Narrative:

I, the sic, and the PIC were in watertown (art), ny, with a king air 100. In preparation for flight, the aircraft was topped off and in the hangar at the FBO. I loaded the cooler, etc, as the PIC called FSS. The PIC asked the FBO owner to check with the plows because the airport was closed with a 10 min prior permission required (ppr). I stood in the lobby while the FBO owner called up the plows on the radio. When he called them up he said, 'we have a king air here that will be departing in 10-15 mins.' they replied back that they would not plow the runways. There was 2 inches that they would leave in case of freezing rain, but it wouldn't be a problem. The owner said again we would be leaving in 10 mins. The response was, we'll be watching and be clear of the runways. We had been at the FBO since morning and the plows had been busy. Snow was falling most of the day. I had heard a few times that they would leave 2 inches on the runways. No other aircraft had been around. As we settled the bill, the plows were out clearing the ramp and taxiway. The PIC and I headed out and boarded the aircraft in the hangar. There were light flurries. Visibility was good -- there was no problem seeing across the field. It was overcast. The FBO owner and a line person pulled the aircraft out onto the plowed taxiway and away from the hangar. The PIC got the ok to start, meaning the hangar door was down. We went through regular starting procedures. With the engines started, I called on #1 radio, 123.0 'watertown, king air is taxiing to runway 10,' and we began to taxi. I then called on #2 radio to get the clearance, monitoring both radios. I had to repeat the request and then the destination one more time. Meanwhile, PIC was taxiing out on taxiway B. (He had pulled out the approach plates and reviewed them and he said we will take off on the longest runway. I said they are just about the same. He said we will use runway 10.) as I was on the radio I looked outside watching the ground and noting our braking and turning abilities. It seemed ok. It was hard to see how deep the taxiway was because there were no tracks. Clearance called back with our clearance and void times. I read it back and said we are departing now. The PIC had back taxied on runway 10. It is approximately 1500 ft from taxiway B to the beginning of the runway. I am unsure of what radio calls were made back to unicom. I believe one of us said we were back taxiing. Then the line person said have a good flight and another comment. In the PIC's brief he said he would run the engines up before releasing brakes. He brought them up and then released brakes as he continued to bring up the rest of the power. He said he was going to bring them to maximum power. I said, 'ok airspeed alive, crosschecked.' the airspeed was accelerating normally and at 70 KTS. I divided attention outside and inside. As I looked back in, the airspeed seemed to pause just above VMC around 84-85 KTS. At the same time, I felt the tires catching or slipping and thought we needed to abort takeoff. It was then we felt drag and a thump. I looked out and knew we were on the crossing runway. As we hit the other side of the runway, I said abort. Then PIC said abort and he stopped the aircraft straight ahead. He feathered and then shut down the engines and called on unicom saying we needed the plow out and a tug, to bring the plane in. He then told me to call to cancel our flight plan, which I did. He got out to walk around. He noticed the flap and propellers. The plows were out clearing by the front of the aircraft. One of the drivers said he would give us a ride back. As we stood there, the driver said, 'it's ok. They should have told you,' a few times, repeating himself. The FBO owner and the line person came out on the tug and we rode back to the FBO. The FBO owner said he didn't hear my radio announcement because he was not in the lobby. Several people then said normal operating procedure was to plow only runway 7. The line person showed us a NOTAM a couple hours later and said the supervisor is supposed to give him NOTAMS on a specific checklist and to have him initial it. There were no other NOTAMS or operatingprocs posted. No runways were specifically mentioned earlier. A local pilot had entered as we were paying the bill and he made comments about the WX and then noted the windsock saying something like, 'it's runway 7, now 10, no, 25.' because the wind was light and the sock was shifting. No one at that time said anything about a favoring runway. The FBO owner and the line person were both in the room. There was no indication of runway closures. The plows and FBO owner were on the ramp and saw us taxi out. The plows all have radios, but some drivers may have been out of the truck as we took off. Everyone uses the same frequency 123.0. The frequency is not continually monitored because the line person is in and out of the room all day. Nowhere were these so-called 'operating procedures' printed. We followed procedures to the book. The airport had plowed both runways earlier but failed to clean up the rows made at the crossing of the 2 runways. We estimated the first bank we hit at almost 2 ft and the other side about 1 ft high. This did not result in an incident or accident. The engines were sent to pratt for inspection and the propellers were twisted and bent. Also the inboard section of flap was bent from the snow. It was impossible for us to see shadows or contours due to the overcast and time of day. We now back taxi the entire runway if no traffic has used it. Even when taxiing it is hard to see snow drifts. They cause major damage that may be hard to recognize on engine instrumentation. I believe pilots need to be aware of the damage that even light dry snow can do and take all precautions to know the conditions they are flying into and out of. FBO operators need to know they are the lifeline (eyes) for us on the ground and we have to trust their word, so braking action reports and runway conditions are extremely important to us!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A KING AIR WAS DAMAGED DURING TKOF ROLL WHEN IT HIT SNOW BANKS ON THE RWY. THE ARPT PERSONNEL HAD FAILED TO CLEAN UP THE SNOW PLOW ROWS THAT WERE CREATED DURING THE CLRING OF THE 2 XING RWYS.

Narrative: I, THE SIC, AND THE PIC WERE IN WATERTOWN (ART), NY, WITH A KING AIR 100. IN PREPARATION FOR FLT, THE ACFT WAS TOPPED OFF AND IN THE HANGAR AT THE FBO. I LOADED THE COOLER, ETC, AS THE PIC CALLED FSS. THE PIC ASKED THE FBO OWNER TO CHK WITH THE PLOWS BECAUSE THE ARPT WAS CLOSED WITH A 10 MIN PRIOR PERMISSION REQUIRED (PPR). I STOOD IN THE LOBBY WHILE THE FBO OWNER CALLED UP THE PLOWS ON THE RADIO. WHEN HE CALLED THEM UP HE SAID, 'WE HAVE A KING AIR HERE THAT WILL BE DEPARTING IN 10-15 MINS.' THEY REPLIED BACK THAT THEY WOULD NOT PLOW THE RWYS. THERE WAS 2 INCHES THAT THEY WOULD LEAVE IN CASE OF FREEZING RAIN, BUT IT WOULDN'T BE A PROB. THE OWNER SAID AGAIN WE WOULD BE LEAVING IN 10 MINS. THE RESPONSE WAS, WE'LL BE WATCHING AND BE CLR OF THE RWYS. WE HAD BEEN AT THE FBO SINCE MORNING AND THE PLOWS HAD BEEN BUSY. SNOW WAS FALLING MOST OF THE DAY. I HAD HEARD A FEW TIMES THAT THEY WOULD LEAVE 2 INCHES ON THE RWYS. NO OTHER ACFT HAD BEEN AROUND. AS WE SETTLED THE BILL, THE PLOWS WERE OUT CLRING THE RAMP AND TXWY. THE PIC AND I HEADED OUT AND BOARDED THE ACFT IN THE HANGAR. THERE WERE LIGHT FLURRIES. VISIBILITY WAS GOOD -- THERE WAS NO PROB SEEING ACROSS THE FIELD. IT WAS OVCST. THE FBO OWNER AND A LINE PERSON PULLED THE ACFT OUT ONTO THE PLOWED TXWY AND AWAY FROM THE HANGAR. THE PIC GOT THE OK TO START, MEANING THE HANGAR DOOR WAS DOWN. WE WENT THROUGH REGULAR STARTING PROCS. WITH THE ENGS STARTED, I CALLED ON #1 RADIO, 123.0 'WATERTOWN, KING AIR IS TAXIING TO RWY 10,' AND WE BEGAN TO TAXI. I THEN CALLED ON #2 RADIO TO GET THE CLRNC, MONITORING BOTH RADIOS. I HAD TO REPEAT THE REQUEST AND THEN THE DEST ONE MORE TIME. MEANWHILE, PIC WAS TAXIING OUT ON TXWY B. (HE HAD PULLED OUT THE APCH PLATES AND REVIEWED THEM AND HE SAID WE WILL TAKE OFF ON THE LONGEST RWY. I SAID THEY ARE JUST ABOUT THE SAME. HE SAID WE WILL USE RWY 10.) AS I WAS ON THE RADIO I LOOKED OUTSIDE WATCHING THE GND AND NOTING OUR BRAKING AND TURNING ABILITIES. IT SEEMED OK. IT WAS HARD TO SEE HOW DEEP THE TXWY WAS BECAUSE THERE WERE NO TRACKS. CLRNC CALLED BACK WITH OUR CLRNC AND VOID TIMES. I READ IT BACK AND SAID WE ARE DEPARTING NOW. THE PIC HAD BACK TAXIED ON RWY 10. IT IS APPROX 1500 FT FROM TXWY B TO THE BEGINNING OF THE RWY. I AM UNSURE OF WHAT RADIO CALLS WERE MADE BACK TO UNICOM. I BELIEVE ONE OF US SAID WE WERE BACK TAXIING. THEN THE LINE PERSON SAID HAVE A GOOD FLT AND ANOTHER COMMENT. IN THE PIC'S BRIEF HE SAID HE WOULD RUN THE ENGS UP BEFORE RELEASING BRAKES. HE BROUGHT THEM UP AND THEN RELEASED BRAKES AS HE CONTINUED TO BRING UP THE REST OF THE PWR. HE SAID HE WAS GOING TO BRING THEM TO MAX PWR. I SAID, 'OK AIRSPD ALIVE, XCHKED.' THE AIRSPD WAS ACCELERATING NORMALLY AND AT 70 KTS. I DIVIDED ATTN OUTSIDE AND INSIDE. AS I LOOKED BACK IN, THE AIRSPD SEEMED TO PAUSE JUST ABOVE VMC AROUND 84-85 KTS. AT THE SAME TIME, I FELT THE TIRES CATCHING OR SLIPPING AND THOUGHT WE NEEDED TO ABORT TKOF. IT WAS THEN WE FELT DRAG AND A THUMP. I LOOKED OUT AND KNEW WE WERE ON THE XING RWY. AS WE HIT THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RWY, I SAID ABORT. THEN PIC SAID ABORT AND HE STOPPED THE ACFT STRAIGHT AHEAD. HE FEATHERED AND THEN SHUT DOWN THE ENGS AND CALLED ON UNICOM SAYING WE NEEDED THE PLOW OUT AND A TUG, TO BRING THE PLANE IN. HE THEN TOLD ME TO CALL TO CANCEL OUR FLT PLAN, WHICH I DID. HE GOT OUT TO WALK AROUND. HE NOTICED THE FLAP AND PROPS. THE PLOWS WERE OUT CLRING BY THE FRONT OF THE ACFT. ONE OF THE DRIVERS SAID HE WOULD GIVE US A RIDE BACK. AS WE STOOD THERE, THE DRIVER SAID, 'IT'S OK. THEY SHOULD HAVE TOLD YOU,' A FEW TIMES, REPEATING HIMSELF. THE FBO OWNER AND THE LINE PERSON CAME OUT ON THE TUG AND WE RODE BACK TO THE FBO. THE FBO OWNER SAID HE DIDN'T HEAR MY RADIO ANNOUNCEMENT BECAUSE HE WAS NOT IN THE LOBBY. SEVERAL PEOPLE THEN SAID NORMAL OPERATING PROC WAS TO PLOW ONLY RWY 7. THE LINE PERSON SHOWED US A NOTAM A COUPLE HRS LATER AND SAID THE SUPVR IS SUPPOSED TO GIVE HIM NOTAMS ON A SPECIFIC CHKLIST AND TO HAVE HIM INITIAL IT. THERE WERE NO OTHER NOTAMS OR OPERATINGPROCS POSTED. NO RWYS WERE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED EARLIER. A LCL PLT HAD ENTERED AS WE WERE PAYING THE BILL AND HE MADE COMMENTS ABOUT THE WX AND THEN NOTED THE WINDSOCK SAYING SOMETHING LIKE, 'IT'S RWY 7, NOW 10, NO, 25.' BECAUSE THE WIND WAS LIGHT AND THE SOCK WAS SHIFTING. NO ONE AT THAT TIME SAID ANYTHING ABOUT A FAVORING RWY. THE FBO OWNER AND THE LINE PERSON WERE BOTH IN THE ROOM. THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF RWY CLOSURES. THE PLOWS AND FBO OWNER WERE ON THE RAMP AND SAW US TAXI OUT. THE PLOWS ALL HAVE RADIOS, BUT SOME DRIVERS MAY HAVE BEEN OUT OF THE TRUCK AS WE TOOK OFF. EVERYONE USES THE SAME FREQ 123.0. THE FREQ IS NOT CONTINUALLY MONITORED BECAUSE THE LINE PERSON IS IN AND OUT OF THE ROOM ALL DAY. NOWHERE WERE THESE SO-CALLED 'OPERATING PROCS' PRINTED. WE FOLLOWED PROCS TO THE BOOK. THE ARPT HAD PLOWED BOTH RWYS EARLIER BUT FAILED TO CLEAN UP THE ROWS MADE AT THE XING OF THE 2 RWYS. WE ESTIMATED THE FIRST BANK WE HIT AT ALMOST 2 FT AND THE OTHER SIDE ABOUT 1 FT HIGH. THIS DID NOT RESULT IN AN INCIDENT OR ACCIDENT. THE ENGS WERE SENT TO PRATT FOR INSPECTION AND THE PROPS WERE TWISTED AND BENT. ALSO THE INBOARD SECTION OF FLAP WAS BENT FROM THE SNOW. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO SEE SHADOWS OR CONTOURS DUE TO THE OVCST AND TIME OF DAY. WE NOW BACK TAXI THE ENTIRE RWY IF NO TFC HAS USED IT. EVEN WHEN TAXIING IT IS HARD TO SEE SNOW DRIFTS. THEY CAUSE MAJOR DAMAGE THAT MAY BE HARD TO RECOGNIZE ON ENG INSTRUMENTATION. I BELIEVE PLTS NEED TO BE AWARE OF THE DAMAGE THAT EVEN LIGHT DRY SNOW CAN DO AND TAKE ALL PRECAUTIONS TO KNOW THE CONDITIONS THEY ARE FLYING INTO AND OUT OF. FBO OPERATORS NEED TO KNOW THEY ARE THE LIFELINE (EYES) FOR US ON THE GND AND WE HAVE TO TRUST THEIR WORD, SO BRAKING ACTION RPTS AND RWY CONDITIONS ARE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO US!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.