Narrative:

B727 on final for runway 23L was sent around because our aircraft, BE1900D, was stopped with approximately 6 ft of the aircraft beyond the hold short line. The aircraft was stopped with the brakes set. There was more than sufficient separation for a safe landing. Factors contributing to the incident. 1) both crew members were on their first trip after IOE so more attention than usual was being placed on checklist items inside the cockpit. Additionally, neither crew member had ever flown out of the cleveland hub. Solution: our company policy is not to allow high minimums captain or first officer's to be paired for trips. The company never follows this and creates a stressful unsafe environment in the cockpit. Prohibit by far pairing of high minimums first officer's and capts. 2) the taxi route to runway 23L crosses runway 28 at cleveland. In fact our aircraft was holding short of runway 23L on runway 28. The markings of this procedure are confusing and it is very difficult to discern what the controllers intend for you to do in this area. When you are flying a low cockpit aircraft all of the intersecting runways and txwys blend together in this area. During my 5 day stay in the cleveland area there were 5 incidents of pilots being confused at this area of the airport. One such incident resulted in an MD80 departing the runway after aborting a takeoff on the wrong runway. Solution: stop using runway 28 as a hold short point for runway 23L. 3) snow obscured runway and taxiway markings, including the hold short lines.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE RPTR FAILED TO HOLD SHORT OF THE HOLD LINE AT CLE RWY 23L. THE TWR TOLD A B727 ON FINAL TO GAR. THE SIGNS AND MARKINGS IN THIS AREA AT CLE ARE CONFUSING FOR PLTS. SNOW OBSCURED RWY AND TXWY MARKINGS. THE FLC BOTH WERE ON THEIR FIRST TRIP AFTER COMPLETING THEIR TRAINING.

Narrative: B727 ON FINAL FOR RWY 23L WAS SENT AROUND BECAUSE OUR ACFT, BE1900D, WAS STOPPED WITH APPROX 6 FT OF THE ACFT BEYOND THE HOLD SHORT LINE. THE ACFT WAS STOPPED WITH THE BRAKES SET. THERE WAS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT SEPARATION FOR A SAFE LNDG. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE INCIDENT. 1) BOTH CREW MEMBERS WERE ON THEIR FIRST TRIP AFTER IOE SO MORE ATTN THAN USUAL WAS BEING PLACED ON CHKLIST ITEMS INSIDE THE COCKPIT. ADDITIONALLY, NEITHER CREW MEMBER HAD EVER FLOWN OUT OF THE CLEVELAND HUB. SOLUTION: OUR COMPANY POLICY IS NOT TO ALLOW HIGH MINIMUMS CAPT OR FO'S TO BE PAIRED FOR TRIPS. THE COMPANY NEVER FOLLOWS THIS AND CREATES A STRESSFUL UNSAFE ENVIRONMENT IN THE COCKPIT. PROHIBIT BY FAR PAIRING OF HIGH MINIMUMS FO'S AND CAPTS. 2) THE TAXI RTE TO RWY 23L CROSSES RWY 28 AT CLEVELAND. IN FACT OUR ACFT WAS HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 23L ON RWY 28. THE MARKINGS OF THIS PROC ARE CONFUSING AND IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO DISCERN WHAT THE CTLRS INTEND FOR YOU TO DO IN THIS AREA. WHEN YOU ARE FLYING A LOW COCKPIT ACFT ALL OF THE INTERSECTING RWYS AND TXWYS BLEND TOGETHER IN THIS AREA. DURING MY 5 DAY STAY IN THE CLEVELAND AREA THERE WERE 5 INCIDENTS OF PLTS BEING CONFUSED AT THIS AREA OF THE ARPT. ONE SUCH INCIDENT RESULTED IN AN MD80 DEPARTING THE RWY AFTER ABORTING A TKOF ON THE WRONG RWY. SOLUTION: STOP USING RWY 28 AS A HOLD SHORT POINT FOR RWY 23L. 3) SNOW OBSCURED RWY AND TXWY MARKINGS, INCLUDING THE HOLD SHORT LINES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.