Narrative:

B727 fuel shutoff switches on flight engineer's panel should be guarded with plastic switch covers. Currently there is only semi-circular metal guards that only protect against accidental horizontal forces (the switches close vertically). I make this suggestion because I have first hand knowledge of logbook covers and checklists moving the switches to close on the ground (engines not running) and second hand knowledge of 3 times the switches were moved manually by mistake (the operator meant to turn the fuel transfer knobs or shut off the fuel boost pumps). One incident resulted in engine shutdown shortly following takeoff, one incident in cruise and the final incident occurred while parked at the gate awaiting the jet bridge and ground supplied power. Also was told by a check airman that he accidently shut off all 3 switches on a simulator check ride, but was able to get the switches back to the open position before anyone noticed. The subsequent engine failures were attributed to a simulator anomaly. The switches are never closed in normal operation, only during engine fire, severe damage, or precautionary engine shutdown.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE RPTR FEELS THE FUEL SHUTOFF SWITCHES SHOULD BE GUARDED BETTER TO ASSURE THEY DO NOT GET INADVERTENTLY SHUT OFF.

Narrative: B727 FUEL SHUTOFF SWITCHES ON FE'S PANEL SHOULD BE GUARDED WITH PLASTIC SWITCH COVERS. CURRENTLY THERE IS ONLY SEMI-CIRCULAR METAL GUARDS THAT ONLY PROTECT AGAINST ACCIDENTAL HORIZ FORCES (THE SWITCHES CLOSE VERTLY). I MAKE THIS SUGGESTION BECAUSE I HAVE FIRST HAND KNOWLEDGE OF LOGBOOK COVERS AND CHKLISTS MOVING THE SWITCHES TO CLOSE ON THE GND (ENGS NOT RUNNING) AND SECOND HAND KNOWLEDGE OF 3 TIMES THE SWITCHES WERE MOVED MANUALLY BY MISTAKE (THE OPERATOR MEANT TO TURN THE FUEL TRANSFER KNOBS OR SHUT OFF THE FUEL BOOST PUMPS). ONE INCIDENT RESULTED IN ENG SHUTDOWN SHORTLY FOLLOWING TKOF, ONE INCIDENT IN CRUISE AND THE FINAL INCIDENT OCCURRED WHILE PARKED AT THE GATE AWAITING THE JET BRIDGE AND GND SUPPLIED PWR. ALSO WAS TOLD BY A CHK AIRMAN THAT HE ACCIDENTLY SHUT OFF ALL 3 SWITCHES ON A SIMULATOR CHK RIDE, BUT WAS ABLE TO GET THE SWITCHES BACK TO THE OPEN POS BEFORE ANYONE NOTICED. THE SUBSEQUENT ENG FAILURES WERE ATTRIBUTED TO A SIMULATOR ANOMALY. THE SWITCHES ARE NEVER CLOSED IN NORMAL OP, ONLY DURING ENG FIRE, SEVERE DAMAGE, OR PRECAUTIONARY ENG SHUTDOWN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.