Narrative:

We departed atlanta to gulfport with 2730 pounds of fuel. We had originally fueled to 2800 pounds and I had planned to leave the gate with 2700 pounds. I thought this fuel load would allow 30 passenger and most of the bags. When I originally fueled I wasn't planning an alternate. After going inside and reviewing the WX, I saw it would be wise to list an alternate. The sa was 7000 ft overcast 3 mi visibility in fog, temperature 62 degrees and dewpoint 58 degrees. The contracted company's terminal forecast didn't require one, but the NWS did. We listed mobile. I would have liked to carry more fuel, but we had the passenger boarding and 50 bags, which I was not counting on. We had to take 6 bags off and 1 standby passenger even with 2730 pounds on the fuel. Gulfport was still VFR. Still, I had a gut feeling about the WX holding. At 45 mi north of montgomery, we called anniston FSS and rechked the gulfport and mobile WX. It was 3500 ft broken, 5 mi visibility in haze at gulfport, and mobile was still VFR too. We started our descent into gpt. Gpt ATIS was 3500 ft broken, 5 mi in haze, temperature 58 degrees, and dewpoint 57 degrees, calm winds and altimeter 30.07. It was the same WX we had from anniston. Then, another commuter made a PIREP to gpt approach, 'we broke out at 400 ft AGL and visibility is getting low at the approach end.' at this point we were getting vectored for the ILS runway 14 at gpt. We quickly picked up mob WX -- it had dropped down to 1 1/2 mi visibility temperature 55 degrees, and dewpoint 55 degrees, winds calm. Both my destination and alternate were dropping quickly. I told the first officer to try and contact flight control via company radio and I flew the aircraft on autoplt, talking to gpt approach. I told them we had 1100 pounds of fuel on board (about 1 hour of fuel), and if we didn't make it into gpt we would have to divert to an alternate immediately. I asked him if he had any ideas on an alternate. He mentioned jan and msy. Msy was the better of the two, WX wise and distance wise. The first officer was unable to contact flight control. He was now back in the loop. Gpt approach advisedmsy WX was 3500 ft scattered and 7 mi visibility, and also gpt WX was dropping rapidly. On base leg vector to ILS, the fuel filter light on the left engine came on. I knew what the poh said because I'd had this problem before. Not wanting to get caught in the minor malfunction syndrome, we continued to monitor the left engine parameters and concentrate on the approach along with rapidly changing WX conditions. ATC advised that new gpt WX was sky obscured and 100 ft overcast, 6000 ft RVR and decreasing. ATC had no chance to update the ATIS. We got to decision ht and the first officer called approach lights in sight. I transitioned from inside the aircraft to visual, but saw nothing. We were at 100 ft AGL, about 2 seconds went by, and I tried to see the runway lights and orient myself to land but could not get any visual cues. I remember thinking to myself that most tactical errors are made by the captain while he is the PF and 80 percent of those involve continuing an unstabilized approach. It was just a straight forward judgement to go around. However, I also remember thinking to myself 'get this airplane on the ground -- you only have 800 pounds of fuel.' we went around. As soon as we leveled off at the missed approach altitude of 2000 ft, we configured the aircraft and I had to make a command decision. Mob WX was going down quickly and gpt was already down. I had around 800 pounds of fuel. My objective was to get the aircraft on the ground quickly and safely. Company station alternates became secondary considerations. Best chance was msy. We told gpt approach that we wanted to proceed direct to new orleans and he gave us a vector. We declared a minimum fuel status. Between gpt and msy we had a heavy workload in a short time. Numerous communications, including company, passenger, flight attendant, and ATC, kept us very busy. The first officer didn't have approach plates for msy (as an first officer), and situational awareness was critical because we were going into an unfamiliar airport at 2300 ft. We also had checklists to complete and set up for the approach. Msy WX held and we landed. Within the next 30 mins,the local WX then went down from 7 mi to 6000 ft RVR and eventually even lower. The CRM principles I learned were a great help here. Communications, workload management, minor malfunctions, distrs, fatigue and utilization of all available resources were all involved. I was very aware of them. Gpt approach did a great job in providing up to the min WX and alternate plans of action and priority handling. WX was changing rapidly and they are to be commended. The first officer did a great job using very standardized procedures and good communication. Contracting airline's operations in msy were very helpful. There was good coordination of fuel, passenger service, and accommodations. They provided a friendly, professional atmosphere. I was pleasantly surprised. Fuel remaining at landing was between 550-600 pounds. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: aircraft was an E120.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN E120 CAPT WAS PROVIDED CONFLICTING WX INFO REGARDING VFR STATUS FOR THE ARR TIME, AT THE DEST ARPT. THE FLC DEPARTED ON A FLT WITHOUT ADDITIONAL ALTERNATE FUEL AND HAD TO MISS THE APCH AT THE DEST, IN DETERIORATING WX CONDITIONS. FUEL CRITICAL STATUS WAS DECLARED AND THE FLC WAS FORCED TO DIVERT TO AN ARPT THAT WAS NOT SERVED BY THEIR COMPANY.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED ATLANTA TO GULFPORT WITH 2730 LBS OF FUEL. WE HAD ORIGINALLY FUELED TO 2800 LBS AND I HAD PLANNED TO LEAVE THE GATE WITH 2700 LBS. I THOUGHT THIS FUEL LOAD WOULD ALLOW 30 PAX AND MOST OF THE BAGS. WHEN I ORIGINALLY FUELED I WASN'T PLANNING AN ALTERNATE. AFTER GOING INSIDE AND REVIEWING THE WX, I SAW IT WOULD BE WISE TO LIST AN ALTERNATE. THE SA WAS 7000 FT OVCST 3 MI VISIBILITY IN FOG, TEMP 62 DEGS AND DEWPOINT 58 DEGS. THE CONTRACTED COMPANY'S TERMINAL FORECAST DIDN'T REQUIRE ONE, BUT THE NWS DID. WE LISTED MOBILE. I WOULD HAVE LIKED TO CARRY MORE FUEL, BUT WE HAD THE PAX BOARDING AND 50 BAGS, WHICH I WAS NOT COUNTING ON. WE HAD TO TAKE 6 BAGS OFF AND 1 STANDBY PAX EVEN WITH 2730 LBS ON THE FUEL. GULFPORT WAS STILL VFR. STILL, I HAD A GUT FEELING ABOUT THE WX HOLDING. AT 45 MI N OF MONTGOMERY, WE CALLED ANNISTON FSS AND RECHKED THE GULFPORT AND MOBILE WX. IT WAS 3500 FT BROKEN, 5 MI VISIBILITY IN HAZE AT GULFPORT, AND MOBILE WAS STILL VFR TOO. WE STARTED OUR DSCNT INTO GPT. GPT ATIS WAS 3500 FT BROKEN, 5 MI IN HAZE, TEMP 58 DEGS, AND DEWPOINT 57 DEGS, CALM WINDS AND ALTIMETER 30.07. IT WAS THE SAME WX WE HAD FROM ANNISTON. THEN, ANOTHER COMMUTER MADE A PIREP TO GPT APCH, 'WE BROKE OUT AT 400 FT AGL AND VISIBILITY IS GETTING LOW AT THE APCH END.' AT THIS POINT WE WERE GETTING VECTORED FOR THE ILS RWY 14 AT GPT. WE QUICKLY PICKED UP MOB WX -- IT HAD DROPPED DOWN TO 1 1/2 MI VISIBILITY TEMP 55 DEGS, AND DEWPOINT 55 DEGS, WINDS CALM. BOTH MY DEST AND ALTERNATE WERE DROPPING QUICKLY. I TOLD THE FO TO TRY AND CONTACT FLT CTL VIA COMPANY RADIO AND I FLEW THE ACFT ON AUTOPLT, TALKING TO GPT APCH. I TOLD THEM WE HAD 1100 LBS OF FUEL ON BOARD (ABOUT 1 HR OF FUEL), AND IF WE DIDN'T MAKE IT INTO GPT WE WOULD HAVE TO DIVERT TO AN ALTERNATE IMMEDIATELY. I ASKED HIM IF HE HAD ANY IDEAS ON AN ALTERNATE. HE MENTIONED JAN AND MSY. MSY WAS THE BETTER OF THE TWO, WX WISE AND DISTANCE WISE. THE FO WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT FLT CTL. HE WAS NOW BACK IN THE LOOP. GPT APCH ADVISEDMSY WX WAS 3500 FT SCATTERED AND 7 MI VISIBILITY, AND ALSO GPT WX WAS DROPPING RAPIDLY. ON BASE LEG VECTOR TO ILS, THE FUEL FILTER LIGHT ON THE L ENG CAME ON. I KNEW WHAT THE POH SAID BECAUSE I'D HAD THIS PROB BEFORE. NOT WANTING TO GET CAUGHT IN THE MINOR MALFUNCTION SYNDROME, WE CONTINUED TO MONITOR THE L ENG PARAMETERS AND CONCENTRATE ON THE APCH ALONG WITH RAPIDLY CHANGING WX CONDITIONS. ATC ADVISED THAT NEW GPT WX WAS SKY OBSCURED AND 100 FT OVCST, 6000 FT RVR AND DECREASING. ATC HAD NO CHANCE TO UPDATE THE ATIS. WE GOT TO DECISION HT AND THE FO CALLED APCH LIGHTS IN SIGHT. I TRANSITIONED FROM INSIDE THE ACFT TO VISUAL, BUT SAW NOTHING. WE WERE AT 100 FT AGL, ABOUT 2 SECONDS WENT BY, AND I TRIED TO SEE THE RWY LIGHTS AND ORIENT MYSELF TO LAND BUT COULD NOT GET ANY VISUAL CUES. I REMEMBER THINKING TO MYSELF THAT MOST TACTICAL ERRORS ARE MADE BY THE CAPT WHILE HE IS THE PF AND 80 PERCENT OF THOSE INVOLVE CONTINUING AN UNSTABILIZED APCH. IT WAS JUST A STRAIGHT FORWARD JUDGEMENT TO GAR. HOWEVER, I ALSO REMEMBER THINKING TO MYSELF 'GET THIS AIRPLANE ON THE GND -- YOU ONLY HAVE 800 LBS OF FUEL.' WE WENT AROUND. AS SOON AS WE LEVELED OFF AT THE MISSED APCH ALT OF 2000 FT, WE CONFIGURED THE ACFT AND I HAD TO MAKE A COMMAND DECISION. MOB WX WAS GOING DOWN QUICKLY AND GPT WAS ALREADY DOWN. I HAD AROUND 800 LBS OF FUEL. MY OBJECTIVE WAS TO GET THE ACFT ON THE GND QUICKLY AND SAFELY. COMPANY STATION ALTERNATES BECAME SECONDARY CONSIDERATIONS. BEST CHANCE WAS MSY. WE TOLD GPT APCH THAT WE WANTED TO PROCEED DIRECT TO NEW ORLEANS AND HE GAVE US A VECTOR. WE DECLARED A MINIMUM FUEL STATUS. BTWN GPT AND MSY WE HAD A HVY WORKLOAD IN A SHORT TIME. NUMEROUS COMS, INCLUDING COMPANY, PAX, FLT ATTENDANT, AND ATC, KEPT US VERY BUSY. THE FO DIDN'T HAVE APCH PLATES FOR MSY (AS AN FO), AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WAS CRITICAL BECAUSE WE WERE GOING INTO AN UNFAMILIAR ARPT AT 2300 FT. WE ALSO HAD CHKLISTS TO COMPLETE AND SET UP FOR THE APCH. MSY WX HELD AND WE LANDED. WITHIN THE NEXT 30 MINS,THE LCL WX THEN WENT DOWN FROM 7 MI TO 6000 FT RVR AND EVENTUALLY EVEN LOWER. THE CRM PRINCIPLES I LEARNED WERE A GREAT HELP HERE. COMS, WORKLOAD MGMNT, MINOR MALFUNCTIONS, DISTRS, FATIGUE AND UTILIZATION OF ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES WERE ALL INVOLVED. I WAS VERY AWARE OF THEM. GPT APCH DID A GREAT JOB IN PROVIDING UP TO THE MIN WX AND ALTERNATE PLANS OF ACTION AND PRIORITY HANDLING. WX WAS CHANGING RAPIDLY AND THEY ARE TO BE COMMENDED. THE FO DID A GREAT JOB USING VERY STANDARDIZED PROCS AND GOOD COM. CONTRACTING AIRLINE'S OPS IN MSY WERE VERY HELPFUL. THERE WAS GOOD COORD OF FUEL, PAX SVC, AND ACCOMMODATIONS. THEY PROVIDED A FRIENDLY, PROFESSIONAL ATMOSPHERE. I WAS PLEASANTLY SURPRISED. FUEL REMAINING AT LNDG WAS BTWN 550-600 LBS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: ACFT WAS AN E120.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.