Narrative:

I was terminating a long flight to fcm, eden prairie, mn. The tower had just opened at xx:00 am and I was the first landing traffic. About 20 mi out I heard the tower operator come on and say that they were open. I reported 12 mi out with their ATIS information and understood the tower to tell me to report 2 mi out for a left base to runway 27L. The conditions were extreme in some ways. Temperature was about minus 20 degrees and the airport, including runway, had clear ice and some snow. As I was about to report on base, the tower operator saw me and cleared me to land. I then turned final about 1 mi out and the controller cleared a beech starship onto the runway for departure. He taxied into position and held there. The controller then told me to go around. In the last 50 mi of my flight my engine had missed about 3 or 4 times, and I felt that attempting a go around at that time and from my low altitude and the other flight conditions, would be unsafe. So I told the controller that I felt that I was committed to land. At that time the starship departed. The controller then told me to land at my own discretion. By the time I crossed the threshold the starship had cleared the end of the runway and had reached about 500 ft of altitude. Hindsight becomes 20/20 on these things. I did not declare an emergency because I did not feel that I had one. I did not mention the engine missing because the problem resolved itself. Maybe I should have. I felt that by having to apply full power for a go around could create a safety hazard to myself and the airplane. I was called out to the control tower that afternoon for an 'educational meeting' with tower controller, the supervisor, ATC controller, the tower operator and FAA inspector of the FAA (msp FSDO). We discussed the events and I feel I definitely learned some information which was both informative and helpful. The meeting concluded when they said that they felt I understood my responsibilities and there would be nothing further done on the matter. ATC cannot and should not be questioned on each of their decisions. At the same time, they have to treat all aircraft with respect and care and not just let a bigger, more expensive aircraft take precedence when there is nothing to be gained and quite a bit to lose. We were the only 2 aircraft around then. There was no line waiting to get out. If I had applied full power and attempted a go around and my engine had coughed and quit, a very grave accident could have occurred. Naturally, if I had hit the departing aircraft a serious accident could have occurred. None of these things happened. And my education was greatly increased.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF AN SMA SEL REFUSED TWR'S REQUEST TO GAR DUE TO A MISFIRING INTERMITTENT ENG PROB, RESULTING IN NO MAJOR CONFLICT WITH ANOTHER ACFT TAKING OFF.

Narrative: I WAS TERMINATING A LONG FLT TO FCM, EDEN PRAIRIE, MN. THE TWR HAD JUST OPENED AT XX:00 AM AND I WAS THE FIRST LNDG TFC. ABOUT 20 MI OUT I HEARD THE TWR OPERATOR COME ON AND SAY THAT THEY WERE OPEN. I RPTED 12 MI OUT WITH THEIR ATIS INFO AND UNDERSTOOD THE TWR TO TELL ME TO RPT 2 MI OUT FOR A L BASE TO RWY 27L. THE CONDITIONS WERE EXTREME IN SOME WAYS. TEMP WAS ABOUT MINUS 20 DEGS AND THE ARPT, INCLUDING RWY, HAD CLR ICE AND SOME SNOW. AS I WAS ABOUT TO RPT ON BASE, THE TWR OPERATOR SAW ME AND CLRED ME TO LAND. I THEN TURNED FINAL ABOUT 1 MI OUT AND THE CTLR CLRED A BEECH STARSHIP ONTO THE RWY FOR DEP. HE TAXIED INTO POS AND HELD THERE. THE CTLR THEN TOLD ME TO GAR. IN THE LAST 50 MI OF MY FLT MY ENG HAD MISSED ABOUT 3 OR 4 TIMES, AND I FELT THAT ATTEMPTING A GAR AT THAT TIME AND FROM MY LOW ALT AND THE OTHER FLT CONDITIONS, WOULD BE UNSAFE. SO I TOLD THE CTLR THAT I FELT THAT I WAS COMMITTED TO LAND. AT THAT TIME THE STARSHIP DEPARTED. THE CTLR THEN TOLD ME TO LAND AT MY OWN DISCRETION. BY THE TIME I CROSSED THE THRESHOLD THE STARSHIP HAD CLRED THE END OF THE RWY AND HAD REACHED ABOUT 500 FT OF ALT. HINDSIGHT BECOMES 20/20 ON THESE THINGS. I DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER BECAUSE I DID NOT FEEL THAT I HAD ONE. I DID NOT MENTION THE ENG MISSING BECAUSE THE PROB RESOLVED ITSELF. MAYBE I SHOULD HAVE. I FELT THAT BY HAVING TO APPLY FULL PWR FOR A GAR COULD CREATE A SAFETY HAZARD TO MYSELF AND THE AIRPLANE. I WAS CALLED OUT TO THE CTL TWR THAT AFTERNOON FOR AN 'EDUCATIONAL MEETING' WITH TWR CTLR, THE SUPVR, ATC CTLR, THE TWR OPERATOR AND FAA INSPECTOR OF THE FAA (MSP FSDO). WE DISCUSSED THE EVENTS AND I FEEL I DEFINITELY LEARNED SOME INFO WHICH WAS BOTH INFORMATIVE AND HELPFUL. THE MEETING CONCLUDED WHEN THEY SAID THAT THEY FELT I UNDERSTOOD MY RESPONSIBILITIES AND THERE WOULD BE NOTHING FURTHER DONE ON THE MATTER. ATC CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT BE QUESTIONED ON EACH OF THEIR DECISIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY HAVE TO TREAT ALL ACFT WITH RESPECT AND CARE AND NOT JUST LET A BIGGER, MORE EXPENSIVE ACFT TAKE PRECEDENCE WHEN THERE IS NOTHING TO BE GAINED AND QUITE A BIT TO LOSE. WE WERE THE ONLY 2 ACFT AROUND THEN. THERE WAS NO LINE WAITING TO GET OUT. IF I HAD APPLIED FULL PWR AND ATTEMPTED A GAR AND MY ENG HAD COUGHED AND QUIT, A VERY GRAVE ACCIDENT COULD HAVE OCCURRED. NATURALLY, IF I HAD HIT THE DEPARTING ACFT A SERIOUS ACCIDENT COULD HAVE OCCURRED. NONE OF THESE THINGS HAPPENED. AND MY EDUCATION WAS GREATLY INCREASED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.