Narrative:

Primary VFR navigation was preset in the GPS at the airport of departure with fort pierce airport (fpr) as the destination. Ceiling in the departure area was about 1500 ft AGL with haze due to an inversion layer. Smoke was present through the north everglades from sugar cane fires restricting visibility. A light chop was present at the initial cruise altitude of 1300 ft MSL and below the lower cloud layer. Flight following was obtained from miami approach below the class B airspace with radar services terminated by ATC after transition. The flight proceeded north and about halfway to the destination 2 passenger started complaining about air sickness and a decision was made to climb above the cloud layer to smoother air. A VFR climb to 5500 ft MSL was made through an opening where several turns were needed for cloud separation. After the climb the RNAV system was programmed based on a radial and distance from the vrb VOR. The initial mistake was made when the pilot then tuned in the vero beach ATIS, and listened to the current information. A descent was made to 1500 ft, below the clouds and when about 20 mi out he tuned vero beach tower and after listening to the current traffic, reported in and requested landing instructions. The aircraft was idented and told to report a 2 mi base to runway 11L. After descending to 1000 ft the pilot continued to use the GPS for course information to fpr. The airport appeared in sight and the pilot continued in for what he assumed was a 2 mi base for runway 11L. Due to radio traffic, the pilot could not call until established on a 2 mi final when a call was made reporting final (to vero beach tower). The pilot did not feel comfortable at this time due to the apparent orientation of the runway of 90 degrees. The runway markers were then assumed to be an 11 although they appeared too wide and separated. The approach continued. A call was received from vero beach during the landing flare and the mistake then became clear. Although the pilot is responsible for the entire event, human factors contributing can be recognized by him in hindsight. The pilot was under a lot of business and family stress during the preceding week. The pilot flies IFR exclusively under all flight conditions with the flight ending with an IFR approach or vectors to a visual. Attention to the passenger when flying a complex aircraft in marginal VFR conditions in an unfamiliar area and in a congested environment left no time for xchking procedures. It is of particular interest and amazement to the pilot how once the mind was set to land on the airport, visual cues were made up to reinforce the wrong as right, such as assuming that the runway markings were an 11. After over 20 yrs of flying such an error is an eye opening experience. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter flew VFR in order to avoid the routing changes that could occur with operations near mia class B airspace. Having been accustomed to operating in the IFR environment, he was under the misconception that the vrb tower had him in radar contact, though. When the tower told him to report base he thought that they had him on radar. The reporter continued the approach believing that ATC was watching him. The runway touchdown zone markers were confused with the runway number 11 even though they were unusually far apart, and another aircraft seemed oddly close. The vrb tower called the reporter just as his aircraft (PA23) was touching down on runway 09 at fpr, asking his position. Reporter then realized that too many things didn't add up, too late.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE PLT OF A PA23 LANDED AT THE WRONG ARPT DURING LOW VISIBILITY CONDITIONS. THE PLT MISIDENTED AN ARPT THAT WAS LOCATED 11 MI S ALONG THE RTE AS HIS DEST.

Narrative: PRIMARY VFR NAV WAS PRESET IN THE GPS AT THE ARPT OF DEP WITH FORT PIERCE ARPT (FPR) AS THE DEST. CEILING IN THE DEP AREA WAS ABOUT 1500 FT AGL WITH HAZE DUE TO AN INVERSION LAYER. SMOKE WAS PRESENT THROUGH THE NORTH EVERGLADES FROM SUGAR CANE FIRES RESTRICTING VISIBILITY. A LIGHT CHOP WAS PRESENT AT THE INITIAL CRUISE ALT OF 1300 FT MSL AND BELOW THE LOWER CLOUD LAYER. FLT FOLLOWING WAS OBTAINED FROM MIAMI APCH BELOW THE CLASS B AIRSPACE WITH RADAR SVCS TERMINATED BY ATC AFTER TRANSITION. THE FLT PROCEEDED N AND ABOUT HALFWAY TO THE DEST 2 PAX STARTED COMPLAINING ABOUT AIR SICKNESS AND A DECISION WAS MADE TO CLB ABOVE THE CLOUD LAYER TO SMOOTHER AIR. A VFR CLB TO 5500 FT MSL WAS MADE THROUGH AN OPENING WHERE SEVERAL TURNS WERE NEEDED FOR CLOUD SEPARATION. AFTER THE CLB THE RNAV SYS WAS PROGRAMMED BASED ON A RADIAL AND DISTANCE FROM THE VRB VOR. THE INITIAL MISTAKE WAS MADE WHEN THE PLT THEN TUNED IN THE VERO BEACH ATIS, AND LISTENED TO THE CURRENT INFO. A DSCNT WAS MADE TO 1500 FT, BELOW THE CLOUDS AND WHEN ABOUT 20 MI OUT HE TUNED VERO BEACH TWR AND AFTER LISTENING TO THE CURRENT TFC, RPTED IN AND REQUESTED LNDG INSTRUCTIONS. THE ACFT WAS IDENTED AND TOLD TO RPT A 2 MI BASE TO RWY 11L. AFTER DSNDING TO 1000 FT THE PLT CONTINUED TO USE THE GPS FOR COURSE INFO TO FPR. THE ARPT APPEARED IN SIGHT AND THE PLT CONTINUED IN FOR WHAT HE ASSUMED WAS A 2 MI BASE FOR RWY 11L. DUE TO RADIO TFC, THE PLT COULD NOT CALL UNTIL ESTABLISHED ON A 2 MI FINAL WHEN A CALL WAS MADE RPTING FINAL (TO VERO BEACH TWR). THE PLT DID NOT FEEL COMFORTABLE AT THIS TIME DUE TO THE APPARENT ORIENTATION OF THE RWY OF 90 DEGS. THE RWY MARKERS WERE THEN ASSUMED TO BE AN 11 ALTHOUGH THEY APPEARED TOO WIDE AND SEPARATED. THE APCH CONTINUED. A CALL WAS RECEIVED FROM VERO BEACH DURING THE LNDG FLARE AND THE MISTAKE THEN BECAME CLR. ALTHOUGH THE PLT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ENTIRE EVENT, HUMAN FACTORS CONTRIBUTING CAN BE RECOGNIZED BY HIM IN HINDSIGHT. THE PLT WAS UNDER A LOT OF BUSINESS AND FAMILY STRESS DURING THE PRECEDING WEEK. THE PLT FLIES IFR EXCLUSIVELY UNDER ALL FLT CONDITIONS WITH THE FLT ENDING WITH AN IFR APCH OR VECTORS TO A VISUAL. ATTN TO THE PAX WHEN FLYING A COMPLEX ACFT IN MARGINAL VFR CONDITIONS IN AN UNFAMILIAR AREA AND IN A CONGESTED ENVIRONMENT LEFT NO TIME FOR XCHKING PROCS. IT IS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST AND AMAZEMENT TO THE PLT HOW ONCE THE MIND WAS SET TO LAND ON THE ARPT, VISUAL CUES WERE MADE UP TO REINFORCE THE WRONG AS RIGHT, SUCH AS ASSUMING THAT THE RWY MARKINGS WERE AN 11. AFTER OVER 20 YRS OF FLYING SUCH AN ERROR IS AN EYE OPENING EXPERIENCE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR FLEW VFR IN ORDER TO AVOID THE ROUTING CHANGES THAT COULD OCCUR WITH OPS NEAR MIA CLASS B AIRSPACE. HAVING BEEN ACCUSTOMED TO OPERATING IN THE IFR ENVIRONMENT, HE WAS UNDER THE MISCONCEPTION THAT THE VRB TWR HAD HIM IN RADAR CONTACT, THOUGH. WHEN THE TWR TOLD HIM TO RPT BASE HE THOUGHT THAT THEY HAD HIM ON RADAR. THE RPTR CONTINUED THE APCH BELIEVING THAT ATC WAS WATCHING HIM. THE RWY TOUCHDOWN ZONE MARKERS WERE CONFUSED WITH THE RWY NUMBER 11 EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE UNUSUALLY FAR APART, AND ANOTHER ACFT SEEMED ODDLY CLOSE. THE VRB TWR CALLED THE RPTR JUST AS HIS ACFT (PA23) WAS TOUCHING DOWN ON RWY 09 AT FPR, ASKING HIS POS. RPTR THEN REALIZED THAT TOO MANY THINGS DIDN'T ADD UP, TOO LATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.