Narrative:

Approach to stl airport ILS runway 30L. DC9-30. WX: RVR 3000 ft, snow, blowing snow, fog, temperature 32 degrees, wind 360 degrees at 19 KTS, runway 30L reported plowed, sanded, deiced. Normal touchdown on centerline. Engines put into reverse but did not work. Noticed absence of engine noise for reverse. Then had total electrical failure and noted difficulty in directional control. In latter part of rollout the aircraft started to wxvane to the right. Then realized that both engines were not running. They had apparently ingested snow from the runway. The aircraft stopped on the runway, turned approximately 70 degrees from runway heading. Emergency equipment was called and verified no apparent damage to aircraft. Aircraft was towed to gate. Recommend more timely information to crew as to depth of snow or slush on runway. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated when he was towed into the gate the chief pilot met them and asked if everything was ok. The chief pilot said that the company was already in the process of turning airplanes away from the airport when he landed. The company limit was 1 inch of slush on the runway and there was more than that. The airplane did get some reverse before flaming out. A company pilot sitting at the end of the runway when he landed said the whole airplane disappeared in the flying snow and slush just after the nosewheel touched down. The reporter said he didn't realize right away the engines had quit. He heard relays clicking, the attitude indicator spilled immediately, he had no reverse, no rudder, no nosewheel steering, brakes only on the accumulator. The pilots were essentially passenger as the airplane slid 5000 ft in the slush and wxvaned into the wind. He doesn't believe the company changed any policies. His procedure now is to be more attentive to runway conditions. He was thinking about the low RVR, and when he broke out he was relieved and at that point thought the ordeal was over. From now on he will use ignition override (high energy ignition) and have the APU going. This is a case where the tower and the company knew the slush existed but the information was not relayed to the pilots of the landing aircraft. He said he had fuel and would have gone elsewhere if he had known. Who knows what would have happened if 1 engine had not flamed out and the reverse would have been asymmetrical. Supplemental information from acn 323960: ILS approach runway 30L stl. ATIS reported runway 'plowed, sanded, deiced' with RVR of 2800-3000 ft and crosswind component of approximately 15 KTS, gusting to 25 KTS. Normal approach, roundout and touchdown. Thrust reversers applied as nosewheel touched down. Amber 'reverser unlocked' lights illuminated. Waited for engine spool-up noise and blue reverser lights -- got none. Total electrical failure followed. Aircraft slowed down at a fairly normal rate and remained on centerline until the latter part of rollout. As rudder effectiveness decreased when airspeed decreased, the aircraft began to wxvane into the crosswind from the right, even with full opposite rudder, nosewheel steering and left brake pedal applied. Aircraft came to rest with nose pointed approximately 70 degrees to right of runway heading on the runway surface, with main gear on or slightly right of runway centerline. Ignition system B in use during approach and landing. Aircraft towed to gate after damage check was negative. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated they held for 25 mins while runway 30L was being plowed and deiced and sanded. Runway 30R was closed due to snow. On landing, the WX was reported as moderate snow. Earlier while they were holding the WX reported heavy snow. The reporter did not see how deep the snow was on the runway but snow was about 2 inches deep on the ramp. The depth of the snow, whatever it was, seemed to help the airplane stop, and on the runway there was little, if any, differential braking due to lack of traction. Nosewheel steering had no power as there was no electric or engine driven hydraulic pumps when the engines quit. There is a company policy of using ignition override on takeoffs in heavy rain but not for landing on snow covered runways. There is no policy for starting the APU as a back-up for electrical, which among other things would power the electrical hydraulic pumps. He said he does start the APU and does go to ignition override now when there is WX or contaminated runways as part of his approach preparation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BOTH ENGS FLAME OUT ON LNDG DC9-30 ON SNOW COVERED RWY.

Narrative: APCH TO STL ARPT ILS RWY 30L. DC9-30. WX: RVR 3000 FT, SNOW, BLOWING SNOW, FOG, TEMP 32 DEGS, WIND 360 DEGS AT 19 KTS, RWY 30L RPTED PLOWED, SANDED, DEICED. NORMAL TOUCHDOWN ON CTRLINE. ENGS PUT INTO REVERSE BUT DID NOT WORK. NOTICED ABSENCE OF ENG NOISE FOR REVERSE. THEN HAD TOTAL ELECTRICAL FAILURE AND NOTED DIFFICULTY IN DIRECTIONAL CTL. IN LATTER PART OF ROLLOUT THE ACFT STARTED TO WXVANE TO THE R. THEN REALIZED THAT BOTH ENGS WERE NOT RUNNING. THEY HAD APPARENTLY INGESTED SNOW FROM THE RWY. THE ACFT STOPPED ON THE RWY, TURNED APPROX 70 DEGS FROM RWY HDG. EMER EQUIP WAS CALLED AND VERIFIED NO APPARENT DAMAGE TO ACFT. ACFT WAS TOWED TO GATE. RECOMMEND MORE TIMELY INFO TO CREW AS TO DEPTH OF SNOW OR SLUSH ON RWY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED WHEN HE WAS TOWED INTO THE GATE THE CHIEF PLT MET THEM AND ASKED IF EVERYTHING WAS OK. THE CHIEF PLT SAID THAT THE COMPANY WAS ALREADY IN THE PROCESS OF TURNING AIRPLANES AWAY FROM THE ARPT WHEN HE LANDED. THE COMPANY LIMIT WAS 1 INCH OF SLUSH ON THE RWY AND THERE WAS MORE THAN THAT. THE AIRPLANE DID GET SOME REVERSE BEFORE FLAMING OUT. A COMPANY PLT SITTING AT THE END OF THE RWY WHEN HE LANDED SAID THE WHOLE AIRPLANE DISAPPEARED IN THE FLYING SNOW AND SLUSH JUST AFTER THE NOSEWHEEL TOUCHED DOWN. THE RPTR SAID HE DIDN'T REALIZE RIGHT AWAY THE ENGS HAD QUIT. HE HEARD RELAYS CLICKING, THE ATTITUDE INDICATOR SPILLED IMMEDIATELY, HE HAD NO REVERSE, NO RUDDER, NO NOSEWHEEL STEERING, BRAKES ONLY ON THE ACCUMULATOR. THE PLTS WERE ESSENTIALLY PAX AS THE AIRPLANE SLID 5000 FT IN THE SLUSH AND WXVANED INTO THE WIND. HE DOESN'T BELIEVE THE COMPANY CHANGED ANY POLICIES. HIS PROC NOW IS TO BE MORE ATTENTIVE TO RWY CONDITIONS. HE WAS THINKING ABOUT THE LOW RVR, AND WHEN HE BROKE OUT HE WAS RELIEVED AND AT THAT POINT THOUGHT THE ORDEAL WAS OVER. FROM NOW ON HE WILL USE IGNITION OVERRIDE (HIGH ENERGY IGNITION) AND HAVE THE APU GOING. THIS IS A CASE WHERE THE TWR AND THE COMPANY KNEW THE SLUSH EXISTED BUT THE INFO WAS NOT RELAYED TO THE PLTS OF THE LNDG ACFT. HE SAID HE HAD FUEL AND WOULD HAVE GONE ELSEWHERE IF HE HAD KNOWN. WHO KNOWS WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED IF 1 ENG HAD NOT FLAMED OUT AND THE REVERSE WOULD HAVE BEEN ASYMMETRICAL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 323960: ILS APCH RWY 30L STL. ATIS RPTED RWY 'PLOWED, SANDED, DEICED' WITH RVR OF 2800-3000 FT AND XWIND COMPONENT OF APPROX 15 KTS, GUSTING TO 25 KTS. NORMAL APCH, ROUNDOUT AND TOUCHDOWN. THRUST REVERSERS APPLIED AS NOSEWHEEL TOUCHED DOWN. AMBER 'REVERSER UNLOCKED' LIGHTS ILLUMINATED. WAITED FOR ENG SPOOL-UP NOISE AND BLUE REVERSER LIGHTS -- GOT NONE. TOTAL ELECTRICAL FAILURE FOLLOWED. ACFT SLOWED DOWN AT A FAIRLY NORMAL RATE AND REMAINED ON CTRLINE UNTIL THE LATTER PART OF ROLLOUT. AS RUDDER EFFECTIVENESS DECREASED WHEN AIRSPD DECREASED, THE ACFT BEGAN TO WXVANE INTO THE XWIND FROM THE R, EVEN WITH FULL OPPOSITE RUDDER, NOSEWHEEL STEERING AND L BRAKE PEDAL APPLIED. ACFT CAME TO REST WITH NOSE POINTED APPROX 70 DEGS TO R OF RWY HDG ON THE RWY SURFACE, WITH MAIN GEAR ON OR SLIGHTLY R OF RWY CTRLINE. IGNITION SYS B IN USE DURING APCH AND LNDG. ACFT TOWED TO GATE AFTER DAMAGE CHK WAS NEGATIVE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THEY HELD FOR 25 MINS WHILE RWY 30L WAS BEING PLOWED AND DEICED AND SANDED. RWY 30R WAS CLOSED DUE TO SNOW. ON LNDG, THE WX WAS RPTED AS MODERATE SNOW. EARLIER WHILE THEY WERE HOLDING THE WX RPTED HVY SNOW. THE RPTR DID NOT SEE HOW DEEP THE SNOW WAS ON THE RWY BUT SNOW WAS ABOUT 2 INCHES DEEP ON THE RAMP. THE DEPTH OF THE SNOW, WHATEVER IT WAS, SEEMED TO HELP THE AIRPLANE STOP, AND ON THE RWY THERE WAS LITTLE, IF ANY, DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING DUE TO LACK OF TRACTION. NOSEWHEEL STEERING HAD NO PWR AS THERE WAS NO ELECTRIC OR ENG DRIVEN HYD PUMPS WHEN THE ENGS QUIT. THERE IS A COMPANY POLICY OF USING IGNITION OVERRIDE ON TKOFS IN HVY RAIN BUT NOT FOR LNDG ON SNOW COVERED RWYS. THERE IS NO POLICY FOR STARTING THE APU AS A BACK-UP FOR ELECTRICAL, WHICH AMONG OTHER THINGS WOULD PWR THE ELECTRICAL HYD PUMPS. HE SAID HE DOES START THE APU AND DOES GO TO IGNITION OVERRIDE NOW WHEN THERE IS WX OR CONTAMINATED RWYS AS PART OF HIS APCH PREPARATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.