRNC WITH A B747. I THEN HEARD A SOUND THAT WAS THOUGHT TO BE GOING OVER A CHOCK OR A SEAM IN THE RAMP. THE CAPT STOPPED THE ACFT AND AS HE DID SO I TURNED TO THE LIGHTING SYS AND SAW THE RED LIGHTS AND ALSO AT THE SAME INSTANT, A MECH WITH WANDS GIVING US THE STOP SIGNAL. AT THAT TIME THE BRAKES WERE ALREADY SET, SHUT DOWN ENGS #2 AND #3. WAITED FOR THE MECH FOR 2-3 MINS AND WHEN HE CAME ON THE INTERPHONE, WE WERE CLRED TO SHUT DOWN #1 AND #4, DID SO AND ACCOMPLISHED THE CHKLIST. THE HUMAN FACTORS INVOLVED WERE: A 5 DAY IDENT, SFO-HKG-SFO WHERE WE GOT ONTO HKG LCL TIME AND THEN HAD A XP05 DEP. I HAD BEEN UP FROM ABOUT XA00 LCL HAD A WORKOUT, TRIED TO GET A NAP, BUT WASN'T SUCCESSFUL, AND HAD MANAGED TO GET A COLD. I WAS PNF AND DURING THE FIRST SEGMENT (BEFORE BREAK) I WAS AS TIRED AS I CAN REMEMBER. THE MAIN THING REFING HUMAN FACTORS I THINK WAS THAT IT HAPPENED AT OUR MOST VULNERABLE TIME AT THE END, WITH FATIGUE FOR ALL FOUR OF US. WHEN THE RAMP WAS CALLED, THERE WAS A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE LIGHTS OR A GUIDEMAN WOULD BE AVAILABLE, THEN THE LIGHTS WERE TURNED 'ON' THEN 'OFF' THEN 'ON' AGAIN AND LEFT ON WITH THE GUIDANCE ALIGNMENT PORTION LIGHTED (FOR SURE ON) DURING THE ENTIRE APCH TO THE GATE. THE BIG QUESTION WAS WERE THERE EVER THE GREEN AND YELLOW LIGHTS WORKING, AS WE PROCEEDED TO THE GATE. AS PER THE ATTACHED, I CANNOT BE CERTAIN OF THE LIGHTING SEQUENCE DURING APCH TO THE GATE. ALL I KNOW FOR SURE WAS THAT AFTER THE CAPT APPLIED THE BRAKES, I SAW THE RED LIGHT. WE (THE 4 CREW) ALL AGREED DURING THE DEBRIEF THAT THE INCIDENT WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED IF THE LIGHTS WOULD HAVE BEEN LEFT 'OFF,' AND THAT THE GUIDANCE PORTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 'ON' IF THE SYS WAS DETERMINED TO BE INOP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.