37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 327245 |
Time | |
Date | 199602 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : mia |
State Reference | FL |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B727 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : preflight |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : second officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial pilot : cfi pilot : atp pilot : flight engineer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 5000 flight time type : 1000 |
ASRS Report | 327245 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : less severe other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : unable |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
B727 fuel shutoff switches on flight engineer's panel should be guarded with plastic switch covers. Currently there is only semi-circular metal guards that only protect against accidental horizontal forces (the switches close vertically). I make this suggestion because I have first hand knowledge of logbook covers and checklists moving the switches to close on the ground (engines not running) and second hand knowledge of 3 times the switches were moved manually by mistake (the operator meant to turn the fuel transfer knobs or shut off the fuel boost pumps). One incident resulted in engine shutdown shortly following takeoff, one incident in cruise and the final incident occurred while parked at the gate awaiting the jet bridge and ground supplied power. Also was told by a check airman that he accidently shut off all 3 switches on a simulator check ride, but was able to get the switches back to the open position before anyone noticed. The subsequent engine failures were attributed to a simulator anomaly. The switches are never closed in normal operation, only during engine fire, severe damage, or precautionary engine shutdown.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: THE RPTR FEELS THE FUEL SHUTOFF SWITCHES SHOULD BE GUARDED BETTER TO ASSURE THEY DO NOT GET INADVERTENTLY SHUT OFF.
Narrative: B727 FUEL SHUTOFF SWITCHES ON FE'S PANEL SHOULD BE GUARDED WITH PLASTIC SWITCH COVERS. CURRENTLY THERE IS ONLY SEMI-CIRCULAR METAL GUARDS THAT ONLY PROTECT AGAINST ACCIDENTAL HORIZ FORCES (THE SWITCHES CLOSE VERTLY). I MAKE THIS SUGGESTION BECAUSE I HAVE FIRST HAND KNOWLEDGE OF LOGBOOK COVERS AND CHKLISTS MOVING THE SWITCHES TO CLOSE ON THE GND (ENGS NOT RUNNING) AND SECOND HAND KNOWLEDGE OF 3 TIMES THE SWITCHES WERE MOVED MANUALLY BY MISTAKE (THE OPERATOR MEANT TO TURN THE FUEL TRANSFER KNOBS OR SHUT OFF THE FUEL BOOST PUMPS). ONE INCIDENT RESULTED IN ENG SHUTDOWN SHORTLY FOLLOWING TKOF, ONE INCIDENT IN CRUISE AND THE FINAL INCIDENT OCCURRED WHILE PARKED AT THE GATE AWAITING THE JET BRIDGE AND GND SUPPLIED PWR. ALSO WAS TOLD BY A CHK AIRMAN THAT HE ACCIDENTLY SHUT OFF ALL 3 SWITCHES ON A SIMULATOR CHK RIDE, BUT WAS ABLE TO GET THE SWITCHES BACK TO THE OPEN POS BEFORE ANYONE NOTICED. THE SUBSEQUENT ENG FAILURES WERE ATTRIBUTED TO A SIMULATOR ANOMALY. THE SWITCHES ARE NEVER CLOSED IN NORMAL OP, ONLY DURING ENG FIRE, SEVERE DAMAGE, OR PRECAUTIONARY ENG SHUTDOWN.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.