Narrative:

The crew first flew this ship on a flight which left lga early in the morning, en route to bos. Subsequently, the crew flew flts from bos-lga, lga-bos, and bos-lga, all on this ship. On these 4 flts there was no malfunction or hint of malfunction of any aircraft system. All system and engines operated normally. On the next flight from lga-bos, engine pushback, start, taxi, and line-up for takeoff and all associated checklists were normal. Upon takeoff clearance the captain, who was flying the aircraft, advanced power to normal rated takeoff thrust. The engines responded normally. At 50 KTS, a loud grinding noise and severe vibration throughout the aircraft suddenly appeared. The takeoff was immediately aborted, however, the captain elected not to use reverse thrust due to the slow speed of the aircraft and it was obvious the problem was with one of the engines and reverse thrust might have worsened whatever was wrong. The first officer reported the abort to lga tower. The engine instruments at this point gave no indication of which engine was malfunctioning but the vibration continued. The captain then shut down #2 engine for the following reasons: 1) vibration could be felt in its throttle, 2) #2 engine, if failing, posed the greatest threat to the aircraft in general since it is an integral part of the airframe. The captain was prepared to shut down all the engines if necessary since none were needed at this point anyhow. The so performed the engine shutdown checklist initial action items. The first officer called lga tower and asked them to roll the fire equipment. They complied. The aircraft cleared runway 13 at exit lima and stopped on that taxiway. The captain thought the aircraft was clear of the runway but apparently the tail was a few ft over the clear line. The captain noticed that #1 engine egt read 560 degrees C. This was extremely high for an idling engine and #1 engine start lever was placed in cutoff. The so adjusted power loads to accommodate the second shutdown. The vibration stopped. Lga tower reported some smoke coming from #1 engine and the captain then pulled the fire T handle and discharged the fire bottle and transferred the bottle xfer switch. The second bottle was not used. The so made a short PA telling the passenger that we had experienced an engine failure and that we would shortly be surrounded by emergency equipment as a normal precaution. He told them to stay in their seats until further instructions. They complied. The tower reported no further smoke and the emergency equipment then arrived. The total time that transpired up to this point in the narrative was about 4 mins. The actions taken by the crew up to this point were reflective of emergency action items. From this point on the crew had time to discuss what to do next. It is the captain's view that he received extremely solid counsel from both the first officer and the so during this next phase of the flight. The lga fire marshall reported on the interphone that there was no fire on any part of the aircraft. The tower then asked if we could taxi ahead about 10 ft to clear the runway and we were able to comply although there was no nosewheel steering due to a loss of all 'a' system hydraulic pressure. Now our options were to be towed back to the gate, to restart #2 engine and taxi back, or to start the APU to obtain 'a' system hydraulic pressure and taxi back on 1 engine. We decided to be towed back to the gate since we had no idea what collateral damage might have been caused by the failed engine. We did not start the APU for the same reason. The captain made a PA explaining that we were going to be towed back and that we would all xfer to another aircraft and fly to boston. All the passenger to the crew's knowledge transferred. The passenger seemed quite calm throughout this emergency and that is most probably due to the complete, timely and reassuring PA's made by the so. Before being towed back, however, a company mechanic inspected the APU and informed us that there was no damage so we started the APU, it operated normally, so we shut down #3 engine. The taxi back was uneventful. The next flight to boston was also uneventful. As it turns out there was collateral damage to #2 engine. Although this crew departed lga before a formal report was filed, we did noticethe mechanics examining what appeared to be a 3 inch hole in the mid-bottom section of the 'south' duct. It is the captain's opinion that this crew handled this emergency event in the most efficient way possible and that by taking the time to confer about what to do next, this emergency was not compounded in any way. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: aircraft vibration was so severe following the abort that the flight crew experienced difficulty reading the instruments. The flight crew shut down the #2 engine which eliminated some of the vibration and it was at this time that they could see the rising egt on the #1 engine. The reporter was later told that the #1 engine had been damaged and one of its turbine blades had been thrown into the tail section, causing a hole in the 'south' duct of the #2 engine. The #2 engine was not damaged, nor was there any extensive damage (cable damage) to the tail section. The captain states that if this had happened during rotation, they would have been in the buildings. He is concerned that there are more engine failures today and that this fact deserves attention because of operations such as this one, where shorter runways are involved. He believes that in the rush to board people on these airplanes (up to full capacity and requiring full power), any profit is being eaten up by engine failures -- there do not seem to be any engine failures during alternate power use.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE FLC OF A B727-200 EXPERIENCED SEVERE VIBRATION DURING TKOF. THE TKOF WAS ABORTED AND THE #2 ENG WAS SHUT DOWN AS A RESULT OF VIBRATION FELT IN THE THROTTLE. AFTER THE ACFT TAXIED CLR OF THE RWY, THE FLC SHUT DOWN THE #1 ENG DUE TO RISING EGT. AFTER THE ATCT CTLR RPTED SMOKE COMING FROM THE #1 ENG, THE CAPT DISCHARGED THE FIRE BOTTLE. TKOF ABORTED.

Narrative: THE CREW FIRST FLEW THIS SHIP ON A FLT WHICH LEFT LGA EARLY IN THE MORNING, ENRTE TO BOS. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE CREW FLEW FLTS FROM BOS-LGA, LGA-BOS, AND BOS-LGA, ALL ON THIS SHIP. ON THESE 4 FLTS THERE WAS NO MALFUNCTION OR HINT OF MALFUNCTION OF ANY ACFT SYS. ALL SYS AND ENGS OPERATED NORMALLY. ON THE NEXT FLT FROM LGA-BOS, ENG PUSHBACK, START, TAXI, AND LINE-UP FOR TKOF AND ALL ASSOCIATED CHKLISTS WERE NORMAL. UPON TKOF CLRNC THE CAPT, WHO WAS FLYING THE ACFT, ADVANCED PWR TO NORMAL RATED TKOF THRUST. THE ENGS RESPONDED NORMALLY. AT 50 KTS, A LOUD GRINDING NOISE AND SEVERE VIBRATION THROUGHOUT THE ACFT SUDDENLY APPEARED. THE TKOF WAS IMMEDIATELY ABORTED, HOWEVER, THE CAPT ELECTED NOT TO USE REVERSE THRUST DUE TO THE SLOW SPD OF THE ACFT AND IT WAS OBVIOUS THE PROB WAS WITH ONE OF THE ENGS AND REVERSE THRUST MIGHT HAVE WORSENED WHATEVER WAS WRONG. THE FO RPTED THE ABORT TO LGA TWR. THE ENG INSTS AT THIS POINT GAVE NO INDICATION OF WHICH ENG WAS MALFUNCTIONING BUT THE VIBRATION CONTINUED. THE CAPT THEN SHUT DOWN #2 ENG FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 1) VIBRATION COULD BE FELT IN ITS THROTTLE, 2) #2 ENG, IF FAILING, POSED THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE ACFT IN GENERAL SINCE IT IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE AIRFRAME. THE CAPT WAS PREPARED TO SHUT DOWN ALL THE ENGS IF NECESSARY SINCE NONE WERE NEEDED AT THIS POINT ANYHOW. THE SO PERFORMED THE ENG SHUTDOWN CHKLIST INITIAL ACTION ITEMS. THE FO CALLED LGA TWR AND ASKED THEM TO ROLL THE FIRE EQUIP. THEY COMPLIED. THE ACFT CLRED RWY 13 AT EXIT LIMA AND STOPPED ON THAT TXWY. THE CAPT THOUGHT THE ACFT WAS CLR OF THE RWY BUT APPARENTLY THE TAIL WAS A FEW FT OVER THE CLR LINE. THE CAPT NOTICED THAT #1 ENG EGT READ 560 DEGS C. THIS WAS EXTREMELY HIGH FOR AN IDLING ENG AND #1 ENG START LEVER WAS PLACED IN CUTOFF. THE SO ADJUSTED PWR LOADS TO ACCOMMODATE THE SECOND SHUTDOWN. THE VIBRATION STOPPED. LGA TWR RPTED SOME SMOKE COMING FROM #1 ENG AND THE CAPT THEN PULLED THE FIRE T HANDLE AND DISCHARGED THE FIRE BOTTLE AND TRANSFERRED THE BOTTLE XFER SWITCH. THE SECOND BOTTLE WAS NOT USED. THE SO MADE A SHORT PA TELLING THE PAX THAT WE HAD EXPERIENCED AN ENG FAILURE AND THAT WE WOULD SHORTLY BE SURROUNDED BY EMER EQUIP AS A NORMAL PRECAUTION. HE TOLD THEM TO STAY IN THEIR SEATS UNTIL FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. THEY COMPLIED. THE TWR RPTED NO FURTHER SMOKE AND THE EMER EQUIP THEN ARRIVED. THE TOTAL TIME THAT TRANSPIRED UP TO THIS POINT IN THE NARRATIVE WAS ABOUT 4 MINS. THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE CREW UP TO THIS POINT WERE REFLECTIVE OF EMER ACTION ITEMS. FROM THIS POINT ON THE CREW HAD TIME TO DISCUSS WHAT TO DO NEXT. IT IS THE CAPT'S VIEW THAT HE RECEIVED EXTREMELY SOLID COUNSEL FROM BOTH THE FO AND THE SO DURING THIS NEXT PHASE OF THE FLT. THE LGA FIRE MARSHALL RPTED ON THE INTERPHONE THAT THERE WAS NO FIRE ON ANY PART OF THE ACFT. THE TWR THEN ASKED IF WE COULD TAXI AHEAD ABOUT 10 FT TO CLR THE RWY AND WE WERE ABLE TO COMPLY ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO NOSEWHEEL STEERING DUE TO A LOSS OF ALL 'A' SYS HYD PRESSURE. NOW OUR OPTIONS WERE TO BE TOWED BACK TO THE GATE, TO RESTART #2 ENG AND TAXI BACK, OR TO START THE APU TO OBTAIN 'A' SYS HYD PRESSURE AND TAXI BACK ON 1 ENG. WE DECIDED TO BE TOWED BACK TO THE GATE SINCE WE HAD NO IDEA WHAT COLLATERAL DAMAGE MIGHT HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY THE FAILED ENG. WE DID NOT START THE APU FOR THE SAME REASON. THE CAPT MADE A PA EXPLAINING THAT WE WERE GOING TO BE TOWED BACK AND THAT WE WOULD ALL XFER TO ANOTHER ACFT AND FLY TO BOSTON. ALL THE PAX TO THE CREW'S KNOWLEDGE TRANSFERRED. THE PAX SEEMED QUITE CALM THROUGHOUT THIS EMER AND THAT IS MOST PROBABLY DUE TO THE COMPLETE, TIMELY AND REASSURING PA'S MADE BY THE SO. BEFORE BEING TOWED BACK, HOWEVER, A COMPANY MECH INSPECTED THE APU AND INFORMED US THAT THERE WAS NO DAMAGE SO WE STARTED THE APU, IT OPERATED NORMALLY, SO WE SHUT DOWN #3 ENG. THE TAXI BACK WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE NEXT FLT TO BOSTON WAS ALSO UNEVENTFUL. AS IT TURNS OUT THERE WAS COLLATERAL DAMAGE TO #2 ENG. ALTHOUGH THIS CREW DEPARTED LGA BEFORE A FORMAL RPT WAS FILED, WE DID NOTICETHE MECHS EXAMINING WHAT APPEARED TO BE A 3 INCH HOLE IN THE MID-BOTTOM SECTION OF THE 'S' DUCT. IT IS THE CAPT'S OPINION THAT THIS CREW HANDLED THIS EMER EVENT IN THE MOST EFFICIENT WAY POSSIBLE AND THAT BY TAKING THE TIME TO CONFER ABOUT WHAT TO DO NEXT, THIS EMER WAS NOT COMPOUNDED IN ANY WAY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: ACFT VIBRATION WAS SO SEVERE FOLLOWING THE ABORT THAT THE FLC EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTY READING THE INSTS. THE FLC SHUT DOWN THE #2 ENG WHICH ELIMINATED SOME OF THE VIBRATION AND IT WAS AT THIS TIME THAT THEY COULD SEE THE RISING EGT ON THE #1 ENG. THE RPTR WAS LATER TOLD THAT THE #1 ENG HAD BEEN DAMAGED AND ONE OF ITS TURBINE BLADES HAD BEEN THROWN INTO THE TAIL SECTION, CAUSING A HOLE IN THE 'S' DUCT OF THE #2 ENG. THE #2 ENG WAS NOT DAMAGED, NOR WAS THERE ANY EXTENSIVE DAMAGE (CABLE DAMAGE) TO THE TAIL SECTION. THE CAPT STATES THAT IF THIS HAD HAPPENED DURING ROTATION, THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE BUILDINGS. HE IS CONCERNED THAT THERE ARE MORE ENG FAILURES TODAY AND THAT THIS FACT DESERVES ATTN BECAUSE OF OPS SUCH AS THIS ONE, WHERE SHORTER RWYS ARE INVOLVED. HE BELIEVES THAT IN THE RUSH TO BOARD PEOPLE ON THESE AIRPLANES (UP TO FULL CAPACITY AND REQUIRING FULL PWR), ANY PROFIT IS BEING EATEN UP BY ENG FAILURES -- THERE DO NOT SEEM TO BE ANY ENG FAILURES DURING ALTERNATE PWR USE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.