Narrative:

With 'company holds' and ATC delays, due to area WX, the flight was operating approximately 1 hour late. I obtained the load manifest from the captain. I noted that the manifest was for the previous day's flight and corrected it -- date, registration, index, basic operating weight, ramp takeoff weight, and runway landing weight. I then continued to complete the load manifest, inserting the fuel load -- 2800 pounds (which was on the gauges at the time) -- taxi and en route burns. Upon running the checklist, at the fuel quantity item, I asked if that was enough, while pointing at the gauges. The captain said no, and then looked at the release again and confirmed that we required 4049 pounds. During this exchange, a fuel truck was in place and had begun fueling. The passenger were already on board, and the cargo manifest was in hand. I completed the load manifest. The captain completed 'spinning' the numbers on the center of gravity calculator. After the fuel truck departed, we noted that we had the required fuel. We then continued with departure procedures -- taxi, takeoff, etc. En route we made small deviations for WX. Upon descent into the bpt area, the WX was moving onto the field. We requested holding. Concurrently, dispatch called us, asking us how many passenger we had on board. Several mins later, dispatch stated their concern that we might be above landing weight. After rechking the load manifest, the math was correct. It came to our attention that the extra fuel had not been added into the total weight. After recalculating, we determined that we could land with approximately 2300 pounds or less and be within landing limits. Dispatch concurred. Our fuel was below 2400 pounds, and we determined that after holding and an approach, that we'd land with approximately 2200 pounds. Dispatch again concurred. We waited for the WX to move off the airport, and then continued into bpt, landing with 2200 pounds of fuel, and below our maximum landing weight. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter was flying a saab 340A and the captain was late and the flight attendants were having a problem with passenger and luggage and the paperwork was incorrect. The reporter (first officer) was not aware that the fuel load had been changed. So he filled out the weight and balance form based on the aircraft fuel load at that time. The captain then came on board with new paperwork and with a different required fuel. The captain called for more fuel and the first officer completed the passenger portion of the weight and balance/load manifest, but did not catch the fuel difference since the gauge readings were the same since the fueler had not arrived. Once the fuel was on board and the doors were closed the flight departed. The flight crew did call in their on board fuel to operations to confirm that they had the minimums required, but nobody noted that they were going to be over the gross weight for landing (this was a short flight and the saab 340B which was also used by this carrier would have been legal at this weight). After the flight was en route the error was found. The company informed the FAA and after discussing the situation with all the parties involved the FAA did not issue any discipline. The company, however, put a letter of discipline in the pilot's files for a 1 yr probation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR SF340A DEPARTS AT A WT TOO HVY TO LAND AT DEST. THE FLC ERRED BY NOT ADDING THE NEW REQUIRED FUEL TO THE WT AND BAL. THE OPS PERSONNEL ERRED WHEN THEY SENT YESTERDAY'S PAPERWORK TO THE ACFT AND WHEN THEY DID NOT NOTE THE FLC'S ERROR WHILE CHKING THE CORRECTED WT AND BAL.

Narrative: WITH 'COMPANY HOLDS' AND ATC DELAYS, DUE TO AREA WX, THE FLT WAS OPERATING APPROX 1 HR LATE. I OBTAINED THE LOAD MANIFEST FROM THE CAPT. I NOTED THAT THE MANIFEST WAS FOR THE PREVIOUS DAY'S FLT AND CORRECTED IT -- DATE, REGISTRATION, INDEX, BASIC OPERATING WT, RAMP TKOF WT, AND RWY LNDG WT. I THEN CONTINUED TO COMPLETE THE LOAD MANIFEST, INSERTING THE FUEL LOAD -- 2800 LBS (WHICH WAS ON THE GAUGES AT THE TIME) -- TAXI AND ENRTE BURNS. UPON RUNNING THE CHKLIST, AT THE FUEL QUANTITY ITEM, I ASKED IF THAT WAS ENOUGH, WHILE POINTING AT THE GAUGES. THE CAPT SAID NO, AND THEN LOOKED AT THE RELEASE AGAIN AND CONFIRMED THAT WE REQUIRED 4049 LBS. DURING THIS EXCHANGE, A FUEL TRUCK WAS IN PLACE AND HAD BEGUN FUELING. THE PAX WERE ALREADY ON BOARD, AND THE CARGO MANIFEST WAS IN HAND. I COMPLETED THE LOAD MANIFEST. THE CAPT COMPLETED 'SPINNING' THE NUMBERS ON THE CTR OF GRAVITY CALCULATOR. AFTER THE FUEL TRUCK DEPARTED, WE NOTED THAT WE HAD THE REQUIRED FUEL. WE THEN CONTINUED WITH DEP PROCS -- TAXI, TKOF, ETC. ENRTE WE MADE SMALL DEVS FOR WX. UPON DSCNT INTO THE BPT AREA, THE WX WAS MOVING ONTO THE FIELD. WE REQUESTED HOLDING. CONCURRENTLY, DISPATCH CALLED US, ASKING US HOW MANY PAX WE HAD ON BOARD. SEVERAL MINS LATER, DISPATCH STATED THEIR CONCERN THAT WE MIGHT BE ABOVE LNDG WT. AFTER RECHKING THE LOAD MANIFEST, THE MATH WAS CORRECT. IT CAME TO OUR ATTN THAT THE EXTRA FUEL HAD NOT BEEN ADDED INTO THE TOTAL WT. AFTER RECALCULATING, WE DETERMINED THAT WE COULD LAND WITH APPROX 2300 LBS OR LESS AND BE WITHIN LNDG LIMITS. DISPATCH CONCURRED. OUR FUEL WAS BELOW 2400 LBS, AND WE DETERMINED THAT AFTER HOLDING AND AN APCH, THAT WE'D LAND WITH APPROX 2200 LBS. DISPATCH AGAIN CONCURRED. WE WAITED FOR THE WX TO MOVE OFF THE ARPT, AND THEN CONTINUED INTO BPT, LNDG WITH 2200 LBS OF FUEL, AND BELOW OUR MAX LNDG WT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR WAS FLYING A SAAB 340A AND THE CAPT WAS LATE AND THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE HAVING A PROB WITH PAX AND LUGGAGE AND THE PAPERWORK WAS INCORRECT. THE RPTR (FO) WAS NOT AWARE THAT THE FUEL LOAD HAD BEEN CHANGED. SO HE FILLED OUT THE WT AND BAL FORM BASED ON THE ACFT FUEL LOAD AT THAT TIME. THE CAPT THEN CAME ON BOARD WITH NEW PAPERWORK AND WITH A DIFFERENT REQUIRED FUEL. THE CAPT CALLED FOR MORE FUEL AND THE FO COMPLETED THE PAX PORTION OF THE WT AND BAL/LOAD MANIFEST, BUT DID NOT CATCH THE FUEL DIFFERENCE SINCE THE GAUGE READINGS WERE THE SAME SINCE THE FUELER HAD NOT ARRIVED. ONCE THE FUEL WAS ON BOARD AND THE DOORS WERE CLOSED THE FLT DEPARTED. THE FLC DID CALL IN THEIR ON BOARD FUEL TO OPS TO CONFIRM THAT THEY HAD THE MINIMUMS REQUIRED, BUT NOBODY NOTED THAT THEY WERE GOING TO BE OVER THE GROSS WT FOR LNDG (THIS WAS A SHORT FLT AND THE SAAB 340B WHICH WAS ALSO USED BY THIS CARRIER WOULD HAVE BEEN LEGAL AT THIS WT). AFTER THE FLT WAS ENRTE THE ERROR WAS FOUND. THE COMPANY INFORMED THE FAA AND AFTER DISCUSSING THE SIT WITH ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED THE FAA DID NOT ISSUE ANY DISCIPLINE. THE COMPANY, HOWEVER, PUT A LETTER OF DISCIPLINE IN THE PLT'S FILES FOR A 1 YR PROBATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.