Narrative:

Having received training on previous flts from the chief pilot/check airman of a part 135 cargo operation, I was scheduled for an initial qualification instrument check in one of company's ct-210's on the day of the incident. I had assumed that as I was receiving the check that I would be acting as the PIC. Subsequent actions on the part of the check airman, however, made it clear this was not the way it was. After a short prebrief on how the check was to be conducted, the check airman asked me to complete the preflight check on the aircraft assigned for the chkride. I found the following discrepancies on the preflight. At least 1 of the fuel gauges (of 2) appeared to be inoperative (off scale low) and the reading on the other was suspect as it indicated more fuel in the tank than would have been present after the aircraft had flown the morning's out and back cargo run. Additionally, using a short stepladder I could not see any fuel in either tank, though from the angle I was viewing, and with the bright glare of the sun reflecting off the white surface of the wing, the tanks still could have been 1/3 - 1/2 full without me seeing the fuel through the narrow fill opening. As the company has a written policy that all its 210's will be full to the top for every flight leaving the base airport (abq) (to offset the fact that many of their 210 fuel gauges have proved unreliable) I went back to the office to order a fuel truck to top both tanks. I was stopped by the chief pilot/check airman who told me that as the aircraft had only flown a 2 hour out and back that morning it had enough fuel remaining (approximately 3 hours remaining) to fly a 1 hour check ride. I questioned this decision by saying the fuel gauges appeared unreliable and that I could see no fuel in either tank filler neck. We then left the chief pilot's office to find the company pilot who had flown the aircraft previously that morning. The chief pilot's intent was to confirm that the aircraft had in fact been topped that morning and had only flown the 2 hours scheduled. With that confirmation, which the other company pilot provided, the check airman was confident that the aircraft contained 3 hours of fuel, in spite of the fact that this could not be confirmed by the gauges or by a visual check of the tanks' fuel levels. The check ride continued with a takeoff, and (from abq) departure to the local practice area, outside the abq class C and northwest of aeg where I performed (under the hood) steep turns in both directions, a stall recovery or 2 and some unusual altitude recoveries. We were operating on what we thought to be the fullest tank (gauge indicating approximately 200 pounds). About 15 seconds after the unusual altitude recovery and a turn toward aeg to accomplish practice approachs, the engine suddenly lost power. The check airman took the aircraft immediately, relegating me to working the radios and operating the boost pumps as he flew the aircraft and attempted to get a restart (he manipulated throttle, mixture, fuel selector, while I checked magnetos and operated boost pump switches as he called for them). Restart attempts were unsuccessful so we landed at aeg on runway 4. Subsequent examination of the tanks revealed the tank we were using had only a little fuel remaining (not enough to keep from 'unporting' during the unusual altitudes) while the other tank had somewhat more. Exact quantities never determined or at least not revealed to me. I suspect the aircraft had flown a previous day's sortie since the tanks were last filled. This would have left only about an hour's fuel on board. I certainly won't take anyone's word again (even another pilot's) about when he filled the tanks, or let a check airman lead me into a situation which makes me uncomfortable.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR AND CHK CAPT RAN OUT OF FUEL AND WERE UNABLE TO RESTART THE ENG. AN ENG INOP FORCED LNDG MADE AT AEG ARPT.

Narrative: HAVING RECEIVED TRAINING ON PREVIOUS FLTS FROM THE CHIEF PLT/CHK AIRMAN OF A PART 135 CARGO OP, I WAS SCHEDULED FOR AN INITIAL QUALIFICATION INST CHK IN ONE OF COMPANY'S CT-210'S ON THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT. I HAD ASSUMED THAT AS I WAS RECEIVING THE CHK THAT I WOULD BE ACTING AS THE PIC. SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE CHK AIRMAN, HOWEVER, MADE IT CLR THIS WAS NOT THE WAY IT WAS. AFTER A SHORT PREBRIEF ON HOW THE CHK WAS TO BE CONDUCTED, THE CHK AIRMAN ASKED ME TO COMPLETE THE PREFLT CHK ON THE ACFT ASSIGNED FOR THE CHKRIDE. I FOUND THE FOLLOWING DISCREPANCIES ON THE PREFLT. AT LEAST 1 OF THE FUEL GAUGES (OF 2) APPEARED TO BE INOP (OFF SCALE LOW) AND THE READING ON THE OTHER WAS SUSPECT AS IT INDICATED MORE FUEL IN THE TANK THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN PRESENT AFTER THE ACFT HAD FLOWN THE MORNING'S OUT AND BACK CARGO RUN. ADDITIONALLY, USING A SHORT STEPLADDER I COULD NOT SEE ANY FUEL IN EITHER TANK, THOUGH FROM THE ANGLE I WAS VIEWING, AND WITH THE BRIGHT GLARE OF THE SUN REFLECTING OFF THE WHITE SURFACE OF THE WING, THE TANKS STILL COULD HAVE BEEN 1/3 - 1/2 FULL WITHOUT ME SEEING THE FUEL THROUGH THE NARROW FILL OPENING. AS THE COMPANY HAS A WRITTEN POLICY THAT ALL ITS 210'S WILL BE FULL TO THE TOP FOR EVERY FLT LEAVING THE BASE ARPT (ABQ) (TO OFFSET THE FACT THAT MANY OF THEIR 210 FUEL GAUGES HAVE PROVED UNRELIABLE) I WENT BACK TO THE OFFICE TO ORDER A FUEL TRUCK TO TOP BOTH TANKS. I WAS STOPPED BY THE CHIEF PLT/CHK AIRMAN WHO TOLD ME THAT AS THE ACFT HAD ONLY FLOWN A 2 HR OUT AND BACK THAT MORNING IT HAD ENOUGH FUEL REMAINING (APPROX 3 HRS REMAINING) TO FLY A 1 HR CHK RIDE. I QUESTIONED THIS DECISION BY SAYING THE FUEL GAUGES APPEARED UNRELIABLE AND THAT I COULD SEE NO FUEL IN EITHER TANK FILLER NECK. WE THEN LEFT THE CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE TO FIND THE COMPANY PLT WHO HAD FLOWN THE ACFT PREVIOUSLY THAT MORNING. THE CHIEF PLT'S INTENT WAS TO CONFIRM THAT THE ACFT HAD IN FACT BEEN TOPPED THAT MORNING AND HAD ONLY FLOWN THE 2 HRS SCHEDULED. WITH THAT CONFIRMATION, WHICH THE OTHER COMPANY PLT PROVIDED, THE CHK AIRMAN WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE ACFT CONTAINED 3 HRS OF FUEL, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THIS COULD NOT BE CONFIRMED BY THE GAUGES OR BY A VISUAL CHK OF THE TANKS' FUEL LEVELS. THE CHK RIDE CONTINUED WITH A TKOF, AND (FROM ABQ) DEP TO THE LCL PRACTICE AREA, OUTSIDE THE ABQ CLASS C AND NW OF AEG WHERE I PERFORMED (UNDER THE HOOD) STEEP TURNS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS, A STALL RECOVERY OR 2 AND SOME UNUSUAL ALT RECOVERIES. WE WERE OPERATING ON WHAT WE THOUGHT TO BE THE FULLEST TANK (GAUGE INDICATING APPROX 200 LBS). ABOUT 15 SECONDS AFTER THE UNUSUAL ALT RECOVERY AND A TURN TOWARD AEG TO ACCOMPLISH PRACTICE APCHS, THE ENG SUDDENLY LOST PWR. THE CHK AIRMAN TOOK THE ACFT IMMEDIATELY, RELEGATING ME TO WORKING THE RADIOS AND OPERATING THE BOOST PUMPS AS HE FLEW THE ACFT AND ATTEMPTED TO GET A RESTART (HE MANIPULATED THROTTLE, MIXTURE, FUEL SELECTOR, WHILE I CHKED MAGNETOS AND OPERATED BOOST PUMP SWITCHES AS HE CALLED FOR THEM). RESTART ATTEMPTS WERE UNSUCCESSFUL SO WE LANDED AT AEG ON RWY 4. SUBSEQUENT EXAMINATION OF THE TANKS REVEALED THE TANK WE WERE USING HAD ONLY A LITTLE FUEL REMAINING (NOT ENOUGH TO KEEP FROM 'UNPORTING' DURING THE UNUSUAL ALTS) WHILE THE OTHER TANK HAD SOMEWHAT MORE. EXACT QUANTITIES NEVER DETERMINED OR AT LEAST NOT REVEALED TO ME. I SUSPECT THE ACFT HAD FLOWN A PREVIOUS DAY'S SORTIE SINCE THE TANKS WERE LAST FILLED. THIS WOULD HAVE LEFT ONLY ABOUT AN HR'S FUEL ON BOARD. I CERTAINLY WON'T TAKE ANYONE'S WORD AGAIN (EVEN ANOTHER PLT'S) ABOUT WHEN HE FILLED THE TANKS, OR LET A CHK AIRMAN LEAD ME INTO A SIT WHICH MAKES ME UNCOMFORTABLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.