Narrative:

After landing at the cheyenne airport runway 26, the pilot of a cessna 182 requested a VOR check and was directed to proceed to the VOR check point located on taxiway C just south of the intersection with taxiway F. The flight, which was an IFR training flight under VFR rules, with another pilot B acting as a safety pilot, and 1 passenger, was cleared to the VOR check point, and proceeded to turn on to taxiway C after exiting the runway. The presence of a C141 starlifter was noted located further north on taxiway C, along with numerous personnel surrounding it, and a flatbed trailer/semi truck combination parked behind the aft loading ramp. After proceeding a short way, the safety pilot B drew to the attention of the pilot the personnel surrounding the C141 had begun to move and appeared to be starting to watch them intently. At the same time, calls from the tower on the ground frequency of 121.9 were heard to 'security' with no reply. Numerous repetitions of the call were made over the next several mins without response, while at the same time the personnel surrounding the C141 had begun to train small arms weapons on the cessna 182. Having reached the VOR check, the aircraft was aligned and being checked when personnel surrounding the C141 began withdrawing behind their vehicles and sighting carefully at the cessna and its occupants. No contact had been heard and continued calls from the tower were heard trying to raise security with more urgency. After several mins, a one sided conversation due to the security personnel using another frequency, was heard, with tower notifying the security personnel of the reason for the cessna and the location of the VOR check point. It was then observed that one of the security personnel signaled others by radio and visually of the conversations which had just occurred with the tower personnel. No observance was made until later of the lowering of weapons. Upon completion of the VOR check, the cessna and its occupants reversed their direction to sbound on taxiway C and taxied to the FBO located on the south side of the field. During the entire period, discussions of what was occurring continued between the pilot and the safety pilot and the consensus was that the best thing to do was absolutely nothing while all of this transpiring. Later on the same day, pilot B telephoned the warren AFB base commander's office, and talked with a duty officer in the hope of ascertaining who the officer in charge of the security detachment was, and to talk over what might be better communication procedures for the military while operating on a civilian airport. No response as of this date has been received. On friday, pilot B telephoned the united states military office, to further inquire as to how to contact the appropriate personnel, and was referred to 'a major C for complaints' at which time it was explained to the secretary on the telephone that no complaint was intended, instead only to discuss better communications in the future, and to prevent the extremely frightening situation which had occurred from happening again. A further reference by the secretary was made to the military offices located on cheyenne airport facilities, and a major there was informed of the situation, with a request that the officer in charge of the security detachment please call pilot B to discuss the situation. Again no response to this time was noted. A decision was then made to file a report to the NASA safety reporting system so as to disseminate information to the pilot population and to effect better procedures between military operations, civilian aircraft, and airport towers especially on civilian airports. In doing this, a call was made to cheyenne tower for the information contained in this report and a statement by tower personnel that D should be contacted, the tower manager, who was preparing a report on the incident. In responding to D's questions, the tower personnel asked 'if this was in regard to the incident on thursday in which some people nearly got shot?' to which an affirmative reply was stated. It is clear to this writer that a near tragedy could have been prevented by the security detachment using the frequencys which the airport and all aircraft operated on. Moreover, the observation of an aircraft approaching should have led the officer in charge of the security detachment to immediately try to contact the tower or the aircraft before raising weapons at a civilian aircraft and its occupants. To do this necessitates adequate briefing of the personnel involved as to frequencys, procedures, and physical locations of pertinent data on an airport by all concerned. Military radios should be capable of communicating and being heard by all when engaged in operations on a civilian airport. If this had been the case, the confusion which resulted from the lack of contact of the security detachment by the tower would have been possibly averted. Radio checks should be made by both security and tower personnel before commencing any kind of operations. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter is 'quite pleased' with the response that he has received to this problem. He has had callbacks from the military and the military offices at the airport, the ATCT manager, and the airport manager. Each one was very sympathetic with the reporter's situation. The reporter has not heard from anyone regarding: a violation or whoever hinted that he thought that the reporter might have been in the wrong. He is 'really impressed with the ATCT' that immediately sensed the problem and started to moderate a potential disaster. The C141 was stopped on a civilian taxiway, not on the military ramp, and was partially blocking 2 txwys. The reporter believes that no one was guarding the C141's radios or a normal VHF frequency. This made communication difficult to establish. A copy of this letter has been sent to a very large pilot's organization and the airport manager. The reporter insists that he was following the ATCT's instructions perfectly and no one has suggested otherwise.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN SMA, OPERATING LEGALLY, GOT CAUGHT IN A MIL SECURITY SIT.

Narrative: AFTER LNDG AT THE CHEYENNE ARPT RWY 26, THE PLT OF A CESSNA 182 REQUESTED A VOR CHK AND WAS DIRECTED TO PROCEED TO THE VOR CHK POINT LOCATED ON TXWY C JUST S OF THE INTXN WITH TXWY F. THE FLT, WHICH WAS AN IFR TRAINING FLT UNDER VFR RULES, WITH ANOTHER PLT B ACTING AS A SAFETY PLT, AND 1 PAX, WAS CLRED TO THE VOR CHK POINT, AND PROCEEDED TO TURN ON TO TXWY C AFTER EXITING THE RWY. THE PRESENCE OF A C141 STARLIFTER WAS NOTED LOCATED FURTHER N ON TXWY C, ALONG WITH NUMEROUS PERSONNEL SURROUNDING IT, AND A FLATBED TRAILER/SEMI TRUCK COMBINATION PARKED BEHIND THE AFT LOADING RAMP. AFTER PROCEEDING A SHORT WAY, THE SAFETY PLT B DREW TO THE ATTN OF THE PLT THE PERSONNEL SURROUNDING THE C141 HAD BEGUN TO MOVE AND APPEARED TO BE STARTING TO WATCH THEM INTENTLY. AT THE SAME TIME, CALLS FROM THE TWR ON THE GND FREQ OF 121.9 WERE HEARD TO 'SECURITY' WITH NO REPLY. NUMEROUS REPETITIONS OF THE CALL WERE MADE OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MINS WITHOUT RESPONSE, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME THE PERSONNEL SURROUNDING THE C141 HAD BEGUN TO TRAIN SMALL ARMS WEAPONS ON THE CESSNA 182. HAVING REACHED THE VOR CHK, THE ACFT WAS ALIGNED AND BEING CHKED WHEN PERSONNEL SURROUNDING THE C141 BEGAN WITHDRAWING BEHIND THEIR VEHICLES AND SIGHTING CAREFULLY AT THE CESSNA AND ITS OCCUPANTS. NO CONTACT HAD BEEN HEARD AND CONTINUED CALLS FROM THE TWR WERE HEARD TRYING TO RAISE SECURITY WITH MORE URGENCY. AFTER SEVERAL MINS, A ONE SIDED CONVERSATION DUE TO THE SECURITY PERSONNEL USING ANOTHER FREQ, WAS HEARD, WITH TWR NOTIFYING THE SECURITY PERSONNEL OF THE REASON FOR THE CESSNA AND THE LOCATION OF THE VOR CHK POINT. IT WAS THEN OBSERVED THAT ONE OF THE SECURITY PERSONNEL SIGNALED OTHERS BY RADIO AND VISUALLY OF THE CONVERSATIONS WHICH HAD JUST OCCURRED WITH THE TWR PERSONNEL. NO OBSERVANCE WAS MADE UNTIL LATER OF THE LOWERING OF WEAPONS. UPON COMPLETION OF THE VOR CHK, THE CESSNA AND ITS OCCUPANTS REVERSED THEIR DIRECTION TO SBOUND ON TXWY C AND TAXIED TO THE FBO LOCATED ON THE S SIDE OF THE FIELD. DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD, DISCUSSIONS OF WHAT WAS OCCURRING CONTINUED BTWN THE PLT AND THE SAFETY PLT AND THE CONSENSUS WAS THAT THE BEST THING TO DO WAS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING WHILE ALL OF THIS TRANSPIRING. LATER ON THE SAME DAY, PLT B TELEPHONED THE WARREN AFB BASE COMMANDER'S OFFICE, AND TALKED WITH A DUTY OFFICER IN THE HOPE OF ASCERTAINING WHO THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE SECURITY DETACHMENT WAS, AND TO TALK OVER WHAT MIGHT BE BETTER COM PROCS FOR THE MIL WHILE OPERATING ON A CIVILIAN ARPT. NO RESPONSE AS OF THIS DATE HAS BEEN RECEIVED. ON FRIDAY, PLT B TELEPHONED THE UNITED STATES MIL OFFICE, TO FURTHER INQUIRE AS TO HOW TO CONTACT THE APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL, AND WAS REFERRED TO 'A MAJOR C FOR COMPLAINTS' AT WHICH TIME IT WAS EXPLAINED TO THE SECRETARY ON THE TELEPHONE THAT NO COMPLAINT WAS INTENDED, INSTEAD ONLY TO DISCUSS BETTER COMS IN THE FUTURE, AND TO PREVENT THE EXTREMELY FRIGHTENING SIT WHICH HAD OCCURRED FROM HAPPENING AGAIN. A FURTHER REF BY THE SECRETARY WAS MADE TO THE MIL OFFICES LOCATED ON CHEYENNE ARPT FACILITIES, AND A MAJOR THERE WAS INFORMED OF THE SIT, WITH A REQUEST THAT THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE SECURITY DETACHMENT PLEASE CALL PLT B TO DISCUSS THE SIT. AGAIN NO RESPONSE TO THIS TIME WAS NOTED. A DECISION WAS THEN MADE TO FILE A RPT TO THE NASA SAFETY RPTING SYS SO AS TO DISSEMINATE INFO TO THE PLT POPULATION AND TO EFFECT BETTER PROCS BTWN MIL OPS, CIVILIAN ACFT, AND ARPT TWRS ESPECIALLY ON CIVILIAN ARPTS. IN DOING THIS, A CALL WAS MADE TO CHEYENNE TWR FOR THE INFO CONTAINED IN THIS RPT AND A STATEMENT BY TWR PERSONNEL THAT D SHOULD BE CONTACTED, THE TWR MGR, WHO WAS PREPARING A RPT ON THE INCIDENT. IN RESPONDING TO D'S QUESTIONS, THE TWR PERSONNEL ASKED 'IF THIS WAS IN REGARD TO THE INCIDENT ON THURSDAY IN WHICH SOME PEOPLE NEARLY GOT SHOT?' TO WHICH AN AFFIRMATIVE REPLY WAS STATED. IT IS CLR TO THIS WRITER THAT A NEAR TRAGEDY COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY THE SECURITY DETACHMENT USING THE FREQS WHICH THE ARPT AND ALL ACFT OPERATED ON. MOREOVER, THE OBSERVATION OF AN ACFT APCHING SHOULD HAVE LED THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE SECURITY DETACHMENT TO IMMEDIATELY TRY TO CONTACT THE TWR OR THE ACFT BEFORE RAISING WEAPONS AT A CIVILIAN ACFT AND ITS OCCUPANTS. TO DO THIS NECESSITATES ADEQUATE BRIEFING OF THE PERSONNEL INVOLVED AS TO FREQS, PROCS, AND PHYSICAL LOCATIONS OF PERTINENT DATA ON AN ARPT BY ALL CONCERNED. MIL RADIOS SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF COMMUNICATING AND BEING HEARD BY ALL WHEN ENGAGED IN OPS ON A CIVILIAN ARPT. IF THIS HAD BEEN THE CASE, THE CONFUSION WHICH RESULTED FROM THE LACK OF CONTACT OF THE SECURITY DETACHMENT BY THE TWR WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLY AVERTED. RADIO CHKS SHOULD BE MADE BY BOTH SECURITY AND TWR PERSONNEL BEFORE COMMENCING ANY KIND OF OPS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR IS 'QUITE PLEASED' WITH THE RESPONSE THAT HE HAS RECEIVED TO THIS PROB. HE HAS HAD CALLBACKS FROM THE MIL AND THE MIL OFFICES AT THE ARPT, THE ATCT MGR, AND THE ARPT MGR. EACH ONE WAS VERY SYMPATHETIC WITH THE RPTR'S SIT. THE RPTR HAS NOT HEARD FROM ANYONE REGARDING: A VIOLATION OR WHOEVER HINTED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE RPTR MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN THE WRONG. HE IS 'REALLY IMPRESSED WITH THE ATCT' THAT IMMEDIATELY SENSED THE PROB AND STARTED TO MODERATE A POTENTIAL DISASTER. THE C141 WAS STOPPED ON A CIVILIAN TXWY, NOT ON THE MIL RAMP, AND WAS PARTIALLY BLOCKING 2 TXWYS. THE RPTR BELIEVES THAT NO ONE WAS GUARDING THE C141'S RADIOS OR A NORMAL VHF FREQ. THIS MADE COM DIFFICULT TO ESTABLISH. A COPY OF THIS LETTER HAS BEEN SENT TO A VERY LARGE PLT'S ORGANIZATION AND THE ARPT MGR. THE RPTR INSISTS THAT HE WAS FOLLOWING THE ATCT'S INSTRUCTIONS PERFECTLY AND NO ONE HAS SUGGESTED OTHERWISE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.