Narrative:

We were on a normal passenger flight from isp, ny, to phl, PA. For approach we were cleared for the ILS runway 27R. When cleared, we contacted the tower. Phl tower advised us that there was traffic to land behind us on runway 35 and cleared us to land. At approximately 2 mi from landing we spotted the BE02 on final approach to runway 35. Several seconds later, we heard the tower advise the departing traffic on runway 27L to cancel takeoff clearance. This brought a false sense of security, feeling the tower was aware of the developing situation. We continued to monitor separation to determine whether or not it would be maintained. At approximately 1/2 mi final, and no indication that phl tower or the BE02 was aware of the developing conflict, we determined the separation would be lost at the intersection of runway 27R and runway 35. I initiated a go around at the runway threshold feeling this was the only alternative. Approximately 1 second after adding power, phl tower then instructed the BE02 to execute a go around. I immediately discontinued our go around to pass beneath the other aircraft. That aircraft passed approximately 100 ft overhead at the intersection of runway 27R and runway 35 at phl. I contacted the phl tower by telephone and was advised the local controller's attention was split between the arrs on runway 27R and runway 35 and the departing traffic on runway 27L. At no time during the approach sequence did I hear phl tower advise the BE02 of the situation, ie, the adjust speed or flight path. I also didn't hear the BE02 indicate whether or not he had our aircraft visually. I feel the situation was allowed to continue to the point of becoming extremely dangerous. The first officer and I discussed the event and determined that we should have queried the controller as soon as we began to have doubts of its outcome and will do so in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MDT ON APCH BEGINS MISSED APCH WHEN IT IS OBVIOUS THERE WILL BE A CONFLICT WITH BE02 ON INTERSECTING RWY. TWR CALLS GAR FOR OTHER ACFT.

Narrative: WE WERE ON A NORMAL PAX FLT FROM ISP, NY, TO PHL, PA. FOR APCH WE WERE CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 27R. WHEN CLRED, WE CONTACTED THE TWR. PHL TWR ADVISED US THAT THERE WAS TFC TO LAND BEHIND US ON RWY 35 AND CLRED US TO LAND. AT APPROX 2 MI FROM LNDG WE SPOTTED THE BE02 ON FINAL APCH TO RWY 35. SEVERAL SECONDS LATER, WE HEARD THE TWR ADVISE THE DEPARTING TFC ON RWY 27L TO CANCEL TKOF CLRNC. THIS BROUGHT A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY, FEELING THE TWR WAS AWARE OF THE DEVELOPING SIT. WE CONTINUED TO MONITOR SEPARATION TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT IT WOULD BE MAINTAINED. AT APPROX 1/2 MI FINAL, AND NO INDICATION THAT PHL TWR OR THE BE02 WAS AWARE OF THE DEVELOPING CONFLICT, WE DETERMINED THE SEPARATION WOULD BE LOST AT THE INTXN OF RWY 27R AND RWY 35. I INITIATED A GAR AT THE RWY THRESHOLD FEELING THIS WAS THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE. APPROX 1 SECOND AFTER ADDING PWR, PHL TWR THEN INSTRUCTED THE BE02 TO EXECUTE A GAR. I IMMEDIATELY DISCONTINUED OUR GAR TO PASS BENEATH THE OTHER ACFT. THAT ACFT PASSED APPROX 100 FT OVERHEAD AT THE INTXN OF RWY 27R AND RWY 35 AT PHL. I CONTACTED THE PHL TWR BY TELEPHONE AND WAS ADVISED THE LCL CTLR'S ATTN WAS SPLIT BTWN THE ARRS ON RWY 27R AND RWY 35 AND THE DEPARTING TFC ON RWY 27L. AT NO TIME DURING THE APCH SEQUENCE DID I HEAR PHL TWR ADVISE THE BE02 OF THE SIT, IE, THE ADJUST SPD OR FLT PATH. I ALSO DIDN'T HEAR THE BE02 INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT HE HAD OUR ACFT VISUALLY. I FEEL THE SIT WAS ALLOWED TO CONTINUE TO THE POINT OF BECOMING EXTREMELY DANGEROUS. THE FO AND I DISCUSSED THE EVENT AND DETERMINED THAT WE SHOULD HAVE QUERIED THE CTLR AS SOON AS WE BEGAN TO HAVE DOUBTS OF ITS OUTCOME AND WILL DO SO IN THE FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.